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ЦЕНТР ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИИ

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«Социологическое обозрение» — академический рецензируемый журнал теоретических, эмпирических и исторических исследований в социальных науках. Журнал выходит четыре раза в год. В каждом выпуске публикуются оригинальные исследовательские статьи, обзоры и рефераты, переводы современных и классических работ в социологии, политической теории и социальной философии.

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Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудитории, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

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Contents

Содержание

IN MEMORIAM

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Carl Schmitt, Erik Peterson, and Giorgio Agamben: the war for Christian political theology

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Power and its sources have always been essential questions for political philosophy. One of the ways to legitimize power is political theology which was discussed at length during the XX century. The proposed paper considers Christian political theology as a project constructed by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben. Both thinkers defended their models and criticized their main "enemy", Erik Peterson. While Schmitt believed in Christian legitimization for the status quo and Agamben dreamed of the coming community without an identity, Peterson argued that Christian doctrines (Trinity, Parousia, etc.) deem any political authority meaningless. A majority of researchers scrutinized and critically evaluated the level of theoretical arguments of the aforementioned thinkers. On the contrary, we have chosen to analyze all of the key and referenced theologians (Paul, Eusebius, Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) to prove that Schmitt-Agamben's notion of Christian political theology is controversial. Like Peterson with Eusebius, Schmitt and Agamben employed loose translations in trying to integrate their ideas (sovereignty, absolute anarchy) into original Christian texts. The detailed analysis allows the paper to deliver a kind of negative conclusion that Christian political theology has no ground in the sources these thinkers have credited. Nevertheless, our research calls for a new round of discussion: was this critique caused by Christian sources selected inappropriately by Schmitt, Peterson, and Agamben, or by the essential incompatibility between Christianity and political theology? Polemics might get a new "positive" horizon with the help of this question.

Keywords: κατέχον, Christian political theology, μοναρχία, felicitas, δύναμις, gloria, Roman Empire, civitas Dei

A conversation no one has participated in

Heinrich Meier once made a crucial claim regarding the discussion between Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. His idea was that its participants were in fact absentees arguing with each other (ein Dialog unter Abwesenden) (2013: 17). This framework could be applied as well to our present rivals, Carl Schmitt, Erik Peterson, and Giorgio Agamben. During the XX century, they deliberated on the very notion of Christian political theology *in absentia*. Political theology is an old concept designating the task common to both the church and political authorities to establish and legitimize their power by resorting to divine symbolism. In the field of political philosophy, the notion received its second birth after the ground-breaking XX-century debates over the role the Christian church played in power relations.

In the 1920s', Schmitt claimed political theology to be a transmission of theological concepts into politics (2005: 46), and counter-revolutionary conservatives allied their

efforts with the Catholic Church[1] (1996a: 21; Schmitt, 2005: 30; 36–37)[2]. Exploiting the authority of Paul, the German thinker presented the universal history as the history of theologically and eschatologically legitimized political power. His former friend Peterson argued that no political theology is compatible with Christianity. His tenets were the Cappadocian dogma of the sole rule of God transcending every terrestrial monarchy, and Augustine's rejection of providential political legitimization favored by Schmitt. In Peterson's view, the orthodox Trinity exposed by Gregory of Nazianzus contradicts the idea of the monarchial king ruling as the Son of God (2011b: 103). Peterson demonstrated how Eusebius and Augustine represent heretical political theology and orthodox Christian eschatology respectively (105). According to Peterson, Christianity is a religion of personal relationship with God, free of politics and governmental concerns. After Peterson's death, Schmitt wrote, in his second volume of *Political Theology,* that empire was inseparable from the Roman church (2006: 59) since it produced sovereignty ordained by the divine authority. Schmitt confronted other Peterson's arguments as well: Gregory of Nazianzus' doctrine of the Trinity contains an internal war between the Son and the Father (2008: 122–123) unless some kind of universal monarchy is established. According to Schmitt, the Eusebius-Augustine distinction is biased and used by Peterson without proper justification (100). Thirty years after Schmitt's response, Agamben, inspired by Metz and Taubes, endeavored to mediate the discussion by providing a third opinion on the issue. Trying to prove that Peterson did not comprehend the true economic meaning of the Trinity (2011: 7; 16; 73), Agamben constructed an anarchic Pauline eschatology against Schmitt's right-wing ambitions (2005: 110–111). Agamben combined most of the early Christian sources available to propose the distinction: Paul, following Jesus, became a proponent of the destruction of the Roman Empire and an adviser to the coming community, while the church fathers came to a collaboration with political authorities by establishing a Christian "economy" of salvation and the Trinity (125-126).

The general amount of literature on the controversy between Schmitt and Peterson[3] is so enormous that even the titles and the authors' names overlap. The list given in the footnote cannot contain all the works[4]. In reviewing the texts, I was surprised to find

1. For Schmitt, Catholicism is a political phenomenon directed at liberalism (Filippov, 2016: 504).

2. As Schmitt later argued, the state always takes the function of the restrainer (κατέχον) by holding the Antichrist back and keeping the peace inside (2006: 60).

3. Aleksey Yarkeev, in his recently published article, thoroughly introduced the debate between Schmitt and Peterson. He has extensively outlined all the key arguments put forth by Schmitt and Peterson. I refer to his article if one looks for a detailed paraphrase of the contest instead of my brief exposition (2022). There is however a clear implicit bias (206–208) in this exposition whose impartiality Schmitt would have questioned. Yarkeev tells nothing of his acquaintance with studies dedicated to Patristic political theology published after Schmitt's thesis of 1922: Varro's theology greatly differs from Bakunin's or Schmitt's concepts (200), "Eusebius' political theology" has been widely doubted (2022: 198; 206). Geréby claims that Schmitt did not comprehend the Trinity contrary to monotheism, a fact totally ignored by Yarkeev, who cites Geréby's article (193; 199; 201). Agamben attacking both Schmitt and Peterson could not, I suppose, be used as a neutral reference here (194; 197; 207–208). In the course of further research, I will try to shed some light on all of the topics mentioned above.

4. Böckenförde points to the importance of faith in Schmitt (1981: 234) while Momigliano shows that no pagan Roman political theology existed to confront Christianity (1986: 296). Nichtweiß thinks that Peterson

that no research devoted to Agamben intervening in the discussion has been conducted. In addition, not much effort has been made to investigate the usage of ancient sources besides Eusebius and Gregory of Nazianzus over which philosophers argue. Most of the scholars were occupied with arguments, ignoring the insights the study of the original references may have given.

I plan to examine Paul, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine in the paper. I am trying to make the case that political theology is hardly applicable to any of these Christian thinkers exploited by modern authors. Consequently, I will analyze Agamben's and Schmitt's approaches toward Paul; then, by exploring the Peterson-Schmitt-Agamben polemics I will estimate the implicit role Gregory of Nyssa played. Finally, I would like to present the contribution to the debate that is hidden in the study of Augustine. The methodology I am going to implement will be based on an analysis of the historical and philological aspects of the problem through understanding ancient sources in their original form. This will be indicated by bracketed essential notions. I will sometimes make a technical translation into English if necessary, and outline the discrepancies in which some facets of modern interpretation appear. In avoiding the debates themselves and pure theoretical arguments, I limit myself to the question as to how the textual evidence scrutinized below affects the representation of Christian political theology in the 20th century.

Agamben and Schmitt versus Paul

Taubes explains the background required to understand Agamben[5]. In his lectures, the professor tells the audience how Paul declares war against Nero in the sense of political theology (2003: 16), proclaims *nomos* as an equivalent to the emperor, and professes a new community to come (24). Lacking any evidence for the first two assertions, Taubes exaggerates Paul's political activism: I have not identified any explicit attack on Nero expressed by Paul[6]. Agamben was so moved by Taubes' brief remarks to consider military

was not opposing any political theology; rather he fought against the appropriation of religion by politics (1992). Metz distances himself from Schmitt through establishing left revolutionary political theology as Barth did in the 1920's (1997). Assmann inverts Schmitt's formula: religion is secularized politics (2000: 20), Geréby proves that Schmitt, who belonged to the Latin Catholic tradition, confused monotheism with the doctrine of the Trinity (2008: 21). Hollerich provides the context of the Weimar Republic (2008: 7–10), Britt stresses how Agamben substitutes Schmitt with Benjamin (2010: 278), Kahn links political theology with faith-decision scheme and sociological methodology (2011: 105–108), Meier locates friend-enemy division within theological area (2011: 90), Taubes brings historical and personal evidence of Peterson warning Schmitt (2013: 27–28), Vatter demonstrates Schmitt's reliance on Hobbes' theory of representation (2014: 259–260), Schmidt refutes Agamben's claim of Peterson's antisemitism (014: 201–202), and Roberts attempts to dissolve the strong tie established between theology and Schmitt's theory (2015: 471–473). Allen attempts to criticize Peterson relying on Church Fathers (2017: 11) while Passos elucidates the nature of martyrdom described by Peterson in a sharp opposition to Schmitt's sovereign (2018: 488; 507–508).

5. Taubes was deeply influenced by Metz's 1997 leftist political theology project (163–164).

6. Taubes seems to misread Paul through Revelation where John couples the empire with the Antichrist (1 Jn. 2:22). I use a conventional reference style citing a New International Version translation supplemented by necessary Greek terms as derived from the Koine Greek New Testament edition. Both Bibles are included in the reference list. It is only in the 10th footnote do I mention Septuagint and Vulgate to highlight a linguistic shift.

and revolutionary power as analogous to his 'coming community' concept (Filauri, 2020: 125), allegedly found in Paul, that he dedicated *The Time That Remains* to Taubes and cited him throughout. In fact, some authors have regarded Agamben's scope as insufficient due to his bias toward Benjamin and Schmitt (Britt, 2010: 265)[7]. I will reconstruct and validate the whole-body argument Agamben implements by analyzing Paul and juxtaposing him with Schmitt's approach. Agamben's main take on Paul rejects identity politics[8]. However, Paul does not prescribe what Agamben regards to be necessary, namely, living without identity ("not not-Jew" (2005: 51)). Agamben devotes a considerable amount of time to elaborating the passage "ὡς μὴ" that he discovered in the speech of Paul delivered in Corinth:

> "To live in the Messiah signifies the expropriation of each and every juridical-factical property (circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; man/woman) under the form of the as not. This expropriation does not, however, found a new identity; the "new creature" is none other than the use and messianic vocation of the old (2 Cor. 5:17: "So if anyone is in the Messiah, the new creature [kaine ktisis]: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new")" (27).

For Agamben, one lives in a messianic condition after the crucifixion when all identities turn meaningless. In the epistle, Paul makes a very different point. The main topic of the 7th section of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians is marriage. Generally, Paul says everyone should turn their attention toward themselves because in that case they can find a gift from God (χάρισμα ἐκ Θεοῦ (1 Cor. 7:7)). Therefore, mundane deeds should be replaced by spiritual riches and the search for God within. Though Paul makes several suggestions regarding preserving virginity or fidelity to a marriage partner, he still puts an accent on the indifference to all of these rules: "Are you pledged to a woman? Do not (μὴ) seek to be released. Are you free from such a commitment? Do not (μὴ) look for a wife" (1 Cor. 7:27).

If someone follows Pauline Christ in the first century, they should not change their worldly attitudes: who has been engaged — do not divorce; who has been virgin — do not marry. While Agamben emphasizes the annihilation of identities, Paul stresses the senseless nature of society and the earthly experience. The phrase "Ὡς μὴ" in Rom. 7:30–31 implies the feeling of void accompanying the Second Coming. Hereby, weeping (κλαίοντες) means the same as not-weeping, while using (χρώμενοι) stands for the same as non-using (1 Cor. 7:30–31). Though Paul does not destroy all identities, he destroys the actual roles that existed before Christ's emergence. Agamben stops at 7:31 after which the main positive message begins: "I would like (Θέλω) you to be free from concern (ἀμερίμνους) (1 Cor. 7:32)". The motto of St. Paul's depicts a state of mind that guarantees

7. Even more recent evidence has been presented demonstrating that Agamben misused Paul's texts without proper justification (Kniss, 2019: 209).

8. Cimino stresses Paul's notion of *simul*, stating that Agamben's project is destined to fail within Europe (2017: 297).

love of God without attachment (ἀμερίμνους)[9] to this world (κόσμος). People have a radically new identity within Christ's body and within the Christian community: our love aimed at the divine (ἀγάπη) should be the primary object of care (μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ Κυρίου (1 Cor. 7:34)). After all, Paul's approval of virginity rather than marriage directs us to the second problem that Agamben's reading conceals. Paul states that he instructs us how to avoid distraction (παραβάσεως (1 Cor. 7:36)), that is, worldly identities look valuable in terms of a comfortable union with God. I believe this fact constitutes the reason why Agamben does not mention the beginning of the "ὡς μὴ" construction: "I wish that all (πάντας) of you (ἀνθρώπους) were as (ὡς) I am (ἐμαυτόν) (1 Cor. 7:7)".

As the reader might remember, this quote comes from Agamben's interpretation of the Second Epistle to Corinthians in which he defends non-identity politics. However, Paul never proves the old (ἀρχαῖα) to be the same value as the new (καινά) (2 Cor. 5:17). Paul speaks not about messianic time itself: rather, he points to the baptism and the process of expiation that Christ has made possible. Agamben's trick is performed through the substitution of 'Christ' for 'Messiah'. It would not be a mistake in the case of Septuagint when its authors coined the Greek term "χριστός" for the Hebrew notion "mašíaḥ".[10] Paul refers to Christ as the divine son who has redeemed us from primordial sin (προπατορική αμαρτία). Like in the Epistle to Romans, Paul reputes that, in Adam, humanity dies, while in Christ mankind lives (1 Cor. 15:20–22). In the passage above, the apostle approves a possibility of eternal life through the crucifixion[11]. Moreover, in Christ, newborns are living in an open possibility of salvation and just behavior (1 Cor 5:18). As master of the ecclesia, Paul outlines the path that leads one to discover God in the depths of his heart (καρδία) (2 Cor. 5:11). A scheme of likeness is neither non-identity nor revolution. Christians should wait and remain the same (μείνῃ) until the Lord comes: they avoid disturbance to achieve spiritual harmony with God (1 Cor. 7:40). What is the relationship between the indifference and the imperial rule made obligatory by Roman laws? Agamben affirms Paul to be a passive trespasser of the law who contrasts "ἀγάπη" with "νόμος" (2005: 98). Despite the law being deactivated, humans should not break it. In a letter to the Romans, Paul preaches;

> "Everyone (Πᾶσα ψυχὴ) must submit (ὑποτασσέσθω) himself to the governing (ὑπερεχούσαις) authorities (ἐξουσίαις), for there is no authority (ἐξουσία) except that which God (Θεοῦ) has established. The authorities that exist (οὖσαι) have been established (τεταγμέναι) by God" (Rom. 13:1).

9. Antonello demonstrates Agamben's profound error in *The Kingdom and The Glory* concerning the distinction "ζωή" and "βίος" within a Christian frame. Paul speaks of "ζωή" as a pure life free from any mundane attachment, and prefers it to "βίος", the people who do not know God (Antonello, 2019: 176).

10. Septuagint: Isa. 45 (Οὕτως λέγει κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῷ χριστῷ μου Κύρῳ), Ex. 40 (καὶ λήμψῃ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῦ χρίσματος καὶ χρίσεις τὴν σκηνὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἁγιάσεις αὐτὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ σκεύη αὐτῆς), and 1 Kgs. 1 chapter (καὶ χρισάτω αὐτὸν ἐκεῖ Σαδωκ ὁ ἱερεὺς καὶ Ναθαν ὁ προφήτης εἰς βασιλέα ἐπὶ Ισραηλ, καὶ σαλπίσατε κερατίνῃ καὶ ἐρεῖτε Ζήτω ὁ βασιλεὺς Σαλωμων). However, the substitution was not rendered in the Latin Vulgate based on the Hebrew original text (the last quote in Latin: et unguat eum ibi Sadoc sacerdos et Nathan propheta in regem super Israhel et canetis bucina atque dicetis vivat rex Salomon).

11. E.g., in 2 Cor 5:18, Paul speaks of reconciliation (καταλλάξαντος) with God by means of Christ's sacrifice.

Strangely enough, Agamben avoids this tough passage during his seminars (Welborn, 2015: xv)[12]. Some readers suppose that Paul prescribes subjugation to the authorities[13], whilst Agamben lacks knowledge of the anarchist reading of the fragment with which he could easily unite his interpretation[14]. In the end, Beatrice proves the fragment was a forgery made in the 2nd century. Paul uses the words "Πᾶσα ψυχὴ" in the context of celestial powers designated by "ἐξουσία" (angels), which is why the clergy combined the fragment on angels with that on tax paying (Rom. 13:6–7) to achieve practical aims (Beatrice, 1973). A brief historical and hermeneutical excursion will help to acknowledge Paul's main concern, that of salvation and spiritual angelic forces. Agamben's next line of argument leads to his reconsideration of the notion of community. He views it as a remnant free of any identity or predicate, even of any measure. (2005: 57)[15]. The epistle is also read by Schmitt. He supposes Jews to be excluded from salvation for their sins and disobedience,[16] and finds the state of exception separating Christians from non-Christians in Paul's corpus (2006: 59). Despite Taubes' victory in the dispute, I could only add Paul's phrase that "all Israel will be saved" (Rom. 11:26). Schmitt writes:

> "Its [Christian republic's] nomos was determined by the following divisions. The soil (Der Boden) of non-Christian, heathen peoples was Christian missionary territory (christliches Missionsgebiet); it could be allocated by papal order to a Christian prince (Fürsten) for a Christian mission" (1950: 27; 2006: 58).

One might think Schmitt is describing the Middle Ages, not Paul's epistles. He assumes that "the attachment to Rome signified a continuation of ancient orientations adopted by the Christian faith" (2006: 59), and traces ancient Christianity back to Paul and the *katechon* (60). Schmitt writes that Christians built their identity on the division of imperial soil to demarcate the land they could convert. While Schmitt may be right concerning the late papal agenda, he misreads the foundation of exception. Paul wants to profess Christianity even to Spain (Badiou, 2003: 28) while simultaneously unbinding

12. We should do justice to Agamben, however: he mentions this passage once implying that obedience to political authority will be abolished "ὡς μὴ" by the deactivation (2005: 33). Defending his theory via equivocation, he still does not connect this passage with the Epistle to Corinthians, the fact that Welborn may read as an attempt to bypass the issue. Agamben's attitude is symptomatic of a leftist interpretation of Paul: Jennings finds it sufficient to say "that Paul is using terms that are perfectly recognizable in Roman political discourse" and "Paul's readers in Rome would recognize in these words the very words of the authorities" (2013: 32, 191). Such commonsense arguments only hinder Paul's intentions.

13. Theologians like Irenaeus (Adversus haereses), Origen (Contra Celsum), St. Thomas (1949; Marey, 2016) and contemporary scholars such as Clinton Morrison (2009) or Ernst Käsemann (1994) believe "ἐξουσίαις" to stand for earthly authorities as a part of the Christian state concept.

14. Barth writes that politics will be replaced with God's eschatological wrath in the first edition, and that the State is equivalent to the Devil in the second version of his bestseller (1968). I advise reading Rizzi's 2006 article for a more detailed account since my primary topic is different.

15. Welborn argues that Agamben is lacking firm ground in his theory of community without identity (2015: 66–67). Correspondingly, Harrison finds that the way Agamben approaches politics based on the Epistle to Romans is unclear (2019: 503). Yet. they fail to grasp the lack of textual evidence I strive to demonstrate pointing to Agamben's misreadings.

16. If one believes Taubes' account of their conversation (2013: 30).

the exception from the soil and empire. He speaks of a spiritual vocation, not a mundane one.

Returning to Agamben, the background of his thought is a small quote from Rom. 11:16 about "premise". While Agamben famously rejects Badiou's universalism found in Paul (2005: 52), the Italian thinker misunderstands the apostle right on this point. The remnant is viewed in an anti-elitist way since it refers to the community without identity. I cannot provide textual evidence to support his point. To the contrary, the apostle insists that God distributes salvation according to his grace (χάριτος) regardless of the deeds (ἔργων) people perform. Hence, God chooses (ἐκλογὴν) those who should expect salvation; it is written that "So too, at the present time (καιρῷ) there is a remnant (λεῖμμα) chosen (ἐκλογὴν) by grace (χάριτος). And if by grace (χάριτι), then it cannot be based on works (ἔργων); if it were, grace would no longer be grace" (Rom. 11:5–6).

The "Λεῖμμα" designates the remnant literally, that of a small group of devout believers strong in their faith (πίστις) who will be saved in God's eternal blessing. Furthermore, the quote does not contain "premise" in any sense: "ἀπαρχὴ" is an ancient term signifying "first fruit" which has deep Hebrew connotations in the Old Testament (Rom. 11:16). All sacrifices Yahweh asked the Jewish people to perform were first born calves of clean domesticated animals and new-born babies[17]. Paul subverts the model[18] because Jesus as the firstborn son of God was sacrificed for humanity during Pesach. Therefore, Paul speaks about the redemption of Original Sin, and the path of salvation for those who have accepted Christ's sacrifice. As I have demonstrated before, Agamben tends to omit crucial points described after the quotes he makes. In the 17th verse, Paul explains that "some of the branches were broken" ("τινες τῶν κλάδων ἐξεκλάσθησαν") referring to those who being sinful were excluded from heaven (Rom. 11:17). In contrast to Agamben's notion of a society without identities, this phrase represents spiritual exclusion.

Agamben and Schmitt versus the Antichrist

Katechon is the highest point of the controversy Agamben and Schmitt were involved in:

> "The *katechon* is therefore the force — the Roman Empire as well as every constituted authority — that clashes with and hides *katargesis*, the state of tendential lawlessness that characterizes the messianic, and in this sense delays unveiling the "mystery of lawlessness." The unveiling of this mystery entails bringing to light the inoperativity of the law and the substantial illegitimacy of each and every power in messianic time.
>
> This is how the messianic is fulfilled in the clash between the two *parousiai*: between that of the *anomos*, who is marked by the working of Satan in every power [potenza], and that of the Messiah, who will render *energeia* inoperative in it. An

17. Ex. 12 scholars have not come to a consensus regarding the historical rite of first-born children being sacrificed by their parents.

18. On the takeover of Easter in the New Testament, see the monograph written by Propp (1999: 459–461).

> explicit reference is made here to I Corinthians 15:24: "Afterwards the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God and the father, when he will render inoperative all rule, and all authority [potesta] and power"); 2 Thess. 2 may not be used to found a "Christian doctrine" of power in any manner whatsoever" (Agamben, 2005: 111).

Schmitt is explicitly cited by Agamben as belonging to the mainstream of 2 Thess. readers (108–110). All of the preceding arguments constitute the ground for two different political eschatologies (7). Potentially, Agamben, who has been so well acquainted with Schmitt's corpus, attacks the following passage from the German thinker: "Not only fanatic sectarians but whole generation of pious Protestants and Greek-Orthodox Christians have seen in Rome the Antichrist or the Babylonian whore of the apocalypse" (Schmitt, 1996a: 3).

According to the German jurist, no Catholic or even the apostle himself would consider the empire to be the Antichrist. Agamben opposes Schmitt's inclination to reverse the formula, and restores anarchical Paul for whom the Antichrist is tantamount to empire. This step not only helps Agamben to break with the Catholic tradition represented by Schmitt but also undermines the movement of counter-revolutionary conservatives like Maistre[19] and Cortes who were anxious about the Antichrist (15). The German thinker connects Paul, the Catholic movement, monarchies, and counter-revolution which he contrasts with Bakunin's political theology[20].

> "I do not believe that any historical concept (Begriff) other than *katechon* would have been possible for the original Christian faith. The belief that a restrainer (Aufhalter) holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian Empire of the Germanic kings" (1950: 29, 2006: 60), and;

> "The emperor's office was inseparable from the work of the *katechon*, with concrete tasks and missions (konkreten Aufgaben und Missionen). This was true of a monarchy or a crown (Königtum oder einer Krone), i.e., of rule over a particular Christian land and its people (christliches Land und sein Volk)" (31, 2006: 62).

Schmitt identifies the Pauline *katechon*[21] actual for Christian Empire[22] with the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. For Schmitt, representation as a fundamental

19. Filippov has noted that whereas Maistre has an idea of divine monarchy, identical with Schmitt's project, Schmitt still diverts from Maistre's position (2012: 233–234).

20. Meier illuminates one of the tenets of such a sharp opposition between left- and right-wing philosophers. For religious faith, no good human nature could exist because human evilness which results in the original sin stems from an innate disdain for God's sovereign power (2011: 78–81; 84). This heretical exposition permits Schmitt to describe the political nature of any divine enemy in secular terms (120; 159–162).

21. In his book, Meier shows that a restrainer and the Antichrist are empty signifiers, which depend on an enemy defined by current political authorities (2011: 120; 161).

22. Paul's concept of empire has created a controversy that has yet to be resolved. On the one hand, Wright believes Paul contrasts Christ with Caesar to implicitly reject all that is imperial (2013: 1283; 1298), and White links Paul with Daniel's vision of four kingdoms (2009: 330). On the other hand, Barclay maintains

element of true sovereignty[23] arises from *katechon,* which gives theological legitimacy to the exercise of personal power (2005: 30)[24]. Catholicism was a model for the politics of decision favored by Schmitt (Hollerich, 2011: XXII)[25]. He even laments that the church had been too absorbed in faith and lost its political authority (Schmitt, 1996a: 23). In order to hold back the Antichrist until the *parousia*, the church must commit to a counter-revolution that would return her to God's law-giving formula (36). In a brief sketch, I have shown how Schmitt inserts St. Paul into these right-wing ecclesial politics. Therefore, when Agamben re-appropriates Paul, he shows the discrepancy between his revolutionary non-identity message and the "religion of Jesus" (2005: 126–127). Schmitt tries to read Paul as the first source of Church-State unity legitimization in his counter-revolutionary project (37).

The Second Epistle to Thessalonians is often regarded as a work that scholarship distrusts, simply because it looks different in contrast to the first epistle (Colin, 2004). Moreover, the epistle has a significant resemblance to the late apocalyptic style of John's Revelation. Whatever its authenticity, let us take a look at the apostle's short message. Paul refers to someone called a man of lawlessness (ἀνομίας) who brings destruction (ἀπωλείας) (2 Thess. 2:3). That man exalts himself above God, and pretends to be divine. The combination of the two following lines suggests that Paul talks about moral decay, not lawlessness. In claiming a false identity, this hideous person dishonors God. Therefore, Paul does not describe anarchy in terms of law but in terms of impurity and unimaginable blasphemy (Colin, 2004: 228). Then, Paul states that the mystery is present and somebody restrains (κατέχων) it (2 Thess. 2:7). The Second Coming precedes God destroying the "ἄνομος", who operates through Satan's orders (2 Thess. 2:8).

There is no explanation in Agamben's argument why "ἄνομος" will be destroyed by God's breath, or what is God's purpose in destroying a utopian community devoid of oppression and exception. Moreover, Colin highlights another collision: Satan becomes "a highly implausible restrainer" who stimulates his own destruction via *parousia* (2004: 229). The fact that his removal also initiated the rebellion misses the point Paul makes. Agamben's research rests on the long tradition of political philosophy based on Hobbes (Stasis: 2nd lecture). As for Leviathan, Agamben insists on Hobbes' belief that God pos-

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that empire is a peripheral phenomenon, while the main battle takes place between cosmic powers like grace and sin (2011: 383–384). Kim does not find any anti-imperial agenda in Paul's writings (2008: 66). Paul rarely remembers the empire and tends to neglect contemporary political phenomena like the crisis of succession (Thate, 2014: 213; 237). Heilig takes an intermediate position claiming that the empire was not an essential enemy of Paul, though he criticized it indirectly (2015: 157–158). Our own interest in contemporary philosophy does not allow us to decide who is right in the dispute between Bible scholars: our Paul is close to the second opinion since excerpts from Agamben's reading do not present a coherent line of anarchical Pauline theory. In case of further interest, I suggest reading Heilig's full work containing a balanced review of the previous research on Paul's attitude to the empire.

23. Vatter emphasizes that for Schmitt, who inherited theology from Hobbes, religion is determined by certain governmental policies (2014: 259–260).

24. Geréby observes how Schmitt contradicts "The Concept of the Political" where he claims that universal imperial peace would be impossible, so the foundational Catholic principles are replaced with ethnic particularism: his Catholicism originates in the Grand Inquisitor negatively depicted by Dostoevsky as Jesus' executor and restrainer (2021: 29; 33; 46).

25. In Schmitt's view, reality is synonymous with a decision (Ball, 2013: 76).

sesses sufficient sovereignty to organize the eternal order and glorified kingdom against the worldly sovereign who is under the rule of the Antichrist (2015: 66–70). Will it be *anomos*? It is hard to say yes. Could Schmitt win the battle of absentees if Agamben fails?

I would not agree that either of them was right. Schmitt, like many church fathers before him (Tertullianus, 1960: Chapter XXIV; Origenes, 1899: Chapter 2.30) discovers the political theology in Paul that legitimizes the authority of the Roman Empire through the Antichrist and apocalypse. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that the terrestrial society responsible for the crucifixion curbs the revolt of the Antichrist against God. Agamben seems to be correct in not identifying Paul as a loyal collaborator with the empire. There is no other evidence in the New Testament to identify the *katechon* and empire (Peerbolte, 1997: 142). Figures like Caligula and Nero cannot pretend to be Orthodoxy's defenders. Furthermore, Colin indicates that the fall of the empire would serve as the third sign of the apocalypse, whereas Paul mentions only two of them (2004: 229). To achieve the result he wants, Schmitt, as Agamben did after him, de-contextualizes Paul. I will return, once again, to Taubes who wrote that Agamben disregarded his humble claims that Paul forbade one to "stand out" until the Second Coming (2003: 45; 54) and went on with sweeping assertions. Taubes' statement that Schmitt's *katechon* was politicized and secularized demonstrates his incisiveness in dealing with Paul (43)[26]. The aim of Agamben's work is to attack Schmitt, so he is attracted to thought that is both radical and lacks support in the text. He still misreads Paul as Schmitt did before him. Paul does not praise or condemn the empire: he remains indifferent to it and is focused on God inside[27]. Thus, Paul is not a valuable source for citing in the projects of 'Coming Community' or 'Counter-Revolution'. Contrary to Schmitt, Agamben correctly describes Paul and the ecclesia, though he has not fully grasped the apolitical nature of Paul's words. It can even be said that Paul's indifference undermines any political interpretation of the *Katechon*.

Finally, I need to write something positive about the fragment derived from Paul. Contemporary scholars either dismiss the possibility of the interpretation due to a fact of forgery (Peerbolte, 1997: 149), or present ingenuous solutions like Colin who assumes that Pseudo-Paul cites Daniel and alludes to the archangel Michael with wide and rich textual evidence provided (2004: 243). The epistle bestows a tool for textual critique that destroys both attempts to coin Pauline political theology. I will continue the investigation in the next chapter by taking a look at the other side of the argument.

Schmitt versus Peterson allied with the Cappadocians

One should approach *The Time That Remains* and *The Kingdom and the Glory* as a sequence: first, Agamben shows how Paul professes a revolutionary political theology, then demonstrates what happened when Christians after Paul organized terrestrial and celestial hierarchies around the Trinitarian economy (οἰκονομία) of the salvation (σωτηρία)

26. Though I disagree with Taubes since he reacts positively to Agamben's re-insertion of Paul's *mysterium* against the "amorality of its theological institutionalization".

27. A new identity Badiou grasps (2003: 13).

(2011: 29–30). According to Agamben, the Trinity was a political instrument divided between God's glorified supremacy and divine management of redemption (11–14). Outlining the unity of economics and theology in the early church period, Agamben criticizes both Peterson[28] for pure theology and Schmitt for pure politics (66). Agamben's attack becomes especially interesting if one remembers that Schmitt accuses Peterson slightly differently. Peterson is the point where long-standing rivals agree. Schmitt argues that the Trinity dogma formulated by Gregory of Nazianzus contains a kind of "στάσις" inside that can be analogically transferred to civil societies (2008: 122). Along with a famous argument regarding Gregory of Nazianzus through which Geréby criticized Fellechner[29], Peterson gives a hint as to which distinction better captures the issue of Trinitarian political theology. Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa's theologies are only sketched by Peterson, but they could be a tool for dissolving the Schmitt-Agamben line of attack:

> "That Arianism in all its varieties is interested in the concept of μοναρχία (μοναρχία-Begriff)[30] is evident. Eunomius speaks about it …" (1931: 560), and;
>
> "But with that, as Gregory of Nyssa says, we rise above the opposition of metaphysical monism and pluralism (des metaphysischen Monismus und Pluralismus), above Judaism and paganism, and arrive at the Gregory Nazianzus' idea of a true order that is beyond all ἀταξία denoted by the terms (die Begriffe) anarchy, polyarchy, and monarchy" (561).

In the apology, Eunomius employs terminology borrowed from politics and Greek moral philosophy. He describes the subordination of the Son to Father in terms of "δύναμις" that denotes a political power in general; "μοναρχία", "υπεροχή", and "βουλή", which have clear political connotations, are also exploited by an Arian supporter (Barnes, 1998: 60; 64; 66). He depicts the Son as the so-called "δημιουργός", as the power of the Father who has him to perform certain actions like creation. It is significant that Eunomi-

28. Moreover, Peterson is accused by Agamben of supporting antisemitism on behalf of his traditional Catholic hostility toward Jews (Peterson, 2011c: 31; Agamben, 2011: 8). Nonetheless, Schmidt dismisses the attack stating that Peterson defends Israel several times as a chosen people whose salvation is necessary (Schmidt, 2014: 201; Peterson, 2011c: 32; 36; see also Hollerich, 2011: xxiii; xxvii–xxviii).

29. Fellechner finds that theology exists independently of politics in the Cappadocian fathers' corpus (1978: 53–55). In Geréby's opinion, Schmitt has not grasped the notion of Trinity which is in sharp contrast with monotheism, polytheism, and a subsequent Latin tradition represented by Augustine, Boethius, and St. Thomas (2008: 18; 21; 30). Plantinga's research supports the argument proposed by Geréby relying on crucial differences between Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine who represent Eastern and Western theologies respectively (1986: 334). The fact that not all scholars agree on Gregory of Nazianzus drives me to search for additional sources necessary for a definite conclusion. For instance, Allen, who endorses Schmitt, does not see Gregory overthrowing the divine monarchy of Arians (2017: 18–20). Although Allen is prone to making mistakes due to his ignorance of the fact that Philo broke with Pseudo-Aristotle's "De mundo", Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine disavowed terrestrial monarchy, the widespread of subordinationism took place in the 2nd century AD, and monotheism was not equivalent to Trinity (11; 13; 15).

30. Note the confluence of notions like "Begriff" and "Monarchie" used by both Schmitt and Peterson through the years. Peterson attacks political theology targeting the sociology of concepts expressed in *Der Begriff des Politischen.*

us gives the name of "μοναρχία" to a divine authority that structures the subordination of Holy Spirit to Son and Son to Father (Eunomius, 1987: Chapter 27)[31]. Hence, Eunomius makes the step toward political categories which he carries into theological matters[32]. Furthermore, his theory allows one to speak of any ruler as having a divine predicate because political concepts are appropriate to the Godhead.

A number of articles written by Steenbuch (2015: 579–582), Bozinis (2018: 278; 282), and Bentley (2001: 65–67) have examined how Gregory's distancing from political Arian theology purifies key notions of Eunomius. Gregory would have resembled an ordinary Cappadocian Father if he had not delved deeper in his apolitical refutation of Eunomius. In Gregory's view, Eunomius' subordinationism brings in polytheism which Gregory demonstrates to be anarchy (ἀναρχίαν) and democracy (δημοκρατικὴν αὐτονομίαν) completely disavowed by the Bishop of Nyssa (Gregory of Nyssa, 1960a: Chapter 484, 1960b: Chapter 3). The various pagans who believe in the plurality (διαφόρους) of gods are complicit in the same mistake of failing to see the true Godhead (1960b: Chapter 6). He underscores that subordinationism has a tremendous consequence: if Jesus had been created (κτίσεως), people would have struggled in an eternal war for power (κράτος) (1960b: Chapter 4). Why should people be subordinated (ὑποχείριον) to someone equal (ἰσομοιρεῖν) to them in nature?[33] Gregory's proof continues as follows:

> "Such a thing resembles tyranny, when power (κράτος) is given not to superiority (ὑπεροχῇ) of being, but with nature remaining equal (ὁμοτίμῳ): the creation is divided into servant and master, so that one part of it rules (ἄρχειν), while the other is subordinate (ὑποχείριον), this honour having been won by luck, as in a raffle (διακληρώσεως), by the one who was allotted advancement above his equals" (1960a: Chapter 526, 2018;[34] : Chapter 526).

Bozinis finds out that Gregory refers in the quote above to the theory of stasis articulated by Aristotle in his critique of democracy (2018: 288–289). Returning to the original Old Testament purpose of the verse "Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness" (Gen. 1:26)[35], Gregory believes no inequality is possible among people created in the image and likeness of God. He even indicates that human governments (δυναστεῖαι) undergo changes and revolutions (μεταβολάς) due to the lack of foundation in the subordination of one man to another (Gregory of Nyssa, 1960a: Chapter 527). Having demonstrated

31. The translator Richard Paul Vaggione obstructs the political connotation implied by Eunomius via translating "sole supremacy" instead of "monarchy".

32. E.g., a key notion of Greek political discourse — "ισότητα" or "equality" — is exploited by Eunomius to shape the theological model of subordination (1987: Chapter 26).

33. Gregory distinguished himself from most church fathers by abolishing slavery, the fact that seemed consistent with both his theological and political views. He reveals that even the Son did not become a slave (Maspero, 2010: 684).

34. I use two modern critical translations made by Stuart George Hall with corresponding Greek terminological apparatus taken from Werner Jaeger's critical edition of the original text.

35. The formula of image and likeness was a part of court customs during pharaohs, and then applied exclusively to kings. The authors who wrote Genesis democratized what was an elitist sense of the phrase through the universal creation of Adam and Eve (Sarna, 2001: 12).

that revolutions happen because of unnatural tyrannical coercion, Gregory implicitly excludes an internal war within the Godhead.

Gregory of Nyssa clarifies how a Christian should perceive a divine Trinitarian monarchy without recourse to a terrestrial analogy. Established monarchy (μοναρχίας δόγμα) — not tyranny — is only possible if there is no split between different orders (μὴ εἰς διαφόρους ἀρχὰς), contrary to Eunomius upholding the hierarchy of Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and humanity at the very bottom. The Sole God (μίαν θεότητα) is the only legitimate ruler without any analogy (Chapter 531).

To sum up, Gregory of Nyssa destroys both Eunomius' political discourse of the divine and Schmitt's ambitions to transmit the notion of *stasis* from the Trinity to humanity. Using Eunomius' language, Gregory shows that most of the notions with political connotations of subjection are incompatible with the monarchial Trinity[36]. Moreover, this fact prevents the war that was possible for Arius and Eunomius, since all men are considered equal under the rule of God to whom monarchy is the most appropriate term. Gregory's anarchism[37] obstructs Agamben's attempt to establish his own history of Christian economics; the *homoousian* Trinity offers no account for any established hierarchy[38].

Totaler Krieg: Schmitt versus Peterson and Augustine. Peterson versus Eusebius and Schmitt

In the end, the Eusebius-Augustine controversy stands as a focal point for Peterson's apology for Christian theology (2011b: 103–105). In his view, while Eusebius glorifies the Roman Empire, Augustus, and Constantine for maintaining peace and preparing for the Second Coming (92–93), Augustine dissolves the peace of nations (pax gentiles) by asserting that only divine peace (pax Dei) could be completely realized as a gift of God (105). Schmitt argues that Peterson draws a political delimitation between friend and enemy without textual proof on the side of Augustine (2008: 94–95; 99; 100; 102). One of the ingenious and plausible solutions was provided by Taubes who revealed that Schmitt had not sufficiently grasped the secret message (encrypted by Peterson) regarding the danger of consolidating with Nazism (2013: 28). My point is not that Taubes simplifies the

36. His charge stems then, in part, from divine infinity by comparison to which Eunomius' analogical and ordinary language is inferior (Fortuin, 2019: 72–73). Gregory instead recommends the usage of apophatic language free from mundane analogies (77).

37. One should be cautious in adapting such a word to describe Gregory as Steenbuch does. Gregory favors monarchy instead of anarchy maintaining that terrestrial power could not avoid unnatural corruption (Gregory of Nyssa, 1960b: Chapter 3). On top of that, being a man of official position, he never calls for any actions to overthrow the empire.

38. Hostility with which Gregory perceives Eunomius' political theology may determine the absence of Gregory's theology in Agamben: he refers to him only twice in the whole body of the text (Agamben, 2011: 12; 59–60). Agamben did not grasp the meaning of Gregory's ontological use of "δύναμις" excluding the economy of salvation. It is not just Gregory's universalism that differs from the picture presented by Agamben, but his social agenda to promote equality is also theologically grounded.

issue, but I want to present source-based evidence that Peterson was wrong considering Eusebius[39] and right considering Augustine[40].

Peterson, like Burckhardt before him, represented Eusebius in an unfair caesaropapist fashion, which Agamben also makes use of (2011: 10). Peterson lacks sufficient support in this case despite being the source of inspiration to outline a further opposition between Eunomius and Gregory. Nevertheless, Schmitt did not deviate from a politicized image of Eusebius either. Presenting two classes of Christians, Eusebius himself prefers an ascetic and holy life to mundane ordinary existence (Eusebius, 1920: 48–50)[41]. This corresponds to the theory endorsed by Jewish exegete Philo[42]. To some extent, Eusebius portrays the empire as the 4th kingdom that will be destroyed in accordance with Dan. 2:40, associated with Thess. 2.7 (Hollerich, 2019: 479), whilst Constantine was only a part of providential history that the bishop abandoned in the last commentary on Isaiah (Hollerich, 1990: 323; Rapp, 1998: 687). Overall, Eusebius is a figure too dubious to be picked up by Peterson in contrast with Eunomius. What is it about Augustine?

For both Peterson and Schmitt, *De civitate Dei* was of primary importance: suddenly, the latter does not use early Augustine's writings that contain more politics resonating with his own theory[43]. Augustine, while fighting the Donatists in North Africa, believed that the empire must suppress heretics in order to achieve religious peace[44]. He even went so far as to claim the Donatists to be the Antichrist about whom Paul and John tell about in the Bible (PotestaÌ, Rizzi, 2012: 65). Before the sack of Rome by Alaric, Augustine praises Theodosius I for the empire's Christianization (Markus, 1970: 85), though he never concedes eternal peace or the union between the emperor and the Son as his predecessors (Eusebius, Prudentius, John Chrysostom, Jerome) upheld (57). This last circumstance proves that Schmitt's argument designed to contextualize Augustine after 410 does not reach its goal. Referring back to the main source over which the dispute was fought, I believe that *De civitate Dei* resembles Paul's indifference to worldly affairs. Augustine dissolves the previous alliance between the empire and Christianity (Papadopou-

39. Some scholars even believe Eusebius and Augustine are not different in having the same vision of theological politics transcending worldly organizations (Hollerich, 2021: 11).

40. Contrary to previous sections, I almost do not cite Agamben in this chapter because the Italian philosopher is not frequent in referring to Augustine: I have been able to find a few fragments from *The Highest Poverty* devoted to Augustine's monastic rules (Agamben, 2013: 29; 36). Agamben tends not to politicize Augustine, unlike Paul and the Cappadocians, while his followers make some attempts which I will try to evaluate at the end.

41. Despite being so praised in the bulk of Eusebius' works (1890: 582–590; 591–592; 690–691; 826–830; 887–889), Constantine would have belonged to the second class of Christians for waging many wars and retaining pagan symbols such as *Sol Invictus* (Siecienski, 2017).

42. Like Hebrews or Essenes being a pious minority among Jews, a small portion of Christians constitute the spiritual elite who have abandoned bodily pleasures at all (Eusebius, 2003: 136–138; 169–172; Hollerich, 1990: 318; 2021: 37).

43. As Augustine matures, he develops a more skeptical position towards power and empire (Brown, 2013: 146).

44. Sketching the theory of just war that St. Thomas would endorse in the Middle Ages, Augustine distinguishes malevolent and benevolent coercion depending on the ends (Augustinus, 1898: epistula 93.6; 93.16.; Brown: 2013: 136).

los, 2021: 178–180). He outlines not a battle between earthly and ecclesial powers as later popes and scholastics would portray his magnum opus in their fight against monarchial supremacy over investiture[45], but an eschatological warfare where a society (civitas) represents a spiritual unity created according to two types of love (*caritas*) (Weithman, 2001: 235; 237. Dyson, 2001: 179)[46].

Though Peterson and Schmitt have highlighted the significance of the eternal peace (pax aeterna) in Augustine[47], they have missed some pieces of the puzzle. Augustine believes politics and theology to be different areas of personal activity. As in the case of the Roman Empire, politics motivates people to strive for glory (cupido gloriae)[48] and commit sins (peccatum) (Augustinus, 1899: Chapters 5.12; 14.28). The earthly city seeking for some good out of pragmatic reasons tends to persist in wars and annexations (Chapter 15.4). Christian people working for salvation should resist (resistitur) earthly goods that have the end (finis) of gaining glory (Ibid.). Glory makes it necessary to love vain goods and even kill your relatives; in this fashion, Augustine describes the emergence of the terrestrial city (civitas terrena) since the moment when Cain and Romulus, full of the will for power (regnum) and glory murdered their brothers (Chapters 15.1; 22.6). Therefore, Christ's first coming was not connected with the blessing of Augustus and the empire; on the contrary Jesus helped the true religion (vera religione) to spread, and not the imperial expansion to grow (Chapter 4.29).

In this end, God distributes his kingdom (regnum) irrespective of the values the rulers might have (ipse dat regna terrena et bonis et malis) (Chapter 4.21). People obey any power over them; pilgrims from the heavenly city obey the laws to sustain the peace (pax) between both societies (Chapter 19.17)[49]. Politics for God is meaningless: people who have strong faith cannot change their attitudes under a rule of a pagan king. Moreover, Christian blessed rulers such as Constantine and Theodosius were given the power to reveal that not every earthly dominion is evil and immoral (Chapters 5.25; 5.35). Both cities

45. Schmitt is a representative of Political Augustinism — which has nothing to do with Augustine claiming all earthly cities to be contingent — widespread after Gelasius introduced the division between "auctoritas" and "potestas" standing for the church and the state respectively (Sabète, 2011: 130–137). Scholars have also become victims of contamination between Augustinism and Augustine: for instance, ignoring the late interpretation of Gelasius and scholars' general consent (Brown, 2013: 322; Cranz, 1950: 217–219; Marey, 2017a: 55–56). Berlanga believes the separation of sacred and secular powers was designed by Augustine (2016: 11; 19; for a general exposition of Berlanga's monograph see Marey, 2017b: 127–128). He is not alone among researchers in this regard (Böckenförde, 1981: 237).

46. Moreover, Weithman writes that Augustine, having attacked Cicero, changes the Roman notion of *civitas*: he replaces the common good and justice with God worship (Weithman, 2001: 241). Augustine subverts Cicero's theory since no genuine *res publica* is possible on Earth (Markus, 1970: 65).

47. In *Christ as Imperator,* Peterson finds out that Augustine alters the tense from "dedi" to "dabit" and substitutes Virgil's Caesar with Christus Imperator, a fact that remains unnoticed by Schmitt (2011a: 145).

48. Augustine's attitude toward *gloria* allows me to make the case against Agamben's political theology of liturgy and glory. Augustine connects glory with the terrestrial and sinful nature of humans who, being consumed by mundane deeds, remain ignorant of divine love.

49. Exegeting Rom. 13:1–7, Augustine speaks of human *"potestas"* and rejects *"cupiditas"*. He equates "potestas" with the power of the soul achieved by grace of God since after the fall men could do only evil being consumed by *"cupiditas"* (Rizzi, 2007: 233). He neutralizes the quote which was early read in favor of terrestrial authorities eliminating thus Evangelic political theology constructed by church fathers.

are intertwined on Earth and will be separated upon the Second Coming (Chapter 11.1)[50]. Therefore, Christians should not destroy political institutions and find salvation even if they are labeled lawbreakers (Chapter 19.17). God gave the Romans a kingdom (regnum dedit) as to other nations, as to the Jewish people: none of them were chosen due to their political identity since spiritual citizenship does not cross the earthly one demarcated by the kings (Chapter 5.31). God brings happiness (felicitas) by his call for people to be saved by his gift and election (felicitatem vero non dat nisi bonis) (Chapter 4.32).

Points taken from Augustine bear a close resemblance with Paul regarding the call, election, love, and indifference when rendered in Latin. With the book's progression, this similarity gains momentum. Augustine directly cites Paul maintaining that the main virtue (virtus) is a personal conscience (conscientiae suae) which subverts the chase for glory. Glory may come only after virtue as good people behave after being saved by God (gloriam quae a solo Deo est non quaerentes) (Chapter 5.12). Paul's words that people should seek God in their hearts (in corde) are equal in fact to Augustine's claim that mundane glory diverts us away from spiritual love (amor) (Chapters 5.14; 5.18). Augustine deepens Paul's approach: the law (lex) depends on people. Good people convert even death (mors) into some kind of good (bonum), whilst vicious human beings transmute the law into malfunctioning evil (malum) (Chapter 13.5). In light of the divine word that justifies the Christian love of God, the law becomes unsatisfactory[51].

One may refute our elaboration of Augustine's apolitical theology by stating that we do not provide any direct evidence. However, fighting against all the aspects of Roman paganism, Augustine challenges Varro's division between three theologies, namely fabled, natural, and civil (fabulosi, naturali, et civili) (Chapter 6.5)[52]. Here, Augustine aligns himself with a long-established Christian tradition of criticizing Varro that Tertullian (Tertullianus, 1954: II.1) and Eusebius (2003: 57–59) support as well. None of them are aware of the fact that Varro and Scaevola agree that political theology adjusted to a polis is inferior to what Varro believes to be the true natural religion of philosophers (Fortin, 1980: 248). In addition to Augustine allying himself with the mainstream, Fortin provides another piece of evidence why Augustine denounces Varro: he avoids contemporary pagan rites and politics and refers instead to such an old and unpopular source as *Antiquitatis rerum divinarum* so as not to offend Romans (255). By knowing this, we can better understand his lack of interest in the Roman Empire.

50. Only Heaven could be the *"ecclesia perfecta"* transcending earthly congregations (Meconi, 2014: 251; 254).

51. Augustine summarizes the point in *De Libero Arbitrio*: political law (lex sociatis) does not function according to the divine will (Augustinus, 1956: Chapter 1.5.13), while eternal law (lex aeterna) governs all of creation. In his early exegesis, the bishop of Hippo speculates that law stimulates committing sins (peccatum) and since the moment of Original Sin the free will of humans needs some blessing (gratia) from above where the Divine law (lex Dei) rules (1971: Chapters 12; 34).

52. Among continental philosophers engaged with Church Fathers, only Lyotard was concerned with Augustine's desire to abstain from all mundane politics and public events, especially theatrical performances. The French thinker criticized the bishop for his dismissive attitude and gave credit to Varro (1974: 7–10). Lyotard, though, is unaware that Varro is close to Augustine in his critical attitude towards the imperial pantheon.

Finally, Peterson and Schmitt ignore that Augustine developed an ingenious solution to the *katechon* problem (Peerbolte, 1997: 138). While the bishop of Hippo makes false assertions concerning the similarity between Paul and John, he writes that the empire-version or Nero-account seem dubious and esoteric: he feels the same lack of justification we have expressed in the 3rd section (Augustinus, 1899: Chapter 20.19). One would be surprised not to find Augustine's independent version of the *katechon* due to his sincere statement: "I absolutely confess I do not know what he said (Ego prorsus quid dixerit me fateor ignorare)" (Ibid.). The inexorable argument of Augustine is that all sense is reduced to the Antichrist preceding the *Parousia*. It may surprise some readers to learn that Augustine would not have embraced the Emperor-Antichrist theory after criticizing the Roman Empire. As a result, he provides a neutral eschatological meaning to a symbol that has been exploited by both hostile and friendly Rome church fathers[53]. Augustine does not get involved in politics at all: the body of *De civitate Dei* is apologetically directed to protect Christianity. As Markus writes, "It [the empire] is theologically neutral" (1970: 55). The *ecclesia* does not represent the divine city to which everyone finds a path through faith and God's grace. Therefore, Augustine refrains from eschatological politics; if one recalls Schmitt speculating on the decline of Rome, geopolitical surroundings, and barbarians, Augustine would look like a madman not exploiting *katechon* against the empire and pagans. Augustine and Paul both asserted that a pious Christian must stay indifferent to the mundane and save the love (caritas) of God in their inner heart. Augustine's simplicity and frankness overwhelm theories proposed by Schmitt, Peterson, Taubes, and Agamben, who have all mistakenly decontextualized Christian books.

Even if Kaufman presents Agamben and Augustine as allies based on revolutionary potential of refugees and spiritual pilgrimage (2019: 24; 48; 65), and even if Peck describes the similarity in their descriptions of sovereignty (2015: 74; 78), I should reject their claims because they contain a profound fallacy; they assume that Augustine was a political theologian. However, they fail to demonstrate any evidence for his politics of pilgrimage or critique of sovereignty. Moreover, to correct Peterson once again with some of his hints (2011b: 101), Orosius would be a better example of a political theologian whom Augustine assails. He argued, as an Augustinian disciple, that divine Providence allowed the empire to keep the faith, persecution to cease, and the Caesars to be compared to God (Marcus, 1970: 161–162). Repercussions of Orosius' views constitute Augustine's disenchanted neutrality toward power, empire, and the earthly church (54). The above reading highlights Schmitt and Agamben's vulnerability to Augustine's complex ideas, while Peterson misreads Eusebius.

Conclusion

We have provided three different cases of theology (namely Paul, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) which are free of and even hostile to politics. Paul subverts Agamben's and

53. According to O'Donovan, Augustine waits for *parousia,* spiritually transforms society, and refrains from making political statements (1996: 82–83).

Schmitt's theories of *katechon* that are essential both for revolution or for retaining the status quo. In presenting the clear proof of Peterson's account of Trinity opposed to monotheism and terrestrial monarchy, Gregory rebukes Eunomius' politicization of theology and his use of divine analogies. By abstaining from *gloria* and politicization of *katechon,* Augustine reaffirms Peterson's choice against Schmitt.

The intention of this paper was not to defend Peterson, whereas it rebukes the left and right political theologies of Schmitt and Agamben: Peterson misinterprets Eusebius and remains ambivalent toward the Cappadocians and Orosius, as well. I have presented evidence of several arguments he could have improved. Over and above this, Peterson promotes his vision of public theology endorsed by the church that my present research cannot support. My objective was to demonstrate that most of the claims made to politicize certain Christian figures ignore theology that is essentially removed from politics and the public sphere. There seems to be an inevitable gap separating the Greek and Latin early theological tradition from such Catholics as Schmitt and Peterson or secular philosophers like Agamben.

I dare hope that the negative result I have achieved will open a wider horizon for the following debates: was the failure of Christian political theology caused by the inappropriate sources that were chosen? As medieval political theology became a legitimate topic among scientists studying kings' or Popes' bodies, liturgies, or sanctity, the problem described above now awaits a new consideration. At this stage, I could only conclude — and thus promoting further research — the war over Christian political theology did not take place.

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Карл Шмитт, Эрик Петерсон и Джорджо Агамбен: война за христианскую политическую теологию

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Власть и ее источники — вечные вопросы политической философии. Один из вариантов легитимации власти — это политическая теология, то есть использование секуляризованных концептов в политических целях. XX век был наполнен спорами о политической теологии. В статье рассматривается только ее воплощение в христианстве, сконструированное Карлом Шмиттом и Джорджо Агамбеном. Будучи теоретическими оппонентами, оба мыслителя отстаивали собственные проекты, критикуя главного «врага», Эрика Петерсона. Если Шмитт защищал христианство как основание для государственного *status quo*, а Агамбен выступал провозвестником грядущего сообщества вне идентичности, то Петерсон считал, что догматы христианства (Троица, Второе пришествие и т.п.) лишают политическое господство смысла. Большинство исследователей стремились изучить и оценить уровень теоретической

аргументации оппонентов, игнорируя вклад самого Агамбена. В статье предлагается иной путь, предполагающий последовательный анализ всех цитируемых упомянутыми мыслителями текстов (Ап. Павел, Евсевий, Евномий, Григорий Нисский, Августин).
На основе исследовательской литературы и собственных философско-филологических реконструкций доказывается проблематичный статус тезисов Шмитта и Агамбена. Оба философа злоупотребляют, как и Петерсон в отношении Евсевия, вольными переводами и желанием внедрить в текст иной эпохи собственные идеи, будь то модель теологически обоснованного суверенитета или упразднение государства и насилия. Детальный анализ позволяет продемонстрировать «негативный» итог: христианскую политическую теологию нельзя построить на тех источниках, которые для политических философов оставались конвенциональными. Работа призывает к новому витку дискуссии: является ли критика христианской политической теологии следствием необоснованного выбора источников Шмиттом, Петерсоном и Агамбеном или же результатом несовместимости христианства с политической теологией?

Ключевые слова: κατέχον, христианская политическая теология, μοναρχία, felicitas, δύναμις, gloria, Римская империя, civitas Dei

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Institution or Inspiration: Strategies for Using the Concept of Charisma in Russian Thought of the Late 19th to the First Third of the 20th Centuries[1]

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Analyzing the emergence and development of the concept of charisma in Russia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, this article makes an argument about the significance of words that have potential for transforming history. Until about the mid 1880s, the word "charisma" was traditionally rendered as "gift" (*dar*), until translations of the works of some German theologians were published. In order to convey the connotations of the concept of "charisma" present in German theological discourse of the time, translators chose to transliterate this word, and the newly coined term soon became widely spread. The article examines the process of enriching the concept with new meanings, while paying attention to the almost traditional opposition between charisma and office (*dolzhnost'*). We demonstrate how the usage of the concept almost changed on the brink of the All-Russian Church Council of 1917–1918, becoming incorporated into the authority discourse. In the conciliar documents, the patriarch is spoken of exactly in the terms of spiritual authority and charisma. The same terms are used to justify the disobedience of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) by a number of hierarchs in the 1930s. We conclude that the concept of charisma had a significant impact on the understanding of church authority both before and after the revolution.

Keywords: charisma, office, power, authority, theology, the Church

In the second half of the 20th century, the term "charisma" took its respective place both in the languages of theology and sociology (Bensman, Givant, 1986; Chernyi, 2020; Borsch, 2021). Its usage is genetically connected with the studies of Protestant scholars of the 19th century, reconstructing the organization of early Christian communities (Freik, 2001). The most prominent author in this context is Rudolf Sohm; his idea of charismatic organization as the essence of the church structure, excluding all the legal elements, greatly influenced the modern meaning of the concept of charisma (Haley, 1980). Sohm's ideas were developed, according to some researchers, in a softer vein by Karl Holl who adapted them to a different research field, namely, to studying the practices of monastic confession (Mühlenberg, 2021).

However, when the concept of charisma enters the Russian context as a part of the said discussion (not forgetting the early-Catholic answers to Protestant criticism) in the second half of the 19th century, its meaning does not remain tied to the initial subject: the beginning of the 20th century sees the development of a distinctive discourse centered

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around the concept, replete with consequences for the Church practice (e.g., Paert, 2014). The aim of this article is to study the development of this discourse by means of analyzing the concept of charisma in one of its historical aspects at a certain period of time[2].

The generation whose works were crucial for the development of the charisma discourse was chiefly active in the end of the 19th century to the first third of the 20th century[3]. Though they had different strategies for using "charisma"[4], they were united by a common context in the period in Russian history marked by the growing interest in the mystical and personal spheres of religion[5]. It is possible that the concept of charisma was brought to attention in the wake of these particular tendencies; at least in the texts we analyze in the article its meaning is always seen as counterpointing that of the concept of "office", which in the modern period, connotes with rationality and control (Vorontsov, 2021; Lyutko, 2022). That is why we will frequently resort to the concept of "office", though its analysis is a separate issue requiring special attention which goes beyond the scope of this research.

Introducing the concept of "charisma" in Russia: technical term or Protestant trend

In this part of the article, we will look at the circumstances which helped "charisma" regain its relevance as well as acquire new meanings in the Russian context. It seems that the term "charisma" was reintroduced into the language by N. S. Suvorov (1848–1909), the professor of Canon Law at Moscow University, in the early 1880s. When translating the work of the Protestant theologian J. Köstlin (1826–1902) *Das Wesen der Kirche nach Lehre und Geschichte des Neuen Testaments* (1854), Suvorov borrows the German word *Charisma* (Köstlin, 1882: 118, 130, 136), which had a definite meaning and a long history in German humanities (Baumert, 2001). This is why he chooses to use it in its conventional setting. In Russia, the concept was traditionally rendered using the words meaning gift (*darovanie / dar* in the Old Church Slavonic translation of the Epistles and in the Synodal Bible), which obviously did not convey the connotations necessary to express Köstlin's

2. Until now, there have not been any attempts made to describe the history of the concept of "charisma" in Russia; nonetheless we do not aim at cataloging all the instances of using "charisma" in Russian texts. This is why we are not interested in all the possible renderings of the concept, which, as is commonly known, has a long history (beginning from Apostle Paul and Koine Greek of the New Testament), in the course of which its meaning underwent numerous transformations while being translated into all of the major languages of the Christian world.

3. On the "generation method", see (Gavrilyuk, 2013).

4. The development of a discourse involves the emergence of different strategies for using it. This is why we are considering discourse in its unity and diversity. In our research, we attempt to show the conflict between these strategies, that is, to explicate the polemic intentions of certain groups based on the history of the concept of "charisma". In this sense, elements of the analyzed language (or conceptual system) and the agents using it are equally important to us. This allows one to build an intellectual history project as proposed by Q. Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, a practice, which has become widespread among Russian researchers (Atnashev, Velizhev, 2018).

5. See: Coates, (2010); Manchester, Sdvizhkov, (2019); Mannherz, (2020).

ideas[6]. We shall assume that this semantic change (the change from "gift" to "charisma") represents a new stage in the interpretation of the concept.

Soon after the publication of the translation, N. S. Suvorov writes (in his Canon Law course) about the transition from the charismatic state of the Church to the "formal ordination of certain officials" (1889: 23–24), in which state charisma is no longer connected with free ministry, but linked to the episcopal office (28). He reinforces this idea of transition from office to charisma by citing J. Döllinger, one of the leaders of the Old Catholic movement, who holds that in the post-apostolic period "the soaring flight of charisma was replaced by the prose of Church life" (24). At this point, Suvorov expresses his thesis using the phrase "special gift" (*osobyj dar*) and gives the Greek word χάρισμα in parentheses (23). The usage of the "special gift" concept was in all probability connected with the ambiguity of the word "charisma"; it was not perceived simply as a technical term, but as also referring to the Protestant conception of Church power. In 1888, I. S. Berdnikov (1839–1915), a professor of the Kazan Theological Academy, strongly opposed using the concept of "charisma" as a Protestant innovation in his Canon Law course. More specifically, he pointed out that Protestants use the adjective "charismatic" when speaking about the "unorganized, amicable order of the Protestant community", which "excludes all legal organization" (1888: 170). This idea, according to Berdnikov, cannot be extended to the Orthodox teaching on Church order.

The argument about the usage of the concept of "charisma" resulted in a broader polemic over the Church structure between Suvorov and Berdnikov, in the course of which Berdnikov accused his opponent of building his conception on the basis of Protestant teaching (1902: 389). He supports his accusation by stating that Suvorov draws upon the work of the important Protestant author R. Sohm (1841–1917), and goes on to compare Suvorov's conception with Sohm's ideas (390–391)[7]. This connection, however, did not prevent the term from being used, and "charisma" soon lost its negative connotations. The change of terminology in new editions of N. S. Suvorov's textbook (its author was freely using the concept since 1908) presents a vivid example of this development[8].

Suvorov's *Canon Law Handbook*, a considerably expanded version of the "Course", contains a straightforward division between "official" (*dolzhnostnaja*) organization, based on ecclesiastical office, and free organization, based on extraordinary gifts (1908: 11). Suvorov uses here the concept of "charisma" in an original text and applies it (which is important) to episcopal office:

6. In the Russian language of the 16th — 17th centuries, the use of the word "charisma" is recorded (Vasmer, 1922: 18), but this usage cannot be called widespread, as the dictionaries show, it is the word "gift (*darovanie*)" that is common (Bahilina, 1977: 172).

7. In one of his texts, Suvorov notes the importance of Sohm's work (Suvorov, 1894: 47).

8. The circle of authors using it will be gradually expanding. This concept will be used by the greatest church historian A. P. Lebedev (1845–1908) in his brochure "*Charismatic Teachers of the Primordial Church of the 1st and 2nd Centuries*", which later, with changes, was included in his major study "*The Priesthood of the Early Church*" (1905). Lebedev describes the gradual disappearance of apostles, prophets, and teachers, whom he calls a specific "early Christian element", from the life of the Church in the 2nd century (Lebedev, 1903: 24).

> …bishops are in possession of charisma, i. e. the gift of truth, and they, as keepers of Church Tradition, which flows continuously from the Apostles, are to be addressed when seeking the correct interpretation of the Holy Scriptures (14).

This fragment is related to a similar passage from E. Hatch[9], where the latter criticizes the conception of episcopal power as suggested by Irenaeus of Lyons[10]. Suvorov, however, understood episcopal charisma in a positive sense. This is how Suvorov, whether he wanted it or not, connected two different trends in the usage of the concept of "charisma", while trying, presumably, to build a more academic language.

The opposition of office and charisma did not bear either positive or negative connotations for Suvorov. It seems that he, unlike his opponents, did not regard the concept as solely Protestant. He used the word "charisma" as a specific technical term, having introduced it to the language of Canon Law in Russia. His pupils resorted to the same strategy when using the concept, including one of his most famous followers P. V. Giduljanov (1874–1937)[11]. In 1905, Giduljanov successfully presented his master's thesis on a legal status of the metropolitan bishops in the Church of the first three centuries, which served as the foundation for his doctoral thesis on patriarchs in the period of the first four Ecumenical Councils. In these writings, Giduljanov develops Suvorov's idea that after the demise of the apostles' charisma passes from apostles to bishops, but then he does not go on to build any kind of conceptual structure around the concept of "charisma"[12]. Consequently, these instances allow us to define one of the strategies of usage of the concept of "charisma" in Russia in the late 19th century; it came to be used as *terminus technicus*, adopted from the German academic language.

We observe that as "charisma" enters the language, two tendencies emerge in using it. There are different strategies behind them, based on regarding the concept as purely technical or as solely protestant. This distinction indicates that the newly coined term possessed both positive and negative connotations from the outset. The different meanings proposed for the concept by different authors depended on an intellectual circle the authors belonged to[13]. Suvorov was a university professor, and Giduljanov succeeded him as head of the Canon Law Chair of Moscow University. Berdnikov belonged to the theological academic corporation. In both cases, their discussions did not go beyond the dichotomy of "charisma / office", and even if they did not deliberately contrast one against the other, the opposition was implied.

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9. "... the bishop was conceived as having what Irenaeus calls 'charisma veritatis', […] and round the episcopal office revolved the whole vast system, not only of Christian administration and Christian organization, but also of Christian doctrine" (Hatch, 1881: 97–98).

10. See: Irenaeus. *Adversus omnes haereses* 4. 26. 2. Irenaeus' phrase "charisma veritatis" was translated from Latin as "the gift of truth (*darovanie istiny*)" (translated by N. I. Sagarda, 1907).

11. See also the handbook A. A. Mirles. See his definition: "What is charisma? Special gifts of truth that descend upon those who believe in Christianity" (Mirles, 1912: 110).

12. Giduljanov, would write "Every bishop is the successor of the apostles, and, as such, possesses Divine charisma" (Giduljanov, 1905: 1); and "Charisma belongs only to bishops and the Holy Spirit speaks only through them" (Giduljanov, 1908: 68).

13. The problem of "corporatism" in theological polemics in Russia has arisen many times (see: Ermilov, 2017).

Growing debates around the concept of "charisma"

Our earlier examples illustrate the peculiar polemics of Russian Canon Law scholars: this was a new discipline in Russia (Shevzov, 2021), and the debate on terminology was an essential part of its development. Soon, though, the concept of "charisma" outgrew this disciplinary field since its content was no longer property of corporative reflection. Charisma became the subject of discussion of a broader body of Russian theologians, and consequently acquired new meanings. In the course of our research, we came to distinguish three major strategies of usage of the concept of "charisma" that are connected with different ways of understanding the opposition between office and charisma.

Charisma as a personality aspect

I. V. Popov (1867–1938), Professor of the Moscow Theological Academy, was apparently the first scholar in Russia to disengage the concept of charisma from the "charisma / office" discourse. In his work *The Religious Ideal of St. Athanasius of Alexandria* (1903–1904), Popov draws upon K. Holl's book *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum*, which described the "revival" of the charismatic gifts of the apostolic period among Byzantine monastics (1898)[14]. Following Holl, Popov writes:

> When regarding the image of St. Anthony historically, we see in the person of this ascetic a charismatic of previous centuries come to life. … charismatics served the Church but their service was voluntary and wasn't restrained by any form. They took this service upon themselves of their own accord and did what they felt they could do for the Church. Despite the anchoritic character of his feat, which apparently left little room for public activities, St. Anthony was also a free minister of the Church, attending to spiritual and bodily needs of the brethren. (1904: 121).

In this quotation, charisma is identified with a voluntary and informal service to the Church. However, Popov goes on to mention that in monasticism, charisma acquired an individualistic character, which distinguishes this context from that of apostolic times when charismatics had served the entire Church and not individuals (122–123).

In his analysis of Athanasius's *Life of St. Antony,* Popov draws several conclusions important for the understanding of the development of the concept of charisma. He differentiates between two types of charisma, one relating to the fullness of the Church and one to the individual. This idea is further developed in Popov's *Mystical Justification of Asceticism in the Works of St. Macarius of Egypt* (1905) where he connects charisma to the figure of an ascetic who has attained unity with God, i.e., has reached theosis[15]. It means

14. Popov refers to Holl in several of his works (1904: 100, 107, 116, 122). See also Khondzinskiy's work on Holl's influence on Popov (2021).

15. "The ultimate goal of asceticism, according to St. Macarius, is the theosis of human nature, which is the result of a substantial communication of the whole man — both body and soul — with God. The moments of theosis are, firstly, charismas, secondly, the supernatural change of the whole human nature." (Popov, 1905: 57–58).

that charisma becomes attached to the ascetic and mystical discourse in which charisma is opposed to all things formal.

For many of his contemporaries, Popov's research provided the key to understanding the problematic of charisma in the Church. The concept went on to be used in specialized studies on mysticism and asceticism (Zarin, 1907: 273–287; Minin, 1914: 314). In these texts, we see the semantics of charisma undergo a certain transformation; alongside "asceticism", which became the keyword of the epoch (Michelson, 2017), they use the concept of "charismatism", which came to be used both as a designation of a historical epoch and of a human condition. This is how P. Florensky (1882–1937) uses the concept in his *Pillar and Ground of the Truth* (1914):

> Asceticism as a historical phenomenon is a direct continuation of charismatism. In essence, ascetics are late charismatics while charismatics are early ascetics. The spirit-bearers are indisputably related to the ascetics (2004: 216)[16].

I. V. Popov's ideas were most consistently developed by his friend and colleague at the Spiritual Academy, S. I. Smirnov (1870–1916) in his work *The Spiritual Father in the Early Eastern Christian Church* (1906). As with Popov, K. Holl becomes one of the central authors for Smirnov (1906: 40)[17].

In Smirnov's texts, we can find such phrases as the "charismatism of Pachomius", the "charismatism of elders" or the "charismatism of martyrs" (41, 217, 236–237). Smirnov understood the concept, first of all, as an inner spiritual quality, close to theosis, which a person attained through ascetic exercise:

> All ascetic struggle… is only a means to purify human nature. … The deified ascetic becomes God, is bearing God, is bearing the Spirit (θεοφόρος, πνευματοφόρος). He possesses a number of spiritual gifts (τὰ πνευματικὰ, χαρίσματα) which were abundant in the Ancient Church, the evidence of which we see in the historical accounts of the first three Christian centuries. … Thus the charismatic phenomena of the first centuries re-emerged in monasticism. (38–39).

Charisma, therefore, is chiefly understood as a spiritual aspect of personality (unrelated to office) and is associated with pastoral care, and the features of the charismatic ascetic are projected onto the elder as a spiritual guide[18].

As with Popov and Smirnov, we see K. Holl's influence in Florensky's *Pillar and Ground of the Truth*, demonstrated by direct references to Holl's works in their texts. In Russia, their works were preceded by a comprehensive polemic review of Holl's *Enthusi-*

16. In connection with Popov's influence on Florensky, see Gavrilyuk (2022: 118). See also Coates (2019: 174–207).

17. There was a correspondence between Popov and Smirnov in which the dissertation was discussed: Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi biblioteki. F. 280. K. 18. D. 23. L. 17–21; D. 24. L. 34; 42. See also Yachmenik (2022).

18. Smirnov uses the term which means pastoral care exercised by the elders (*starcheskoe pastyrstvo;* 33, 70, 174, 194, 207, 296, 324).

asmus und Bussgewalt containing a detailed rendering of its contents, which was written by Suvorov (1899). This is an important detail since in Russia, the interest in *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewal*t arose before the interest in *Kirchenrecht* by R. Sohm, which was published in Russian only in 1906. It does not mean that academics had not read this text in the original (let us recall the polemics of Berdnikov and Suvorov where his name was mentioned), but the publication of the first part of the first volume of *Kirchenrecht*, carried out by P. Florensky and A. Petrovsky, had symbolic meaning in that it served to emphasize the importance of the text. The idea of the translation arose, apparently, during discussions of the problem of power in the Church during the meetings of a religious revolutionary movement called the "Christian Brotherhood of Struggle" (1905–1908)[19]. The translation was consequently published as part of the *Religious and Social Library* series, found by the Brotherhood[20].

While working on the translation, Florensky was writing one of his early theological texts *The Concept of the Church in Sacred Scripture* (1906), which explains his interest in R. Sohm. In this work, Florensky placed "charismatics" in a separate group, distinctive from both clerics and laity, whose aim was to "purify the consciousness of the Church" and to invoke other groups to follow "the voice of free conscience" (2018: 326).

These ideas were later developed by Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), who was under the intellectual influence of Florensky at this period of time. In his work *On early Christianity* (1909)[21], he maintained that the early Church organization had been "neither aristocratic nor democratic, but *charismatic*", and this is why it hadn't included the "secular office of bishops and presbyters" (104) at its early stages. It had been charismatics who conveyed religious experience (Ibid.)[22].

The same idea was represented in the *History of Religion* textbook (1909), written by the same former Brotherhood members Elchaninov, Ern, and Florensky, and joined by Bulgakov. In the chapter on Christianity, we see the Church administration characterized, using Sohm's theory, as charismatic power. It is exercised through people, who

> are not chosen by certain people or elected by a majority of votes, but are marked by the gifts of God, by the so-called charisma, the presence of which in the person is acknowledged unanimously by the community (Istorija religii, 1909: 138).

We see that the discourse on charisma was not developed entirely by academics, but also by religious philosophers who focused their attention on the aspect of charisma related to freedom and personal religious experience.

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19. Its main participants, besides Florensky, were V. P. Sventsitsky, A. V. Elchaninov, and V. F. Ern. On the Brotherhood, see Chertkov (2017).

20. For the context of the translators' work, see Ivanova (2004: 580–582).

21. The text is a report made in 1908. Later, the article was included in Bulgakov's book *Two Cities* (1911).

22. Apparently, the concept of charisma falls here into the broader context of the development of the concept of religious experience in Russia (Antonov, 2007), and it may also fall within Weber's sphere of influence (Teslya, 2019).

Charisma as controlled by office

The popularity of charisma, understood as a personality aspect opposed to the office, apparently provoked various attempts to overcome the opposition of "charisma / office" among those, who disliked both Holl's and Sohm's conceptions.

S. I. Smirnov's understanding of charisma as a spiritual gift of an ascetic, as "charismatism", drew a crushing critical response from P. V. Giduljanov. In particular, Giduljanov criticizes Smirnov's statement that the source of power of a spiritual father lies in his charisma (Giduljanov, 1907: 417–418). According to Giduljanov, it wasn't personal charisma which played a key role in monastic confession, but the will of an official;

> Charisma is a gift of God, whereas in this case the issue was irrefutably decided either by the office or by the will of a father superior, who appointed the elder whom he approved of, spiritual father of the monastery (436–437)[23].

It seems that Giduljanov disapproved of Smirnov's positioning charisma as a gift independent from hierarchical rank, an assumption Giduljanov considered based upon Holl's ideas. According to Giduljanov, charismatic individuals in a monastery were controlled by the Father Superior, i.e., an office-bearer.

Another important milestone in the discussion of the "charisma / office" opposition was N. A. Zaozersky's critical review (1909–1911) on the book by R. Sohm (for details, see Shevzov, 2021: 235–236). It seems that in this text, Zaozersky (1851–1919) did not only argue with Sohm but also spoke out against the thinkers who held a similar opinion.

In an earlier work, Zaozersky stated that the instances of charismatic life in the early Christian communities interfered with the Church order, which made it necessary to establish offices which would exercise authority over the charismatic individuals (1891: 63). This chain of reasoning did not imply the denial of charisma as such since it was viewed rather as a natural part of the Church order, complementing its legal structure. This is why in his review, Zaozersky spoke out against opposing the free and the legal organisation of the Church, as done by Sohm. He accordingly calls Sohm's ideas "the theory of illegal Church" (playing on the semantics of the Russian word "bespravnaya") (1911: 7). He suggests another model instead:

> Charismatics have never been hierarchs by virtue of their gifts; they became hierarchs only when the Church congregation, led by the hierarchs, chose to ordain or lay hands on them. If the twelve apostles — who were chosen directly by the Lord and received from Him the fullness of Church power — hadn't existed, there would have been no charismatics. … Then, as well as later, they appeared as a special, con-

23. Here is another phrasing of this opposition he disapproved of as well: "This approach to the power of the keys as a separate gift of the Holy Spirit, independent of hierarchical rank, resulted in the assimilation of the gift by the monastics, who were viewed as the epigones of ancient charismatics and martyrs" (Ibid.: 435). Also refer to an unpublished Smirnov's answer to this criticism, which explains the author's understanding of "monastic charismatism" (Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi biblioteki. F. 280. K. 9. D. 2. L. 5).

> tingent instrument of the Divine Providence over the Church: the hierarchy, again, is a constant, necessary institution (76–77).

Zaozersky describes the office-bearers as leaders of the Church, who control charismatic ministries. Church power is a category used to define the hierarchical order in the Church: bishops, as the successors of the apostles, receive it when ordained. It is this which distinguishes the bearers of charisma from the hierarchs.

Zaozersky doesn't deny the existence of charisma, it was the absolutisation of this element of the life of the Church that he opposed. That is why he excludes charisma from the sphere of the necessary organization and includes it into the sphere of the contingent. His idea, apparently, was that the Church as an institution cannot live without hierarchy, just as any other institution cannot live without a legal framework (34). For this reason, he believes Sohm's rendition of the conception of the charismatic organization of the Church as damaging to the Church structure.

The critical reactions of Giduljanov and Zaozersky contributed to the development of the charisma discourse, and caused the opposition between "charisma" and "office" to evolve even further.

Office as charisma

The authors we are going to review in this paragraph did not criticize their predecessors directly, but it is highly probable that their critical response was triggered by the transformation of the charisma discourse; consequently, they suggested a new meaning for the term. Their main points are summarized below.

V. N. Myshcyn (1866–1936) in his doctoral thesis on the *Structure of the Christian Church in the First Two Centuries* (1909) remarked, that using the concept of "charisma" didn't help describe Church structure:

> The difference [between the apostles and the bishops — *V. Ya.*] … is not that the first ministry was charismatic, and the second wasn't. This relatively widespread notion would not have been in keeping with the spirit of the early Church and the way it is represented in the primary sources. The latter consider administration a ministry as full of grace as preaching. There exists a charisma of apostleship, of prophecy and of teaching, as well as a charisma of administration, of presiding, of serving tables and so on. (157).

In Myshcyn's conception, all forms of Christian ministry, including the legal ones, are charismatic. This allows him to speak of charisma and office as coinciding in the person of the clergyman: "The charisma of administration for him [for the ap. Paul — *V. Ya.*] coincides with the bearers of administrative functions" (60). On these grounds, Myshcyn criticizes the idea that the community should test the bearer of the charisma[24]. He infers

24. Mytshcyn here is plainly critical of R. Sohm's idea, which was further developed in both in Catholic and Orthodox theologies (Köhler, 1998).

that the community is, on the contrary, in no position to acknowledge the leader, but obeys the authoritative body because it possesses the gift of grace (160).

We find a similar approach in the magisterial thesis of M. Fivejsky (1856–1919), *Spiritual Gifts in the Early Christian Church* (1907), where he analyzes the idea of charismata in the corpus of Paul's epistles. Fivejsky largely based his reflections on J. Englmann (1817–1879), a Catholic author of the second half of the 19th century, who played a key role in this field[25]. Following him, Fivejsky defines charisma as every form of Christian state[26]. Church offices, accordingly, have nothing to do with the bureaucratic system, but are themselves "the ministries devoid of official character, or rather the powers that govern and administer the Christian society" (1907: 67).

He eliminates the opposition between charisma and office by reinterpreting the concept of office as a category which excludes bureaucratic connotations. Charisma, in his view, includes all forms of Christian ministry and underlies all offices, while being opposed to everything formal (or official), beginning with power and hierarchy:

> The word "hierarchy" is used neither in the New Testament nor in the writings of the apostolic fathers. … the people who worked for the good of the Church of the Apostolic Age were characterized not by ἐξουσία (power), but by διακονία (ministry) (68).

Charismatic ministry, expressed in church offices, excludes both official and bureaucratic interaction, as well as hierarchical patterns built on power. We see here another step in the transformation of the charisma discourse; it broadens to include the sphere of the unofficial.

The works of Myshcyn and Fivejsky are not the only texts reflecting the change in the charisma discourse. In 1916, Giduljanov published a leaflet called *The Essence and Legal Nature of Church Rule*. This text marked a new step in his understanding of the charismatic.

The key to Giduljanov's ideas lies in his understanding of the Church structure as a charismatic organization. He writes that "Because of the generous distribution of the gifts of grace the organization of the Church is charismatic" (1916: 15–16). We see two problems in connection with this statement. Firstly, if every believer is a holder of charisma, i.e., has a charismatic calling to any activity in the Church, it means that charismatic organization is by nature a community of people, who freely obey the will of God (14). This "voluntary obedience" acquires at a certain stage a characteristic meaning of "power,

25. His basic ideas figured in the "Charismata" article of the *Old Catholic Encyclopedia* of 1913. On the import of this text and on further development of the topic in Catholic theology, see Reshchikova (2022).

26. "Any form in which Christian religious life somehow or other manifested itself was a charisma, a gift of God, following directly from the work of the Holy Spirit on the human soul" (Fivejsky, 1907: 11). He constructs the interrelation of office and charisma along the same lines: "The powers had already appeared and started to operate even before the office was defined and received a corresponding name. Their source is charisma; the form of their expression is ministry" (67).

which comes from a feeling of dependence of the believers on the will of God which rules the Church" (37).

The introduction of the topic of Church power leads to a second problem. The free charismatic organization also includes people who "possess a more powerful charisma" and consequently occupy a higher position in the Church (14). Giduljanov however, doesn't go on to interpret this figure simply as a governing body and defines it as a teaching authority. He writes:

> Only the person who possesses the gift of teaching can give definitions regarding the structure of ecclesia (ordination), permission to accept a person into community, taking disciplinary action, since only the word if God, and not some decision of a communal meeting as such, is called upon to give answer to all these questions (17).

The absolute power, which is based on the charisma of teaching, extends not only to the lay members of the community, but to the official hierarchy as well. The source of this power is the word of God, conferred to the charismatic by virtue of His gift.

Then, Giduljanov states that the most representative bearer of the gift of teaching is the prophet. However, he existed only for a short period of time in his pure form (21). His place in history was taken by the bishop, who possesses charisma due to his Church office:

> With the disappearance of the true prophets, the only true prophecy that remains is the episcopal ecstasy, which is based on his office. ... After this gift ceased to manifest itself in the natural course of things, the only prophecy that remained was the one that was based on office, flowing from the grace of ordination: the prophetic gift of the bishop (23–24).

Giduljanov makes an important step in the development of the charisma discourse by introducing the figure of a prophet as an ideal type of charismatic power. However, he does more than project this type on to the early Christian charismatics; he extends it to the episcopate, which he defines as possessing the prophetic gift, having received it not in a "natural way", but through ordination.

At this stage of development, we see several strategies of using the concept of charisma, the choice of which depended on the interests of different researcher groups. The first group, represented by I. V. Popov, S. I. Smirnov, and P. Florensky, understood charisma as a personality aspect, while the other two (in many aspects similar) groups (V. N. Myshcyn, M. Fivejsky, N. A. Zaozersky, P. V. Giduljanov, et al.) insisted either on an unconditional connection between charisma and office by virtue of ordination, or on a model in which charisma as an element of the Church life remained under the control of the office-bearers.

These authors already perceive "charisma" as a conventional term. In their texts, we see the presence of a key figure which, in the corresponding theory, is the bearer of cha-

risma. The elder represents an ideal type of charismatic power-bearer for the first group, while the second group chooses the figure of the prophet. It appears that the figure of the prophet allows them to interpret charisma as a teaching function, and thus to connect the charismatic teachers of the Apostolic Age with the succeeding bishops as bearers of the church office[27].

The projection of "charisma" onto the Church practice

The works dating to pre-revolutionary years mark yet another stage in the development of the charisma discourse in Russia: the authors of these texts make statements referring to Church practice. The texts were published following discussions of Church reform which made it clear that "charisma" was applicable. For instance, in the preface to his book, Fivejsky refers to the discussions in the Pre-Council Commission (1906), when stating that we need to "reform and reorganize our Church on a new basis" (1907: 4)[28]. By this, he means the necessity to revive charisma ("the new basis") as a specific feature of the ancient Church.

"Charisma" in the discussions of the Church reform

We see the concept of "charisma" used in several documents connected with the Church reform of the early 20th century, i.e., the protocols of the Pre-Council Commission (Predsobornoe prisutstvie. Vol. 2, 2014: 862) and the "Commentary of the Diocesan Bishops on the Question of Church Reform" (1905) (Polunov, Solov'ev. Vol. 2, 2004: 997). These sources, on the one hand, are not sufficiently representative since they only contain examples of technical usage of the concept. On the other hand, they belong to the range of documents directly relevant to Church reform. This allows us to interpret the discussion around the reform as a search for a person who could be thought of as a bearer of charisma. The implicit presence of this tendency is easy to track in the documents of the All-Russian Church Council of 1917–1918[29].

The council, as demonstrated by recent research, reconsidered the model of the conciliar Church government (Destivelle, 2006). However, the contemporary theological thought in Russia did not reduce itself to the juxtaposition of corporate and individual leadership within the Church, but also meant to reinterpret the phenomenon of Church power as such. "Charisma" was part of that same context, although it did not play a leading role in the conciliar discussions.

One of the most intriguing statements concerning charisma was made by Archbishop Mitrofan (Krasnopolsky, 1869–1919), who brought the issue of restoring the patriarchate

27. This is not the only example in Russian history when the figure of the prophet is connected with charisma (not to mention Western thought, especially M. Weber), see Yachmenik, Makarova (2022).

28. See the controversy between Suvorov and Zaozersky over charismatic organization as a model for modern church life (Predsobornoe prisutstvie. Vol. 1, 2014: 28–29).

29. One of the examples concerning the use of the concept of "charisma" at the All-Russian Council was studied in this article Yachmenik (2021).

in the Russian Church to the attention of the Council, and provided a rationale for it. He declared that the prospective patriarch was not going to be an "autarch", but a "charismatic person" (Kolcherin, Mramornov, 2015: 485). An interesting detail is that in the typescript of this speech the patriarch is described as "having received the gift of grace" (*oblagodatstvovannyj*), which is crossed-out by hand and replaced by an adjective derived from the word charisma. The question of whether this is a relevant example of the textological problem remains unanswered. In any case, other examples of charisma-usage from the protocols demonstrate that it was used to juxtapose the individual and the collective (which reminds us of the ideas of I. V. Popov, one of the participants of the Council). Soon after the speech of Archbishop Mitrofan, N. N. Fioletov (1891–1943) observed that individual leadership had formed historically and there was no Church teaching on a first hierarch's charisma:

> All bishops are equal in what concerns their grace-given powers. The privilege of the Roman Cathedra is not based on charisma, not based on the gifts of grace, but has developed historically (534).

Fioletov mentions the Roman Cathedra because of an idea popular with some of the participants of the Council who regarded patriarchate as a "Russian papacy" which would be inevitable if the Church restored the rank of the patriarch (Suvorov, 2020: 123–149). Based on these examples we infer that the patriarch is primarily understood not as an individual leader, but as a rank-bearer who equals his fellow-bishops in the possession of charisma. Another author resorting to a similar pattern of usage is S. Bulgakov, who wrote in 1922:

> … the Church power is personal by nature, it is charisma itself, and charisma is not given to collegiums or consistories. Charisma requires a personal bearer. *The crisis of the Church power in Orthodoxy* — and I continue insisting on it — is caused by the absence of a personal bearer of this power (2019: 73)[30].

Here and in some other parts of his work *At the Walls of Chersonese,* Bulgakov is critical of Fioletov's speech declaring that the patriarch has no special charisma[31]. Bulgakov understands charisma as a personality aspect not in the sense of its being related to the personal qualities of an individual, but in the sense of its coming to manifest itself only in individual leadership[32]. Nevertheless, this text allows us to document another instance of using charisma in the context of the opposition of the individual and the collective in connection with the patriarch. This opposition gained significance in the post-revolutionary years in connection with the new status of the Church in the state.

30. Bulgakov's italics.

31. He writes: "Orthodox theologians insist that the Patriarch is a bishop who does not have any special charisma" (68). Cf. with Fioletov's theses (Kolcherin, Mramornov, 2015: 534).

32. These thoughts, apparently, reflect Bulgakov's desire to convert to Catholicism, but later he reconsidered these ideas (Borsch, 2008: 75–80).

This demonstrates how charisma is used within the problematics of the contemplated scheme of the Church government. As a strategy, this concept allows for the presenting the figure of the patriarch as a personal power, which at the same time, cannot be reduced to monarchical rule.

"Charisma" in the discussion regarding the legalization of the Church in the Soviet Union

The next case of usage of the charisma concept is found in the polemic texts, written as a reaction to the Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky, 1867–1944) issued in July 1927, where he professed the loyalty of the Russian Church to the Soviet Union. We see the concept in the collection of articles called *The Metropolitan Sergiy's Dossier* (1929), which criticize Metropolitan Sergius' Church-politics. It includes a text by Bishop Pavel (Kratirov, 1871–1932) "A letter of a bishop who 'departed' to a bishop who 'did not depart'" (1927), where we see a specific interpretation of the concept of "charisma":

> The episcopal ministry in the Church of Christ, after the extraordinary ministries of the Apostolic Age ceased to exist, combines all ministries including the prophetic one. The bishop, like the charismatic-prophet, should rightly handle the Word of Truth, he should, with the help of grace, look, praying, through the darkness which surrounds the Church of God at the historical setting[33].

At this stage, the position of a "bishop who departed" means a total rejection of the participation of the state in the organization of Church life; in other words, Bishop Pavel disapproves of the project of the legalization of the Church.

Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky) conversely, in his article titled *Does Christ have a vicar in the Church*? (published posthumously), appears to respond directly to the concept of the "charismatic prophet". Though the article belongs to the field of comparative theology, it is not difficult to interpret some of its fragments as an evaluation of the difficulties the author encountered in his life. Thus, Patriarch Sergius writes:

> And like He sent His prophets and judges to ancient Israel, thus in trying times He sends exceptionally gifted people, as if prophets, strong in spirit and faith, to help the Church. Not having an official rank, these people come forward from the crowd and become the leaders of others. This leadership isn't official and doesn't constitute a Church office and doesn't always stay within the framework of the official. As with any prophecy, this is a personal feat of these people, a matter of their private initiative and zeal for the Lord and the Church. Being temporal and in a way accidental, this feat doesn't mean they have a right to rule the Church or to occupy an episcopal seat. (1947: 70).

While not using the concept of charisma, Patriarch Sergius speaks of the prophets as of the people "possessing extraordinary gifts of grace" (a formula which is close in meaning to charisma), and admits that they have played an important role in Church history.

33. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii. F. 5991. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 74 rev.

At the same time, he observes that they are not authorized to rule the Church. In these words we see a certain kind of response; this is how a bearer and a defender of Church office reacts to the discourse on informal charismatism.

These examples seem to be genetically connected with the charisma discourse which was developing before the Revolution. The text of Metropolitan Pavel (Kratirov) describes a direct connection between charisma and prophecy in the person of a bishop (the "charismatic-bishop") which was present in the pre-revolutionary texts, but the document of 1927 has a different emphasis. While P. V. Giduljanov derived the prophetic function of episcopal charisma from the fact of the ordination, for Kratirov, the performing of this function was possible only when the bearer of the office did what was right and had God's help[34]. We find Patriarch Sergius apparently appealing to a different aspect of pre-revolutionary discussions. He differentiates between prophecy as a personal initiative which does not function as Church power, and office as an authoritative function in the Church. This scheme seems to be close to the ideas of N. A. Zaozersky, who described charisma in the terms of cconstant control and viewed charisma as an extraordinary phenomenon in the life of the Church.

The presence of the concept of charisma in the polemics around the 1927 Declaration allows us to single out a new strategy of its usage, that of the performative strategy. This makes this case different from that of pre-revolutionary texts where charisma figures as part of the discussion on what should be or on *how* it was in the course of history. The intention of the authors who engaged in the polemics of the first decades after the revolution have a direct practical relation to the contemporary situation in the Church, because these polemics revolved around the question of the normativity of Church organization. This example of the usage of the opposition of charisma and office culminates our conceptual history research. The generation of thinkers we considered leave the intellectual field: some of them (e.g., S. Bulgakov) migrate and further develop their ideas in a different context, but the majority perish.

Conclusion

In Russia, the concept of "charisma" was introduced in the late 19th century. It was used initially in translated literature, which provoked discussion among Russian academics. We were able to uncover two focal points in the usage of charisma at this time; one group used it as a relevant academic term (Suvorov), while another group understood it as an alien concept unfit to be used within the framework of Orthodox theology (Berdnikov). In the first case, the authors used it as a Western theological term, the contents of which were not as yet clearly defined in Russia. Suvorov extends the term both to the Apostolic Church, which he maintains to be free from legal control, and to the office of the bishop. In the second case, which is represented chiefly by Berdnikov, we see a critical strategy,

34. Kratirov's concept seems to be close to the ideas of M. A.Novoselov about the authority of the bishop, who, most likely, included his text in the collection (Kosik, 2013: 176–177). See Novoselov's views (Ermilov, Paromov, 2019).

which implied that by introducing a term alien to Orthodox theology, their opponents accepted an alien understanding of Church power. By means of this argument, the concept of charisma enters the Russian language carrying both positive and negative connotations.

After a dialectic reception, the concept becomes more widespread and its usage more conventional. This process takes place in the pre-revolutionary years; there various researcher groups emerge, suggesting their own understanding of the concept of charisma. We identified three strategies of its usage at this stage.

Firstly, we singled out an understanding of charisma as an aspect of personality. On the one hand, the concept is placed in the ascetic discourse (Popov). At this level, charisma (which becomes "charismatism") is connected with the person of an ascetic, who by virtue of his ascetic practices, reaches theosis (Popov, Florensky). The concept of charisma comes to be used in the field of pastoral care; this is why Smirnov draws an analogy between the images of a charismatic ascetic and an elder acting as a spiritual father. Apparently, this strategy is based upon K. Holl's ideas, which Russian authors tried to apply in the Russian context. On the other hand (and this tendency appears to be connected with the ideas of R. Sohm), charisma is found in Russian religious philosophers' discourse in a sphere which is connected with the concept of religious experience (Bulgakov). Here, the realm of the personal and the realm of freedom become the key aspects of charisma.

Secondly, we marked out several authors who made arguments against the paradigm of Holl / Sohm as a separate polemic group. An alternative interpretation of Holl's conception was suggested by Giduljanov, who stated that it was not ascetic charismatism that was instrumental to the development of pastoral power of spiritual fathers, but a specific monastic order based on the will of an official. Sohm was criticized by Zaozersky who asserted the necessity of the legal element in the Church organization which would control the extraordinary charismatic phenomena through office-bearers. This model did not doubt the existence of charisma as a phenomenon, but viewed it as an exceptional occurrence in the life of the Church.

Thirdly, there exists a number of authors who differ in their strategy of using "charisma" from both already-mentioned groups. In their case, office is re-interpreted as charisma in order to partly eliminate the dichotomy of "charisma / office". Their main argument was that the opposition does not reflect the structure of the Ancient Church (Myshcyn), where Church office was one of the ways charisma manifested itself (Fivejsky, Giduljanov). Nevertheless, they viewed charisma as a phenomenon related to the field of the informal / unofficial and opposed to bureaucratism (Fivejsky, Giduljanov). The ideas formed within the group gave rise to the conception that the ideal type of charismatic power is represented by the prophet, whose teaching role is inherited by the bishop (Giduljanov), the latter being opposed to the ascetic as the bearer of personal charisma.

Different connotations of the concept of "charisma" and various intentions behind its usage strategies formed a unique discourse on charisma in the pre-revolutionary years. Theoretical debates of the time, apparently, answered to the practical challenges faced

by the Church, and which were discussed in the context of Church reform. Thus, the concept of charisma gradually became a kind of a performative act. We can hardly speak of the influence of a certain group in this case; it is more likely that practical discussions involved using the whole range of available ideas. When viewing the arguments in favor of the restoration of the patriarchate, we see the concept of charisma identified with office (episcopal charisma). However, when speaking of the future patriarch as a "charismatic person", the participants of the Council implied his personal charismatic power. Presumably, we see here the development of Popov's idea of individual and universal (Church) charismata, which use the pastoral function of spiritual gifts in diverse ways.

Finally, we see the concept in the context of discussions around the 1927 Declaration of loyalty of the Church toward the Soviet government. Metropolitan Pavel (Kratirov) criticizes Metropolitan Sergius using the conception of the charismatic power of the prophet. According to Metropolitan Pavel, officials should succeed prophets not only in terms of ordination, but also liken their lives to those of the prophets. In other words, according to his conception, charisma legitimizes office, not vice versa. Apparently, when answering this discourse, Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky), who became Patriarch as a result of his Church politics, used a different strategy. In his understanding. the interpretation of the opposition between "charisma" and "office" depended on the meaning of office, perceived as an official position in a religious corporation, with the task of controlling personal charismatic initiative.

The fact that charisma figures in the polemics between Metropolitan Pavel and Metropolitan Sergius allows us to view this complex setup against the background of pre-revolutionary discussions. In this context, "charisma" becomes a performative act used in polemics between the bishops on how to organize the life of the contemporary Church.

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Стратегии использования понятия харизмы в русской мысли конца XIX — первой трети XX вв.

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В статье анализируется возникновение и развитие понятия харизмы в России конца XIX — первой трети XX вв. Это слово в русском языке активно начинают использовать в начале 1880-х годов, когда выходят переводные сочинения немецких теологов. Если ранее библейское слово *charisma* бытовало как «дар» или «дарование», то в конце XIX века предпочитают транслитерацию этого слова, чтобы передать новые коннотации понятия «харизма». В статье показано, как понятие обретает новые смыслы, при этом обращается внимание на почти традиционное противопоставление харизмы и должности. Выявлено три варианта этой оппозиции в текстах, описывающих церковную организацию: во-первых, харизма, понятая как личностное начало, будет противопоставлена «должности» как началу обезличенному; во-вторых, в соответствии с альтернативной стратегией употребления этой оппозиции, «должность» предстает как инстанция, контролирующая «харизму»; в-третьих, встречаются концепции, в которых снимается противопоставление «харизма / должность» благодаря их отождествлению. В статье показано, как в контексте подготовки Всероссийского собора 1917–1918 годов изменяется употребление этого понятия, когда оно обретает практическую значимость. В документах собора о должности патриарха говорится именно в терминах духовного авторитета и харизмы. Это же понятие используется для критики церковной политики митрополита Сергия (Страгородского) со стороны ряда непоминающих его иерархов в 1930-е годы. Вывод статьи заключается в том, что вхождение понятия харизмы в теологию оказало значительное влияние на понимание церковной власти как до революции, так и после нее, — что, в целом, иллюстрирует аргумент о значении силы слов, обладающих трансформирующим для истории потенциалом.

Ключевые слова: харизма, должность, власть, авторитет, теология, Церковь.

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Georg Simmel and Semyon Frank: from Kant to *Lebensphilosophie*

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Georg Simmel's legacy is traditionally distinguished between sociological and philosophical works so that researchers have little overlap in his areas of interest with their colleagues.

Simmel, however, was different in each of these disciplines. It is particularly evident in the context of his relationship with Kant. His sociology, more relevant before 1908, leads to Kant, while his philosophy (the so-called Lebensphilosophie or 'philosophy of life') developed after 1908, is opposed to Kant. This research aims to explain this dichotomy.

Many thinkers transitioned from Kant to Simmel's Lebensphilosophie, including Simmel's student, Semyon Frank, whose fate resembles that of his teacher in many ways. Frank attended his lectures in 1898, translated and reviewed his works, and wrote about Simmel in his own essays. In general, it is difficult to find a figure among the foreign contemporaries of Frank who had a more significant influence on him than Simmel.

In many ways, Frank was Simmel's Russian counterpart: both were baptized Jews in Christian countries; both passed through a school of controversial opinions in many ways fatal to their destiny; both were exiles, despite their prolificacy and significance, and both were unsteady in their academic statuses, but highly appreciated by their colleagues.

Frank is a well-known figure in the history of Russian religious philosophy, but his philosophy in the context of his path from Kantianism to his philosophy of life has not been sufficiently studied. This research also aims to fill this gap and to present Frank to Simmel's readers.

Keywords: Simmel, Frank, Kantianism, Lebensphilosophie, Goethe, Russia

Velut aegri somnia vanae finguntur species

I Kant for philosophy of life

In the history of *Lebensphilosophie,* Kant was a very significant but ambiguous figure. For example, Bergson, as one of *Lebensphilosophie* key figures, contrasted his main point in 1889 to "the associationists and the determinists…on the one side, and the Kantians on the other" (2001: 238-239). Dilthey, a founding-father of *Lebensphilosophie* echoed Bergson in 1922 with his words that "no real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought" (1989: 50).

It is possible to identify Kant as an eternal opponent to *Lebensphilosophie.* However, it will be much more precise to describe him as the prime irritant for *Lebensphilosophie*. No question can be asked regarding *who we claim to be Lebensphilosophen,* but *what do we*

regard as Lebensphilophie? There is no need to trace the origin of the term, but rather the origin of the problem which had already been in existence before the term was coined. Rickert admits that *Lebensphilosophie's* predecessors experienced Kant's appreciable influence (1920: 188). Was it not then that the problem emerged?

It suffices to recall the figure who became "the common point of departure for most of the philosophers of life … who had received little attention in his own day but whose posthumous reputation was all the more spectacular: Arthur Schopenhauer" (Joas, 1996:117). Leo Shestov, a famous Russian philosopher and a close friend of Edmund Husserl, gives an accurate description of this relation, asking in 1912, "Where are the Kantians who attempt to make deductions from the proposition as to the subjectivity of space and time?" (1916:187) and answering that the philosopher "Schopenhauer is the only exception. He indeed took the Kantian idea seriously, but it may be said without exaggeration that of all Kantians the least like Kant was Schopenhauer." (Ibid.).

It would seem that this is only a particular case from the history of thought of a "predecessor" to *Lebensphilosophie*, but if we turn to his other "predecessors", will it not be possible to find Kantian impulses there as well? Kierkegaard wrote in 1846 that he "admires Haman" (1992: 250), and that he "was often inspired by Jacobi" [Ibid.], but who inspired the thing in Haman, Jacobi, and throughout the German academic community that in its turn inspired Kierkegaard in such a way? Was it not the example of "Hegel's relation to Kant" (328) that has become a cause why "the dubiousness of the [Hegelian] method … become quite obvious" (Ibid.) to Kierkegaard? The same can be said even about Nietzsche; his acceptance of Schopenhauer in 1872 was also the acceptance of Kant (1911: I, 139-140, 153) and his subsequent rejection of Schopenhauer in 1881 was also the rejection of Kant (1911: IX, 339).

The long winding road from *Lebensphilosophie* through Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and others, albeit in a curious way, leads to Kant.

The Neo-Kantian attitude towards *Lebensphilosophie* was rather indulgent, with a hint at understanding as they saw it as a new turn of irrationalist philosophy: "They expressed the revolt against what was felt to be an ossified culture, a rebellion which in many respects was reminiscent of the *Sturm und Drang* movement of the late eighteenth century, but which now had something more closely resembling a mass base" (Joas, 1996: 117). *Lebenpsphilosophen* looked at Kant in a more complex way, mainly as a criminal looks at Leviathan: it is quite impossible not to come in contact with him, but one who does will be forced either to fight him (with about the same chance of winning) or to obey. In this sense, the most exciting example seems to be Georg Simmel, who is ranked equally as a Kantian and as a philosopher of life.

II Simmel: from Kant to philosophy of life

The first questions should be posed here: what is Simmel's Kantianism, and what is his *Lebensphilosophie?*

It is possible to reveal the content of these concepts only after having them differentiated as much as possible. The problems of distinguishing between them will lead to

their essence. It is possible to draw such a distinction on the basis of the periodization of Simmel's work.

This research is based on Max Frischeisen-Kohler's periodization that was the first to divide Simmel's works into three periods, those of his Darwinist-positivist-biological pragmatism, his Kantianism, and then his *Lebensphilosophie* (1920: 10-24). Later, M. Landmann developed and refined this periodization (Simmel, 1987: 7-8). He proposed to divide Simmel's career into three periods, each of them lasting about a decade, from the positivist-minded philosopher (1888-1898) to the Kantian one (1898-1908), and later to *Lebensphilosophie* (1908-1918).

The advantages of this interpretation come from its flaws and vice-versa. It is simple, accurate, and can be traced by relying on Simmel's area of interest at each period of his life. For the same reasons, this interpretation does not offer any complex view of Simmel's work since the latter is split somehow into three parts. Therefore, it solves the problem of organizing Simmel's work within different periods of his life, but faces another problem of the interrelation between these periods. At the same time, the prioritization of the whole of Simmel's work (for example, in the context of his relationship to Kant) is still relevant.

It is not possible to trace the causes of these dynamics by simply stating some changes in the author's thought; if we proceed in this way we are bound to deal only with its consequences. However, this periodization of Simmel's work remains the only form of its reception; it cannot provide us with the key to understanding it after simply pointing out the problem. Thus, we propose then to attach some key (i.e., the hierarchical principle) to Simmel's entire work, which will also complement this periodization.

This principle may be based on the preface to the second edition of *Introduction to the Science of Morality* [*Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*] (Filippov, 1994: 65). Simmel admits here that "further development of [his] views constitutes more replenishment than a simple denial of the preceding" [1904: 5]. At the same time, this phrase reflects Simmel's attitude to his previous works while signaling the program to develop his future thoughts. However, there are reasons to believe that it applies to only his subsequent works. An argument in favor of such an assumption lies in Simmel's attitude towards his three early seminal works.

Simmel's first major work, *On Social Differentiation* [*Über soziale Differenzierung*] (1890), was not highly appreciated by him (Filippov, 2019: 239). The second work, published in 1892, *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* [*Die Probleme der Geschichtphilosophie*] was profoundly revised in the second edition (1905), while the third edition (1907) practically does not differ from the second version (241). Simmel was firmly against republishing his third work titled *Introduction to the Science of Morality* (in the first edition of 1892-1893) (Rammstedt, 2012: 310). *Introduction to the Science of Morality* and *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* were not among his favorites in their original drafts but were regularly revised and republished, while *On Social Differentiation* was not. Given that *Kant* was awarded four lifetime editions, it seems correct to assume that Simmel was free to decide on the subsequent fate of *On Social Differentiation*.

However, he preferred to consign this work to oblivion; he did not entirely discard the early oeuvre but it definitely had lost its relevance.

Based on this principle and the periodization that has already become classical (Levine, D. N. (1997): 179), the question of Simmel's *early period* seems to be reduced in the context of this research, but it can be re-actualized by a different prism of reception, that is, not when each period is assumed to be self-sufficient, but when one of these periods is assumed to be the main one while the others are considered to be subordinate. Thus, three variants of the prism arise here, each a preference of a particular period, or rather the prevalence of fundamental ideas over others in different periods. So, if classical periodization is an internal key because it is based on and subordinated directly to Simmel's ideas and concepts in each separate period, then, by focusing on one side of that prism, one primary idea determines the whole system and becomes the key to the whole of Simmel's oeuvre.

When the early period is considered to be the cornerstone, the choice of the first prism is not a frequent option. A severe limitation for this choice is the circumstances we mentioned above and the fact that Simmel later criticized his early works by saying that "until the age of 35" he was, "actually, silly" (Filippov, 2019: 239). To a much greater extent, his later writings represent Simmel both to his contemporaries and to today's researchers. Although it is wrong to entirely ignore the works of that period, we will have to skip too many important details to consider them as the essence of his entire heritage. The second (*Kantian*) and the third (*philosophy of life*) variants of the prism have their arguments, both pro and con. Before proceeding to their descriptions, though, it is necessary to take the specific case into account where one period subjugates the other, albeit in a slightly different form, that is, not as a starting point of reasoning, but as an outcome. This conclusion can be drawn from the adoption of the third prism, where the first period is subjected to the third one (philosophy of life) and opposed to the second (Kantian). Thus, Kantian ideas are either believed to be the beginning of the third period (the subordination of the second period to the third one), or are supposed to be temporary deviations from the path outlined in the early period (the subordination of the second period to the first one).

A prism like this was used by J. Bleicher, who wrote that "already in 1896 asking *What is Kant to Us?* Simmel refers to the classic of German Idealism as a representative of an obsolete position, one that tries to offer a kind of unitary account. The 'modern Weltanschauung', in contrast, recognizes the 'living flux of development' and sees 'the forms of cognition as subject to the stream of development" (2007: 151). This prism argues for the temporary affirmative appearance of Kant in Simmel's philosophy. However, one can object that Simmel was not only well versed in Kant, (one of the reasons he was strongly recommended to defend the thesis on his philosophy (Frisby, 2002: 10)), but was even his admirer — yet, in an extraordinary and even radical sense — already with *On Social Differentiation*, which "hinted at its positivist inheritance" even by its title (Liebersohn, 1988: 130).

Simmel is one of the most striking examples of the philosopher who defines himself more through his questions (especially unsolvable ones), rather than answers, though the most important achievement of *On Social Differentiation* for Simmel's sociological heritage is its answer.

Designating sociology as an eclectic and not-yet existing science, Simmel emphasizes that it is necessary to proceed from the most complex problems, not from the basic concepts that could be deduced only in an already existing science. Definitions of basic sociological concepts ("What is society? What is an individual? How are the mutual psychological effects of individuals on each other possible?" (1890: 3)) become available only after identification of the most pressing problems of society. Simmel indeed touches basic concepts in his later work, *Sociology* (1908); here we can conclude that Simmel followed the plan outlined in *On Social Differentiation*. It is exactly the case when his "earlier works frequently foreshadow motifs that would later become fundamental to his thought" (Joas, 2000: 70).

Simmel's formal sociology's de-radicalization was not only the reason for its development, but a direct outcome of the path charted by *On Social Differentiation*. The temporary nature of its relevance, is already evident in the work. Simmel wrote "this, of course, does not mean that the basic concepts of sociology need indisputable and clear definitions … It is more appropriate to provide the reader with a general concept of the field, rather than an exact description. We should expect a full understanding of objects after the completion of science, not before it.... If science has yet to be created, then it is necessary to proceed directly from these problems. These problems are always highly complex and can only be partially decomposed into their elements." (1890: 3). Thus, relying on the basis of *On Social Differentiation*, we can conclude that sociology as a discipline already exists in *Sociology* and, therefore, the statement that its study as not yet existing is wrong. In other words, that *On Social Differentiation* is subordinated in advance to later works that could only exist under the conditions of sociology as an independent and already functioning discipline.

Of course, many questions from *On Social Differentiation* found their answers not only in Simmel's later works but in the works of other authors. However, all the research done in *On Social Differentiation* is a development of the initial thesis (i. e., answer): "…It is impossible to begin cognition with such a conception of society, from which relationships and mutual actions of its components would accrue. These must be established, and society is only the sum of these interactions, which will only become applicable to the extent they are established" (14). Thus, Simmel asks a question that corresponds exactly to the basic premise of his thesis (i.e., the answer) from *On Social Differentiation*, that will appear later in *Sociology* and, more specifically, in *How is Society Possible?* Simmel binds *On Social Differentiation* and *Sociology*, and, to be precise, he again subordinates his earlier work to his later one.

In other words, it is possible to apply the conceptual key from *On Social Differentiation* to the reading of *Sociology* and vice versa. So, in the first book, "Simmel seems to consider the individual primarily as a product of social relations — that is, as an intersection of social circles… That is, a person does not owe one's individuality to some autonomous hidden essence but to one's relations. In the last instance, for Simmel the sociologist, the individual *is* one's relations" (Pyyhtinen, 2010: 140), then in the second one, as Kurt H. Wolf noted, "Simmel in effect suggests that even from an empirical stand-

point one must note that 'individual' is no more 'real' than 'society'; that is (one may put it), both are equally heuristic concepts" (Simmel, 1950: xlviii-xlix). As a result, Simmel's thesis from *Sociology* directly includes a thesis from *On Social Differentiation* and also, in a sense, introduces its antithesis. Thus, Simmel's antinomic thesis appears to highlight society's nature, which constructs its elements and, at the same time, is being constructed by them. Later, Simmel softened his formal sociology approach outlined in *On Social Differentiation*, but it was its original form which would become the cornerstone for his social theory, more fully disclosed below.

Simmel can already be regarded as a Kantian in *On Social Differentiation,* not because he repeatedly and emphatically uses Kantian terminology, but because this can be explained as merely a tribute to the peculiarities of time or culture. He deliberately chose the Kantian question '*How is society possible?'* as an opening chapter, asking the central question (thesis) from *On Social Differentiation*. Simmel would write "the entire contents of this book [*Sociology*], as developed on the basis of the principles presented above [in *How is society possible?*], is the initial attempt to answer this question" (2009: 42). It does not matter how much *On Social Differentiation* contradicts the chief work in the hierarchy (*Sociology*); its initial thesis essentially anticipates *Sociology*'s central thesis, and, using the key (i.e., the internal key) that Simmel deployed in his two other works, *On Social Differentiation* should be read in the sense that does not contradict *Sociology*.

Bleicher demonstrates a mutually exclusive approach to the Kantian and *Lebensphilosophie* periods. He wrote that "[o]nly a few years after the publication of *Kant und Goethe* in 1904, a collection of essays released by Simmel as a monograph entitled 'Goethe' joined an impressive array of books under the same title being published around that time. Its content evidences how far Simmel had by then moved along his path from neo-Kantianism towards Lebensphilosophie" (2007: 140). Bleicher presented a one-sided vision of Kant in Simmel's legacy, and preferred to see Simmel either as an already established *Lebensphilosoph* or as a prospective one; he generally chose not to see Kant in early Simmel's oeuvre in a positive context at all.

Bleicher continues, writing that "*Kant und Goethe*… helps us to trace the development and core ideas of his *Lebensphilosophie* from an early stage" (Ibid.). Bleicher quoted *What is Kant to Us?* only once, extracting Simmel's only critical remark about Kant and coloring it much more negatively at a time when opposite characteristics are quite predictably found in the work. Simmel wrote in 1896 that "we must constantly search for the conditions which, situated within ourselves, impose their general norms and forms on every field of experience, because they are the laws of the spirit itself, which creates that field for itself by imagining it: this we still have to learn from Kant, and in this task he still lives for us today" (2000a). So, "the truth must prove itself. It is for this reason that the forerunners of the great explorers, now found everywhere, have only an anecdotal value, while the historical significance remains with those who introduced the thought into the spiritual movement and gave it the physical form with which it alone is able to function. Kant made the main idea so fruitful that his branches and offshoots still bear new fruit today" (Ibid.).

There is a particular dichotomy here: if we assume that our reasoning (the priority of the Kantian key to Simmel's early philosophy) refutes Bleicher's entire thesis, then we find out that Simmel retrospectively submits the first period to the second. If this argument does not refute but rather complement Bleicher's thesis, then it provides the evidence for the antinomy in Simmel's ideas, which are not reducible to each other but nevertheless remain valid. Thus, it turns out that either the key, according to which the figure of Simmel's Kant is an homage to the spirit of the age. It is viewed exclusively negatively already at an early stage, and is illegitimate due to the stronger argumentation of the antithesis. That, or these keys exist on different planes and respond to different questions, but, due to their antinomic nature, cannot in principle be used as keys because they do not lead to an unambiguously correct answer. One way or another, the argument here plays the only role of the almost complete reduction of Simmel's early work in the context of this study, and, therefore, it does not matter whether it refutes or complements Bleicher's initial thesis.

Relying on this argument, it seems that blurring the line between the early Simmel and Simmel-the Kantian in the context of formal sociology is possible and necessary; we should do this by subordinating his early works to the Kantian period, as it was done by Simmel himself. This suggests that the emergence of Kant in Simmel's thinking was not sudden, but even predictable and expected. Now that the early period is de-actualized in the context of this research through the proof of the mutually non-exclusive nature of Simmel's work periods, we can return to the topic of his Kantianism and philosophy of life.

Simmel's characterization as *Lebensphiloph* does not say anything about him except that his philosophy's key concept was 'life', but this cannot tell us anything about the concept's content (Joas, 2000: 76). The second period of his work (especially his sociological writings) was associated with Kant's name; something similar can be observed in the third period, which, however, is associated with other figures. The immediate details of Simmel contrasting these authors to Kant are the main milestones on his path from Kant to *Lebensphilophie*.

The first such figure for Simmel might have been Bergson, who had been a strong influence on him since 1908 (Habermas, Deflem, 1996: 406) and the greatness of whom was not even in the least doubtful to Simmel (2000f). Simmel appreciated the suggestive effect of Bergson's philosophy (as well as Husserl's philosophy) on his liberation from "Kantian chains" (2000e); while asking who will take a step further after Kant, Simmel himself notes that Kant was also the genetic part of Bergson's own philosophy (Goodstein, 2017: 5).

To a greater extent, Bergson's vitalism was mostly a catalyst (but rather more the anticipation) of Simmel's *Lebensphilophie*. Simmel, like Tolstoy, was not always interested in his contemporaries; he preferred discussions with figures like Kant or Nietzsche. However, the reasons for the unusual emergence of Bergson in Simmel's texts are perhaps somewhat trivial: his obvious significance (and popularity) along with the fact that in many ways he was the spokesman for Simmel's "own ideas" (4).

The other Simmel's influences were Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to whom he devoted *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* (1907), defined by him as the "chief work" (Liebersohn, 1988:130). However, Kantian motives cannot be ignored here either; in the clash between Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kant, Simmel repeatedly defends Kant.

Simmel wrote there that Schopenhauer "thoroughly misunderstood the ultimate meaning of Kant's philosophy" (991:19-20), and, although later he added that Schopenhauer did it on "purpose", it does not negate the fact that Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant, according to Simmel, does not achieve its goal.

In 1906, Simmel refutes one of Nietzsche's most important theses on Kant's moralism, writing that "the Kantian imperative is merely a formulation of the fact of human reason made by an objective theoretician who places his ideal outside of time and is even indifferent to its practical acknowledgment." (159-160). Kant created only a form (an ideal of unattainable ethics (2000b), while Nietzsche was a moralist to a much greater extent because, as Simmel noted earlier, "Kant deals only with the *existing*, while Nietzsche talks about how it should be in reality" (2000).

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is perhaps a "brilliant example of his [Simmel's] study of the philosophy of life" (Joas, 1996: 68), but it is also a brilliant example of Kant's study done by Simmel himself.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both proceed from Kantian premises. In 1918 these two "personifications of modernity" (Pyukhtinen, 2010: 51-52) were criticized by Simmel precisely because they did not overcome Kant: Schopenhauer did not overcome Kantian phenomenalism, which separates a man from *life* (Simmel, 2011: 72-73); Nietzsche did not overcome his categorical imperative, which remained "above life" (107). However, Simmel wrote that Kant's imperative is presented in a categorically incomplete form (1991: 160), and it turns out that Nietzsche, in this sense, is under heavier attack than Kant.

In 1907, Simmel reproached Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for having had gone too far from Kant. In 1918, Simmel accused them for having had not gone far enough.

Simmel put Goethe on the banners of his philosophy (2007: 186). He showed interest in him for many years, with that interest becoming especially active in his *Lebensphilosophie* period (Bleicher, 2007: 156).

Goethe did not oppose himself to Kant. However, although he knew his works and wrote enthusiastically about them, Goethe did not really rely on Kant and did not criticize him. The opposition between Kant and Goethe emerged later. Although it was already outlined by Schopenhauer in 1819 (2010: I, 628) and was clearly manifested by Nietzsche in 1888 (1911: XVI, 110], philosophers started to oppose Kant en masse under the banners of Goethe precisely in Simmel's era. Earlier, Goethe's opposition to Kant would be unjustified: Kant's significance for Germany's intellectual life became apparent almost immediately after the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with his importance in academic philosophy only growing, while interest in Goethe, after his death, significantly decreased (Mandelkow, 1980: 85). Goethe became relevant precisely because he was not a philosopher and did not even pretend to be (like Schiller). Meanwhile, it was the philosophers who hoisted Goethe's name on the banners of anti-Kantianism and proposed a degree of magnitude

for him even greater than for those who are usually believed to be the direct predecessors of *Lebensphilosophie*. It happened since, in German thought, only a non-philosopher like Goethe could be opposed to Kant who was then hanging menacingly over the whole of German philosophy (Simmel, 2000c). Having inherited the language of Kant's philosophy, post-Kantians had no choice but to inherit Kant himself. In the beginning of XX century, there was a saying in German academic circles that "You can philosophize with Kant, or against Kant; you cannot philosophize without him" (Kohnke, 1991: ix).

Simmel had already outlined contrasts between Kant and Goethe in *Kant and Goethe* (1899) and *Kant and Goethe (*1906), but his acceptance of "eternally young" Goethe against "initially old" Kant (Simmel, 2000d) eventually emerged in 1909. Later, Simmel was busy with 'reconciling' Kant's dualism, thereby subordinating Kant to Goethe for having reduced Kant's nominalism. As early as 1895, Simmel had this motive, although he believed it to be not a development of Kantian philosophy, but rather its original essence (Helle, 2013: 36). Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie* period is characterized by a departure from a rather radical Kantian nominalism, which could be observed in *Sociology*, to a non-philosophical Goethean realism which was primarily provided in *The View of Life*.

Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie* is aimed against Kantianism, but here is the question: which Kantianism? The problem of choosing a prism is thus replaced by the interaction of Kantian and *Lebensphilosophie* tendencies in Simmel's legacy.

Although Simmel himself did not separate different phases of his life into different creative periods, sociologists are primarily interested in his innovative formal (Kantian) sociology which was fully developed before 1908, while philosophers are mainly interested in Simmel's work after 1908 in his *Lebensphilosophie* phase.

Up to 1908, Simmel positioned himself precisely as a sociologist (Filippov, 2019: 225-230), but after that he de facto moved away from sociology. Filippov would write that "Instead, the direction of Simmel's later work seems to confirm Troeltsch's comment that "in later years, when I brought him round to sociological questions, he rejected discussion of them; these things "no longer interested him"" (Frisby, 2002: 19). In his later period, Simmel wrote on sociology only (with the exception of two small articles in the year 1910: *Sociology of the meal* [Soziologie der Mahlzeit] and *Sociology of socializing* [Soziologie der Geselligkeit]) in *Fundamental Questions of Sociology* (1917) [Grundfragen der Soziologie], but did that at the request of the publisher (2019: 240). In this work, Simmel supplements the discipline by surrounding its core of formal or pure sociology with general sociology on the one hand, and philosophical on the other. He did not contradict *Sociology* and, moreover, even then the only Simmel's sociology "in a proper sense" is the formal sociology because other sociologies are beyond the limits of the discipline: general sociology is rather an empirical philosophy of history, while his philosophical sociology is rather epistemology and metaphysics of social science (252). In this sense, general sociology and philosophical sociology are necessary not to expand their scope but to define the boundaries of pure sociology beyond which it becomes some another discipline.

Simmel opposes his *Lebensphilosopie* to some other Kant, whose follower, Simmel, could be called a sociologist. Simmel as the Kantian and Simmel as the *Lebensphiloph*

treated Kant's work on the basis of different questions. By and large, Simmel-the-Kantian does not ask Kant questions: he focuses his main epistemological question of *how is society possible?* He then goes on to practical philosophy in his own way. As a sociologist, he felt dissatisfaction with practical philosophy, but this did not diminish the role of Kantianism in substantiating his theoretical sociology. In fact, in his last years, Simmel ceased to be a sociologist and, *for the same reason*, he ceased to be a Kantian, or rather ceased to be perceived as a Kantian. Simmel comprehended Kant and understood his philosophy, but his philosophy almost always was concerned with only practical matters; in this way, he always was against Kant and, in that sense, Simmel was never actually a Kantian at all. Simmel the philosopher was never satisfied with Kant's "moralistic" content, but as a sociologist, he remained a Kantian for the rest of his life. It was the combination of the acceptance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* precisely as a criticism, and the rejection of *Critique of Practical Reason* not so much of Kant's ethics, but of its general form, that provoked this break.

Simmel, in criticizing Kant and Fichte together (2011:114), ignores the deep inconsistency between their systems, which Kant himself managed to demonstrate. In Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie,* Kantianism became associated with rationality, systematic philosophy as an enemy of living culture, and violence of logic over *life* (Lotter, 2000: 178).

It is particularly crucial not to fall into the teleological snare here: what turns out to be later in the theoretician's individual development is not necessarily its highest stage (Filippov, 1994: 65). Despite the fact that Simmel partially neutralized the dichotomy between Kant and *Lebensphilosophie*, he made not a philosophical but simply a cultural choice in favor of *the latter*. By and large, he only joined this tendency, and in this, his philosophy manifested itself in a quite ordinary way. However, it is precisely this ordinariness that was so unusual for Simmel that speaks of him as a figure inscribed in the cultural context of not only a philosophical crisis, but of a crisis in general. Simmel's thought has not lost its inherent brightness, but many authors had such a view of Kantianism (and also on Kant) as Jacobi or Goethe already had. Therefore, it is not unusual that an immediate disciple of Simmel's from faraway Russia, Semyon Frank, adhered to the same views uniting the German and Russian intellectual environments.

III Two Exiles

Semyon Frank was Simmel's university student in 1899 (Boobbyer, 1992: 36). Later, Frank visited him in 1907 together with his elder comrade, Peter Struve (82). Frank was overwhelmed by Simmel's thought (Frank, 2001: 40). He called him "perhaps the most gifted Kantian" (2020: 398) and "one of the best contemporary philosophical essayists" (520). At the beginning of the 20th century in Russia, perhaps only Struve who was "Simmel's first discoverer in Russia" (Rezvyh, 2017: 173), comprehended Simmel better than Frank.

This acquaintance could not fail to impress Frank.

Frank was heavily influenced by Simmel's perception of Nietzsche (Frank, 2020: 439, 444, 463, 483, 634, 642) — he, following Simmel, emphasizes the moralistic side of

Nietzsche's teachings (318). Frank read Goethe (134) through the eyes of Simmel. To a lesser extent, this is also a characteristic of Frank's reading of Kant (2006:75-77).

There were also coincidences on a more implicit level. It is felt in the influence of Spinoza, who was an important inspiration for the worldview of both Simmel (Helle, 2013:152-160) and Frank (Frank, 1986: 119); in Mach's influence, which can be found in the epistemology of both Simmel (Skidelsky, 2003: 367) and Frank (through Schuppe) (Frank, 2019: 487-488); and in Marx's influence (Goodstein, 2017: 82; Frank, 2018: 163-428).

Frank completed the Russian translation of Simmel's *Kant and Goethe* (1906) in 1908, referred to Simmel (*Friedrich Nietzsche — Eine moralphilosophische Silhouette* (1896)) in his writings (*Nietzsche and the ethics of 'love of the distant'*), and wrote works dedicated to him (*Simmel and his book on Goethe* (1913)).

He was equally influenced by Simmel's early works such as *Introduction to the Science of Morality* in 1900 (329) and *On Social Differentiation* in 1899 *(*2018: 159), his Kantian (*Philosophy of Money* in 1902 (463), *Sociology* in 1909 (Frank, 2020: 290-298), and his *Lebensphilosophie* writings (*Kant and Goethe)* in 1908 (596).

Furthermore, one should not overestimate Simmel's influence on Frank's philosophy as a whole: what is most fascinating is not the fact that Frank in some way followed Simmel, but that he followed a similar path and largely repeated Simmel's fate.

Simmel's and Frank's lives both were strongly influenced by anti-Semitism. In fact, Simmel was bound to come across it during his entire academic career. It is not an easy task to say whether Simmel was aware at the end of his life of the huge role anti-Semitism played in his academic failures. Simmel would underestimate the power of anti-Semitism in Germany until the end of his days.

Frank also could not help but encounter anti-Semitism in Russia, but, being an exile, he happened to face its far more-outspoken version (first in Germany, then in occupied France), which threatened not only his career but his life as well.

Simmel and Frank were both expelled from Jewish community at the same time,. After all, there is an assumption that in 1899, Simmel wrote (Rammstedt, 1997: 455) that the Dreyfus affair was exclusively cultural in its nature and one should not be afraid of it (Filippov, 2019: 233), having thereby alienated the Dreyfusards (including Emile Durkheim). Frank once faced Hermann Cohen's fierce reaction caused by the fact of his baptism (Scherrer, 1973: 438). The assimilation was an obvious choice for both, although it cannot be said to have brought them many benefits.

Simmel, as a confirmed German patriot, welcomed the Germany that was supposed to arise out of the First World War (Cotesta, 2017: 432). Although it cannot be denied that, in the long term, he was right (Simmel, 2000h: 13) and Germany actually leads the whole of Europe in the 21st century, with regard to his personal fate, there is a dry irony in the fact that Simmel somehow was a part of the movement that thoroughly ruined his life and, after his death, in its more explicit form of Nazism, almost thoroughly erased it from the memory of people.

In 1944, Frank considered The First World War as defensive for Russia (2001: 475); however, it scared him (1990: 578), just as the Russo-Japanese War did (2019: 148-149).

His patriotism was expressed in his youth mostly not as in conservative Simmel's way, but in his progressive political activity which was not radical, but still was Marxist opposition to imperial authorities. The same force, the Marxism turned into a political regime, later made him an exile, one of the passengers on the famous *philosopher's steamboat*.

All contemporary accounts of Simmel's thought agree that he was considered to be one of the most brilliant, if not the most brilliant, lecturers of his time (Coser, 1977: 211). The same can be said about Frank. Probably the most influential historian of Russian philosophy, Vasily Zenkovsky, considered that "without hesitation … Frank's system is the most significant and profound system in the history of Russian philosophy" (1967: 853]. However, they are united not only by lifelong respect but also by posthumous oblivion.

Of course, Simmel's scholars did not forget him; for sociologists, though, he still remains in the shadow of Durkheim and Weber, and he is of marginal interest for philosophers. Frank, in this sense, was also overshadowed by such figures as Berdyaev and Shestov. Despite the keen interest among Russian scholars, he is still not widely available to the general reader, since only 4 of 8 volumes of his complete works have been published to date.

IV

The tradition of Russian religious philosophy with all its originality is adjacent to the mostly German pan-European tradition. Russian philosophers of the late XIXth century, at the dawn of Russian thought, actively read Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Through the reception of these authors, Russian religious philosophy also absorbed Nicolas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme (Evlampiev, 2015), and many others.

In the context of the reception of European philosophy in Russia, Semyon Frank has a particular place; "Plotinus, Nicolaus Cusanus, Leibniz, Jacobi, Goethe, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Dilthey — all of them were real accomplices of the philosophical process in which Frank's position was developed" (Porus, 2012: 7). This list could also include Simmel, Marx, Mach, Nietzsche, Bergson, Spinoza, and Windelband. Frank was deeply immersed in the context of European continental philosophy throughout his life, and the traditions of Kantianism and *Lebensphilosophie* did not bypass him either.

There are descriptions of Frank's philosophy as a path from Kantianism to *Lebensphilosophie* (Boobbyer, 1992: 46), and as a combination of the latter with Neo-Kantian approaches (Swoboda, 1992: 14). Of course, these positions neither describe, nor do they pretend to fully comprehend Frank's philosophy, but they do show the essential phases of his development. To uncover the meaning of these descriptions, it is worth it to start with the first one.

Frank was studying Kant during his university studies (Frank, 1986: 121), but he became more deeply immersed in Kantianism in 1899 when he was studying in Berlin with some prominent professors such as Simmel, Windelband, and Riehl (Boobbyer, 1992: 37). In 1903-1908, his neo-Kantianism (influenced by G. Simmel, W. Windelband, and

W. Schuppe) experienced a distinct gravitation towards neo-Fichteanism (Aliaiev, Tsygankov, 2019: 173). Already at the pinnacle of his Kantianism he displays in the work *On Critical Idealism (*Obolevich, 2017: 26), Frank writes of critical idealism as the main idea of "Kantian-Fichtean philosophy" (2019: 205-206). Thus, it can be said that Frank's Kantianism, even in his most Kantian work, was not independent and to no less extent it was Fichteanism, because "the last step (the elimination of the very concept of absolute and transcendental reality) that was not (or was not sufficiently resolutely) taken by Kant … was partially performed by Fichte and completed only nowadays in the teaching of the so-called immanent philosophy" (215-216). This motif had appeared in Frank' works earlier, in 1902, when he wrote that "Fichte brought out much that is true to Kant: first of all, that every non-Self emerges from the Self" (569) then, in 1905, when he wrote that "Fichte carried out a critical purification of Kant's system from the elements of naive realism that remained in it and thus laid the foundations for consistent critical idealism" (310).

In Frank's other works of that period, Kant appears only in passing and, indeed relying on them, it is possible to call Frank a Kantian only by a long stretch of the imagination. He already refused to reissue *On Critical Idealism* in 1911 (Swoboda, 1992: 378), and at the end of his life in 1935, Frank confessed that he was not a supporter of Kantianism, saying that even at that time "Kantianism was not his cup of tea" (Frank, 1986: 121). In 1909, Frank wrote that "a rigorous examination of past thinking proves that … Kant … can no longer be our leader" (2020: 183).

Lebensphilosophie had taken Kant's place in Frank's thought in the years of 1908-1910 (Aliaiev, 2017: 52). This development can be observed in his philosophy of culture and theoretical philosophy.Frank's philosophy of culture was born from *Ethics of Nihilism* (1909), which was devoted to the "criticism of the philistine (bourgeois) culture" (Porus, 201: 352). Both Marxism and Nietzscheanism served as the instruments to this criticism (Ibid.), but while his Marxist criticism had a socio-economic nature, the Nietzschean criticism was philosophical.

Frank set out on his philosophical journey with Nietzscheanism in *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Ethics of 'Love of the Distant'* (1902). In this book, he fused the ethics of Nietzsche with political and ethical radicalism and (illegally) Kant's ethics (2018: 632). In 1935, Frank said that after reading Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (in the winter of 1901-02), he "became an idealist, not in the Kantian sense, but an idealist-metaphysician, a bearer of some kind of spiritual experience that provided access to the invisible inner reality of being" (1986: 121). In *Nietzsche and the Ethics of 'Love of the Distant'* (1902), Frank presents Nietzsche as Kant's successor (2019: 490). *On Critical Idealism* (1903), as well as Simmel before him, reproaches Nietzsche for an insufficient understanding of Kant (2019: 232). Later, he contrasted *Lebensphilosophie* to Kant's 'morality of the categorical imperative' which was a torment for a living human being, and embraced Fichtean and Nietzschean 'humanistic individualism' against universalist morality of Hegel and Schelling (310).

At the same time, Nietzsche, who provided the initial impetus to Frank's philosophy, was rather a source of questions, but not answers. In Frank's later philosophy, Nietzsche acted as an antagonist due to his "proclamation of bestialism" (Porus, 2012: 357), that is, the fight against God.

Frank's philosophy of culture (cultural criticism) was most vividly manifested in four works: *Ethics of Nihilism* (*Vekhi*, 1909), *De Profundis* (*De Profundis,* 1918), *The Crisis of Western Culture* (*Oswald Spengler and the Decline of West,* 1922), and *The Downfall of Idols* (1923).

The target of his initial criticism was the Russian intelligentsia. Their moral worldview, according to Frank, was a nihilistic moralism, the paradoxical denial of absolute (objective) values perceived as an absolute value. The Creed of a Russian *intelligent* person is "the good of the people, the satisfaction of the needs of the *majority*", absolutely hostile to theoretical, aesthetic and religious values. (Frank, 2020: 193). Frank sees the solution to this problem in the transition to *culture-creating religious humanism* (220).

The warning that Frank issued together with other *Vekhi* authors was not heard, as noted by Struve in his preface to *De Profundis* collection dedicated to the Russian revolution of 1917 (Sapov, 2009: 635). In *De Profundis*, Frank promoted his thesis of the opposition between nihilistic and religious humanism (887).

In *The Crisis of Western Culture*, Frank no longer focused his attention on the Russian intelligentsia; the object of his criticism was now the entire Western culture. By using Spengler's terminology, he contrasts the living religious principle of culture with a depressing impact of civilization (Stepun, 1923: 45). Here, he resonates with Fyodor Stepun (24) and Nikolay Berdyaev (56), his co-authors of *Oswald Spengler and the Decline of West.*

The Downfall of the Idols (1923), one of Frank's most significant works in general, closes this theme. Here, he talks about the fall of four idols: the idol of revolution, the idol of politics, the idol of culture, and the idol of ideas and moral idealism.

Although Frank was not greatly influenced by the first of his idols, allowing him to think but not to act radically, he nevertheless believed that "the existing political form seemed the only source of all evil" (1990: 116). Thus, he was under the influence of the idol of revolution in a much lesser degree than under the influence of the idol of politics, the belief in the possibility of evolution towards a millenarian political ideal. He was already under the influence of the idol of politics in 1905 (Frank-Norman, 1996: 438), while the idol of the revolution had fallen before him by 1896 (Frank, 1986: 111). Frank wrote that both of these idols "collapsed in our souls that were impressed by the Russian revolution" (132), while the idol of culture was destroyed by the First World War. This war proved the great European culture to be only an illusion, for the idea of unconditional progress had become a thing of the past. Frank considers culture to be not the cause of spiritual life, but its 'residue' (143).

These three idols serve as a special case for the fourth idol of ideas and moral idealism, the main idol of modern mankind (146). Frank was not a nihilist: he does not deny ideas, and he opposes a *dead* idea to a *living* God.

Frank's *Lebensphilosophie* in the context of philosophy of culture is reborn into the philosophy of religious humanism. This idea will remain relevant to Frank's thought until the end of his life. At the same time, Frank's use of religion appears not as a formal relativistic concept (for which he reproached Simmel (Frank, 2022: 100)), but as an intrinsically

valuable concept. Frank has not divided Simmel's work into periods; Simmel remained a Kantian for him (329). He calls subjectivism and relativism as borrowed from Kant as the only solid content of Simmel's mindset. He considers Goethe's spirit as absolutely alien and even hostile to Simmel. This view of Simmel has its reasons, but it should be noted that Frank oversimplifies Simmel by perceiving his philosophy exclusively through his sociological heritage while ignoring their mutual irreducibility.

The development of the theoretical *Lebensphilosophie* can be observed in the trilogy of *The Object of Knowledge* (1915), *The Human Soul* (1917), and *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* (1930). The works of the trilogy differed thematically (*The Object of Knowledge* is his epistemology, *the Human Soul* is philosophical psychology, while *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* is social philosophy).

According to Nikolay Losskiy, a prominent figure in Russian philosophical intuitionism, metaphysics can be epistemologically justified after Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* only by justifying intuitionism, which is what *The Object of Knowledge* is devoted to (1977: 161). Even the book's title is immediately opposed to Rickert's *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* and Cohens's *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis* (Aliaiev, 2008: 35). In this anti-Neo-Kantian impulse, Frank finds an ally in Bergson's philosophy since Bergson attracted Frank with his non-systematic and humanistic philosophizing (Antonov, 2021: 575, 758). He also follows Bergson in solving the problem of cognitive dualism between subject and object; Gajdenko writes that "For both Bergson and Frank, intuition is a higher type of knowledge different from what the former calls analysis and the latter — abstract [rational] thinking. Both philosophers emphasize that intuition is a penetration into an object as a whole. It is experiencing it as a kind of unity in a multiplicity, merging with the object 'from the inside', rather than seeing it 'from without'" (2001: 253).

Yet, Bergson's philosophy itself repulsed Frank, who, unlike Simmel, not only noted the irrational nature of Bergson's concept of life but believed that Bergson's struggle against intellectualism led rather along the path of asserting the irrational than over-rational forces. Frank's over-rational epistemological intuitionism is assumed as a kind of third option instead of an opposition between rationality or irrationality.

The Human Soul is dedicated to philosophical psychology, but Frank considered this discipline to be impossible if the existence of human soul is denied. He wrote that the task of philosophical psychology is precisely the nature of a human soul as a relationship between the conscious and the subconscious and its relationship to some supra-individual being (1995: 419-420).

Frank believes that it is the irrational subconscious that is primary in mental life (480), but he does not oppose consciousness and subconsciousness. Although they can suppress each other since the mere consciousness removes 'feeling' and 'living knowledge', while the mere subconsciousness gives rise to passions and mental weakness in the highest areas of our life (i.e., spiritual life) harmony between them is possible (493-495). The subconscious could gradually pass from formless chaos to the formative power of spiritual unity (558).

Frank wrote that "Leibniz understood this best of all: the psychic life or, as he said, the inner world of the monad embraces the entire universe and even God, but reflects

or "represents" this infinity only vaguely" (507). However, unlike Leibniz, Frank does not rationalize the subconscious, and, like Goethe (Sickel, 1920: 10), criticizes Leibniz's view that isolates monads from each other (Frank, 1995: 577-578). Social life, according to Frank, is "an expression of trans-subjectivity of experience" — a supra-individual life. The whole of spiritual life of a person is built on communication (594). Frank presented the solution of *The Human Soul* in *The Spiritual Foundations of Society*. However, the book's intended purpose,"to raise the spiritual level of our culture" (420), became irrelevant after the fall of the idol of culture.

The Spiritual Foundations of Society is the distinctive part of the trilogy. It was conceived 10 years earlier, and some ideas of this book appeared in 1902-1913, before *The Object of Knowledge,* when Frank was creating his social psychology. Materials on social psychology (published by Aliaiev and Rezvykh) are incomplete since they provide only a synopsis of the system and scattered records from different years. Only one article, *The Problem of Authority* (1905), can be attributed to the completed works in this field. Here Frank, following Simmel as well as Tarde and Marx (Frank, 2019: 257), enters the realm of the philosophy of law asking the question 'How is authority possible?' This text is also adjoined by *The Essence of Sociology* (1909), containing a review of Simmel's *Sociology* (1908). In general, Frank was enthusiastic about Simmel's book calling it "The only philosophical work of idealism devoted to public life" (2020: 285). However Frank criticizes Simmel for distinguishing sociology from other social sciences and at the same time failing to differentiate inside the sociology itself (2019: 288-290). Simmel partly solved these problems later, through the introduction of the distinction between general and philosophical sociology.

Frank's renewed interest in social issues was manifested in his social philosophy, exposed in his *Essay on the Methodology of Social Sciences* (1922), *Religious Foundations of Society* (1925), *"I" and "We"* (1925) (Aliaiev, 2017: 113), and *On the Phenomenology of a Social Phenomenon* (1928). The most interesting case, though, is *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* (1930).

Here, Frank borrows his ideas from Simmel's *Sociology* (1908), contrasting them with those of Durkheim (1930a: 63-64). He proceeds from the realist attitude (characteristic of Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie*), criticizing Kant's practical philosophy from the same positions asserted by Simmel in The *View of Life* and earlier philosophical works (25-27). Then, Frank does what Simmel himself did not dare to, that is, combining Simmel's sociology with his *Lebensphilosophie* in some way.

The object of Frank's social philosophy remains the same as in Simmel's sociology[1]1, that is, society is not a substance, but a form of interaction between people. Here, Frank does not proceed from the nominalist point of view characteristic of Simmel's sociology,

1. Frank's complex relationship with Simmel is definitely felt in the theme of social psychologism. If, in 1902, Frank defined his system as social psychologism (Frank, 2006: 43) and reproached Simmel for paying little attention to a specific psychological causality of communication process (Frank, 2020, 293). Then, by 1922, according to Aliaiev and Rezvykh. Frank admits that he no longer follows the main tendency of psychologism, characteristic of his early articles (Kolerov, 2019: 393). In 1928, according to Nazarova, he reproaches Simmel for psychological relativism (Ibid.: 284). In 1930, Frank again criticizes psychologism, but referring to Simmel (Frank, 1930a: 67).

but from the realist POV. According to Frank, sociology, having found some pattern in people's interaction such as a social life, posits it but does not explain it, while the condition of this pattern is real. "Society is, therefore, a true integral reality, and not a derivative association of separate individuals; moreover, it is the only reality where a man is given to us in his concrete form" (1930a: 96).

For Frank (as well as for Simmel as a sociologist), "You" is no less obvious than "I" (and even Me is a predicate of Not-Me (You) (which will be relevant in his later works) (1990: 348), but like Simmel in his philosophy of life, Frank wished to avoid the violence of philosophy over life and focused his attention not on the formal nature of Kant's ethics, but on its own content of Kantian ethics. Unlike Simmel, Frank brings an imperative sense with concrete ethical content to his social philosophy (1930a: 104). For Frank, the source of this ethical content lies in religious faith.

Of course, such a decision by Frank is far from Kant's philosophy, from *Lebensphilosophie,* and from Simmel himself, but the main problem for *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* with this decision was that its entire content was reduced to a religious faith while the book itself was precisely philosophical and not theological in its form. Without faith, social philosophy in *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* deviates towards sociology, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of law (the thing Frank was consciously planning to avoid in this book), and does not solve the problem posed by Frank himself. Perhaps this is the reason why later, as A. Filonenko noted, Frank particularly disliked this text; it was not supposed to be republished due to having been overcome by his later work (Frank, 2003: 12).

The task of the book, borrowed from *The Human Soul,* that is, spiritual and social renewal, was solved by Frank using the same methods that were relevant before the fall of his idols — by some faith in the progress of humanity. Therefore, *Spiritual Foundations of Society* was thematically left by Frank to the past. Moreover, it was left already in 1929 since it was written "to earn some money, while the *First Philosophy* [the first sketches for the future *Incomprehensible*] was started *as a labor of love*" (Kolerov, 2017: 8-10).

The trilogy is not characteristic of Frank's philosophy, not only because of its internal problem. Frank wrote "The Russian tragedy [revolution], which is violating the harmony of this plan" (1930a: 6), but also because even the first and most significant part of it is "more than the first section of Frank's philosophical trilogy, but also *the first version* of his integral system, which in subsequent works was subject to correction, clarification, detailing, extension" (Motroshilova, 2007: 327). This *integral system* exists in three books: *The Subject of Knowledge* (1915), the *Incomprehensible* (1939), and *Reality and Man* (1956).

Every question of the trilogy of *The Object of Knowledge* (1915), *The Human Soul* (1917), and *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* (1930) will be resolved in the philosophy of religion, *Incomprehensible,* which has no necessary basis in Frank's previous philosophical work (Antonov, 2015: 22). Although these previous works help to see the genesis of Frank's ideas (Evlampiev, 2000: 337), they have a subordinate status in the research literature, so they can be considered to be secondary branches of his philosophy.

Frank's philosophy of culture and theoretical philosophy in *Lebensphilosophie* suppressed his Kantianism as well as his Neo-Kantianism, but despite this, *Lebensphilosophie* as a tradition cannot be regarded as the final point in Frank's philosophical development.

Although Lebensphilosophie, along with neo-Kantianism, could be regarded as the basis for a system of pan-unity (*vseedinstvo*), the highest tradition which Frank was following in all three books was an integral Neo-platonic system of Nicolaus Cusanus and Plotinus. As P. Gajdenko points out, although Frank probably learned about the former while studying in Marburg (Porus, 2012: 114), Platonism in Frank's system is needed to suppress other philosophical systems and traditions, including neo-Kantianism and the philosophy of life.

Frank explains his over-rational solution by using two approaches, those of the internal and external.

The internal approach manifested in three negative definitions of his Platonic system of pan-unity can be found throughout all three books. The first is that pan-unity; by becoming a topic for comprehension, it "obviously must be available and attainable to us in some form" (1995: 80). Frank seeks to resolve the antinomy, and opposes his notion of Incomprehensible to Kant's things-in-themselves. The second is that pan-unity cannot be explained rationally (in the manner of Hegel or Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism). Such an artificial total unity was unacceptable for Frank (415). The third is that pan-unity cannot be explained irrationally (in the manner of Bergson) (305).

Frank therefore constantly uses the language of the authors with whom he argues. (Swoboda, 1992: 14). The comprehension of Frank's philosophy as a combination of neo-Kantianism and *Lebensphilosophie* quite accurately describes his system in its first version, which was in Kantian form with *Lebensphilosophie* content. Later, Frank shifted his emphasis; the system started to seem like a deviation in the direction of Bergson and irrationalism. However, despite the fact that Frank Bergson became a new spokesman of Plotinus' and Cusanus' ideas (Frank, 1995: 205; 629), this version of Platonism could not neutralize the deviation of Frank's philosophy towards irrationalism and Bergson. Thus, despite the declared dissociation from Bergson's "irrationalism", Frank's philosophy had an obvious bias in this direction (Gajdenko, 1987: 96-113).

One way or another, any philosophical (including platonic) decision will experience a pull like this. Therefore, his Kantianism (and neo-Kantianism too) along with his *Lebensphilosophie* are Platonic (Frank, 1995: 40; 2014: 515-516). Frank overcomes this gravitation with the external solution which levels out rationalism and irrationalism not through negation, but through the negation of negation, i.e., including them in the over-rational.

Frank's trans-rational (external) solution was developed within the system of his *antinomystic monodualism*. *Monodualism* is a problem, and *antinomystic* is its solution. In any of his lifetime editions, Frank uses precisely the term *antinomystic*, not the *antinomic*, but researchers mistakenly use *antinomic* in author's contemporary editions. However, Frank's antinomy is related not to Protestant antinomianism, but is a play on words *antinomic* and *mystical*. Antinomy is the problem, and the mystical is the solution.

This mysticism apparently only brings Frank closer to Bergson and irrationalism, as well as to *Lebensphilosophie* as a system since it dwells in this mysticism in its purest and deepest sense, namely what Goethe probably had in mind.

To a greater extent, for Frank, Bergson becomes a new spokesman for Goethe (Netercott, 2008: 226). Frank brought *Personality and Thing* (1908) to completion with the phrase: "The works of William Stern, Bergson, and some other signs indicate that at present a new, still few in number, but already rich in strength army is being assembled, the general plan of which may most likely be an expressed desire for the spiritual universality of Goethe" (2020: 134). In 1910, Frank added that a single Goethe's aphorism contains the whole of Bergson's 'philosophy of action' (436).

It is worth it to note that Frank concluded his 'most Kantian work' (1904) with almost the same words: "Goethe put forward the requirement that everyone should consider their life as a work of art (das Leben — ein Kunstwork) … and it is this principle that suggests itself as a general inference from the philosophy of critical idealism outlined by us" (2018: 250). Already in his most Kantian work, Frank departs from Kant to Goethe. A little later, Frank countered Schiller's Kantian-Fichtean philosophy (in the spirit of Windelband's *Aus Goethes Philosophie*) with Goethe's Spinozian objectivism in favor of the latter (2019: 300-303).

For Frank, Goethe's thought, and, to a significant extent, Goethe himself, was the essence of his *Lebensphilosophie* as pan-unity; Simmel would write that "… That mysterious oneness of all existence which philosophy has forever been trying to come close to" (2007: 186). Here Frank coincided with Simmel (1932: 82). Goethe, having become the main event of Frank's intellectual life in 1908 (2001: 456) "helped to realize his basic philosophical intuition" (Elen, 2012: 22). This intuition remained relevant for him until the end of his life.

Frank's mystical decision makes his system not only purely philosophical but theological as well. It emerges in *Incomprehensible* and gains momentum in *Reality and Man*. Therefore, Frank criticized *The Object of Knowledge* in 1944 for being excessively systematic (Antonov, 2021: 713). This a-systemic mystical motive eventually led him to Vladimir Solovyov (Frank, 2009: 5), whom he previously considered to be rather a theologian than a philosopher (1930b: 112).

Although both solutions are present in all three books, the system has gravitated more towards an external solution over the years. In this external solution, Frank's system suppressed Kantianism and approached *Lebensphilosophie* in its a-systemic version. This is a rejection of formalism in philosophy in favor of philosophy itself and of the pursuit of wisdom.

The fate of Frank's legacy is reminiscent of that of Leibniz: he translated his system into various philosophical languages to explain it. While these translations helped him to write his system into a general research field, it de-hierarchized his legacy. He felt the danger from such a perception of his thought and began to move away from the system.

V

Simmel and Frank, as the seminal thinkers of Europe in the first half of the 20th century, acutely felt the crisis of philosophy and culture in trying to overcome it.

The Kantian turn brought about by Simmel did not only have an intrinsic value. It not only became the starting point of formal sociology but also stimulated one of the most important projects in the history of sociology, that of Max Weber. Frank's philosophical system, albeit not immediately, became one the most important works in the history of Russian religious philosophy, an unattainable synthesis of Russian religious thought (in the footsteps of the great Russian writers Dostoevsky and Tolstoy) with the centuries-old traditions of European philosophy.

Realizing the significance of their achievements, Simmel and Frank turned these pages of their lives and moved from the abstractions of science to *Lebensphilosophie*. This step was not evidence of cowardice or fatigue, but, on the contrary, of a deep understanding of comprehensible human crisis along with the desire to overcome it by giving its deepest substantial content back to philosophy, that is, wisdom itself as a unity without which philosophy would turn into empty formalism.

Simmel and Frank (like many other *Lebensphilosophen*) found one of the causes for the decline of the West in systematic philosophy in general, and particularly in Kant. However, to a greater extent, the opposition of *Lebensphilophie* to the Kantianism philosophy was caused not by Kant's philosophy itself, but by the view of it as a system that violates life, and promoted by *Lebensphilosophen.* Although Kant immediately touched upon the concept of *Leben* in *The Critique of Judgment,* he was far from understanding life as an inert matter (Molina, 2010: 24).

The whole of Kant's critical philosophy is not very suitable to be defined as the systematic philosophy that the *Lebensphilosophen* have outlined for us. Kant's system is metaphysics-destroying formalism; the declared goal of all three *Critiques* was to narrow the boundaries of knowledge to adequate ones, to those that can really be known.

This absence of claims as to what is not subject to knowledge brings Kant's philosophy closer to *Lebensphilosophie*.

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Георг Зиммель и Семен Франк: от Канта к философии жизни

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Наследие Георга Зиммеля четко дифференцируется на социологические и философские произведения, поэтому исследователи практически не пересекаются со своими коллегами, занимающимися другой сферой интересов. Однако и сам Зиммель в этих дисциплинах проявлял себя по-разному. Это особенно ощущается в контексте его отношения к Канту. Его социология, более актуальная до 1908 года, ведет к Канту, а его философия (философия жизни), которая получила развитие после 1908 года, противопоставляется Канту. Наше исследование направлено на объяснение этой дихотомии.

Многие мыслители ушли от Канта к философии жизни. Таковым был и Семен Франк, ученик Зиммеля, судьба которого во многом схожа с судьбой учителя. Франк слушал его лекции в 1898 году, переводил и рецензировал его произведения, писал о нем в собственных очерках, так что среди зарубежных современников Франка сложно найти фигуру, оказавшую на него более значительное влияние, чем Зиммель.

Во многих отношениях Франк был русским двойником Зиммеля: оба крещеные евреи в христианских странах; оба прошли через школу противоречивых мнений, во многом фатальных для их судьбы; оба были изгнанниками; несмотря на их научную плодовитость и значимость их трудов, обладали неустойчивым академическим статусом, впрочем, высоко ценились коллегами.

Франк — хорошо известная фигура в русской религиозной философии, но его философия в контексте пути от кантианства к философии жизни изучена недостаточно. Это исследование также направлено на восполнение этого пробела и открытие Франка читателям Зиммеля.

Ключевые слова: Зиммель, Франк, кантианство, философия жизни, Гете, Россия

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Theory of (Un)Planned Behavior? How our behavioral predictions suffer from "unplanned" actions

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An influential model in micro-sociology, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provides one of the most popular instruments for the prediction of social actions. Its focal point is the assumption that intentions are *obligatory* mediators between initial behavioral factors and corresponding actions. If some people break their intentions, TPB interprets this as those intentions have been "inflated" under the pressure of external factors. TPB does not claim to explain these factors, but rather argues that there is a gap between "perceived" and "actual" control over behaviors. In this way, the concept of "unplanned behavior" caused by some uncontrollable *external* factors emerges.

This contribution proposes an alternative approach. Here, we examine an assumption of the existence of *internal* factors of behavior which are still not accounted for by the current TPB model, but can explain "unplanned" behaviors. As an example of these still uncounted-for factors, we chose an implicit component of general attitudes which is in line with the sociological interpretation of the Dual-System Theory. By demonstrating how this factor contributes to behavior bypassing intentions, we can expand the TPB model to include at least some variants of behavior, which, for now, are counted as "deviant" from predicted behavior.

Theoretically, this may lead to a restructuring of the TPB basic model through its enrichment by this factor. In practice, at least some fractions of "unplanned" actions will become accessible for prediction.

Keywords: factors of behavior; two-component model of behavioral factors; explicit factors; implicit factors; attitude; structural theory of attitude; dual process; dual system theory; reasoned action approach; theory of planned behavior; DST; GATA; RAA; TPB; MODE; RIM

1. The aim and scope of this contribution

The imperfections of available behavioral models are painfully obvious to practitioners. To illustrate the current state of affairs, one can mention the dramatic failures of electoral forecasts during the last decade[1]. Some resonant cases even prompted industry investigations (Kennedy et al., 2016; Sturgis et al., 2016). The analysis of these investigations reveals two general domains of possible errors, those of sampling, and the inflated

1. The incomplete list of such failures that occurred at the level of the whole industry includes the 2014 parliamentary elections in Moldova, the 2015 parliamentary elections in the UK (led to an industry investigation), the 2015 Knesset elections in Israel, the 2015 Referendum in Greece, the 2015 presidential elections in Poland, the 2015 presidential elections in Belarus, the 2016 Brexit Referendum in the UK, the 2016 presidential elections in the USA (which led to an industry investigation), and includes the 2017 parliamentary elections in the UK.

intentions of respondents. The latter results in so-called "unplanned" behavior, which is practically inaccessible to any kind of measurement and prediction.

In this article, we will examine an alternative approach. We will try to assess the scale and mechanism of the emergence of at least a fraction of unplanned behavior. To do this, we should test the Dual System Theory's (DST) potential to explain the respondent intentions' inconsistency that counts as an apparent cause of "unplanned" and "unpredictable" behavior. According to the classification of dual-process research in sociology by Vanina Leschziner (2019), this paper is a sample of a study focusing on the implicit factors that influence the social actions' escalation process. We do not investigate cognitive processing itself, but rather both of its components as potential precursors of actions.

We assess this effect by comparing the predictive power of the model with and without an implicit or unconscious component. As a control model for predicting behavior, we probably the most the most popular and, in any case, generally accepted forecasting model of the Theory of Planned Behavior. The experimental model is represented by the TBP model enriched with an implicit component of the general attitude towards an object of action.

The sociological value of this attempt is hidden in the analysis of the interaction between two DST components, a lack that has drawn attention from some scholars (Vila-Henninger, Luis Antonio, 2015).

Our design addresses a variety of related but conceptually distinct disciplines of macrosociology, microsociology (social psychology), and cognitive- and neuro-sciences. This generates some disturbance concerning conceptualizations and terminology. Through the entire article, we interpret terms borrowed from all of these disciplines such as "acts", "actions", and "behavior" as equivalents, representing localized, specific, and spatiotemporal volitional activities of an individual or a group. In the context of the "reasoned action approach", these activities are also viewed as "*social* actions". In certain cases, we refer to pure sociological interpretations of "action" versus "behavior" concepts, marking them with special notes.

We expect to see recommendations for improving behavior forecast's accuracy as a practical impact of this study. Anticipating theoretical contribution refers to the empirically-proven defining of mechanisms with which implicit factors *may* disturb initial intentions results in "unintentional" or "unplanned" actions for an external spectator.

In real life, the potential impact of implicit determinants on behaviors may depend on many factors, including environmental ones. We do not try to assess the role of these potential factors here, but rather detect, describe, and interpret the phenomenon of implicit mechanisms that generate "unplanned" behaviors. That eases the constraints of ecological validity for our experiment, fitting the methodological requirements of everyday realism well enough.

Finally, we do not claim to offer the holistic theory of unplanned / unintentional behavior. Instead, we seek to reliably explain at least some of its fractions in order to improve our social action prediction models.

2. Intention-based models suffer from unintentional actions

Starting with Max Weber, intention-based models of explanation and behavior prediction are rooted in the concept now referred to as the reasoned action approach (RAA). To this day, RAA is one of the most fruitful grounds for the development of theories of social behavior. There are three influential models that fit within the RAA framework and effectively support it with their findings. These are the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Fishbein, Ajzen, 2011), Bandura's 1986 social cognitive theory, and the health belief model (Janz, Becker, 1984).

Generally speaking, RAA assumes that human behavior involves some degree of reasoning. A "reasoned" action means "correct" or "right" not in objective reality, but in the minds of the actors. Being directed by "reasonable" factors is enough for actors if they *believe* these factors will guide them to the viable possible option. Reasoned actions are intentional and aim at the subjective goals of actors.

Within this framework, intentions take a very special place. They are the aggregation points of *all* processes preceding actual behaviors. The primary purpose of these processes is to estimate possible outcomes of a planned action and to assess their impact on the actor's goals. However, these evaluations and their background factors do not affect behavior directly. Intentions are an unavoidable mediator between numerous behavioral precursors and real actions. As intentions are formed, they start to drive a stream of corresponding actions, and there is nothing else that could substitute them for this function (Fishbein, 1967). In contrast to this, unplanned behavior is behavior for which people do not have intentions (Gibbons et al., 1998). The Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) also regard unplanned actions as unintentional.

In many cases, this model proves its validity. A thorough meta-analysis of behavior-changing interventions has revealed strong support for assuming the causal effects of intentions on actual behavior (Steinmetz et al., 2016). There is, however, a flip-side of the coin.

Everyday practices, and especially the experience of electoral predictions, show many actors ruining their initial intentions and behaving in a "unintentional" or "unplanned" way. That points to a phenomenon of discontinuity between intentions or plans and behaviors. The phenomenon can take the form of inaction where the corresponding intention is to act, or of action, where the corresponding intention is not to act. To illustrate the state of affairs, we refer to the unique effort of a systematic investigation of the problem.

T. Rogers and M. Aida (2012) collected data on voting intentions declared by thousands of respondents during several independent pre-electoral surveys preceding several independent elections in the US. Then, they matched these data with electoral databases in the states where records of visiting polling stations are open to the public. The resulting sample turned off a bulk of the 29,403 respondents for whom there was reliable data of both kinds, that is, for intentions and for actions. In spite the fact that this sample does not represent the entire electorate, it seems reliable enough to draw accurate conclusions about intention-action inconsistency. Table 1.1 illustrates them with an example.

Table 1.1. Planned and unplanned behavior

Intention	Actually did vote	Actually didn't vote	Total
Yes	30,4%	36,0%	66,4%
No	7,0%	16,8%	23,7%
Not sure	4,2%	5,7%	9,9%
Total	41,5%	58,5%	100,0%

Source: (Rogers, Aida, 2012: 18), calculated as shares of the total sample.
Recalculated by Oleg Chernozub on the basis of the source data.

As we can see in Table 1.1, there is a considerable share of respondents who clearly failed to realize their intentions. There are 36% of the total sample who, in contrast to their declared intentions, did not vote. and 7% who did. The total of 43% of the sample displayed the "unplanned" behavior. This scale is quite similar to the "planned" one: only 47,2% (30,4% + 16,8%) of respondents confirmed the seriousness of their intentions through action. Considering these statistics, it is clear that this is a problem that can not be ignored.

The RAA recognizes a gap between intentions and corresponding actions caused by the inevitable time distance between the decision to act and the action itself. According to the theory, this phenomenon can be explained by the concept of intentions' "inflation". Every time an action escalation process is undertaken, some intervening factors are likely to change the initial intentions. The larger the time gap, the more in quantity and the stronger potential external factors are, the greater the chances of losing the connection between initial intention and actual behavior. In particular, the TPB directly points to one of these intervening factors, namely "actual behavioral control". The TBP regards it as the main potential cause of intentions' inflation.

In other words, the TPB suggests that some scale of an intention — behavior inconsistency is normal and can be explained by the pressure of intervening forces that "inflate" initial intentions. Let us consider the effect of these forces by comparing their impact on those, who have intention and those who have not. Table 1.2 presents the accuracy of turnout predictions for each intention group.

Table 1.2 Turnout prediction inaccuracies by intention groups.

Intention	Actually did vote	Actually didn't vote	Total
Yes	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%
No	29,3%	70,7%	100,0%
Not sure	42,4%	57,6%	100,0%
Total	41,5%	58,5%	100,0%

Source: (Rogers, Aida, 2010: 18).

Taking actual behavior into account, the opt-in and undecided groups split almost identically, 45,8% to 54,2%, and 42,4 to 57,6%, respectively. This means that knowledge of intentions sometimes adds disappointingly little to our ability to explain and predict behavior. That is the essence of the problem. This is not a surprise since the intention — based prediction for this particular case was 66,4%, while the actual turnout was — 41,5%.

All other studies analyzed by Rogers and Aida provide exactly the same results; in fact, we can find almost identical observations based on any study that explains intentions and behavior (Chernozub, 2020a, 2020b). For the bulk of unplanned behavior, we have almost no chance to verify the severity of impact or even the existence of any "intervening forces". Usually, when a period between intention formation and behavior is controlled by the researcher, we do not see even a hint of interference.

For example, we conducted online research for many years where respondents had the option of getting a discount on their favorite consumer goods items. There was an alternative option to finish the online session right there and then. This proposition of a few seconds results in confirmation of their intention to buy an item in the next three months. The coupon is valid for three months, and could be used for both online and in-store shopping. It is added to other discounts, if any. Technically there is no effort required to get it. Thus, what percentage of consumers changed their intentions? Table 1.3 represents the results, based on the five last waves of the study (2021 — 2022, quote-controlled river sampling, 600 respondents per wave, and 3,000 observations of the total sample).

Table 1.3. Unplanned behaviors in the process supposedly unaffected by intervening forces

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Mean
Intented to act						
Action	35,3%	35,9%	37,7%	33,6%	29,6%	34,4%
Inaction	64,7%	64,2%	62,3%	66,5%	70,4%	65,6%
Unintended to act						
Action	31,1%	31,4%	35,0%	29,5%	26,3%	30,7%
Inaction	68,9%	68,7%	65,0%	70,5%	73,7%	69,3%

Table 1.3 demonstrates almost exactly the same results as the findings of T. Rogers and M. Aida. On average, 65,6% of those in the "intended" group and 30,7% of those in the "unintended" group fail to deliver on their intentions. Corresponding figures from table 1.2 are very close, since "unplanned" turnovers account for 54,2% and 29,3% of total behaviors, respectively. One could assume a wide range of intervening factors causing the "intentions' inflation" during the electoral process, but that seems like a difficult task for our experiment.

Data indicates that some factors inherent in the action escalation process determine at least some fraction of "unplanned" behavior. Most often, they are in place at the mo-

ment of intentions' formation, but somehow lurk in a shadow right until the moment when it is time to act. If this assumption is valid, there is a chance to detect and take them into account while predicting behaviors. Certainly, that potential improvement will not eliminate the notion of intervening factors, but should help to expand the scale of explanation for predictable behavior.

The existence of "unplanned" behavior is a painful issue for practitioners. In the spheres where the accuracy of predictions is permanently and effectively validated, like electoral studies, various models of "likely actors" are developed (Perry, 1960, 1962, 1973, 1979; Newport, 2008).[2] Taking the RAA as the base model, they add varied combinations of additional filters to correct intention-based models' "raw" output. They use historically tested indicators of action probability to classify respondents as "likely" or "unlikely" actors. In electoral studies, a giant compendium of these indicators has been collected by the ANES project.[3] Sometimes, these additional corrections to the basic models turn out to be effective, at other times, not. Sadly, the results are unstable and sometimes so disappointing that industry investigations have been organized to figure out what happened (Sturgis et al., 2016; Kennedy et al. 2016). Unsurprisingly, this stimulated attempts to elaborate substitutes like prediction markets (Arrow et al., 2008; Atanasov et al., 2015), surveys of expectations (Rothschild, Wolfers, 2011; Graefe, 2014), social media content analysis (Tumasjan et al., 2010), and economy-based forecasts (Tufte, 1978), all quite alarming signals for pollsters and sociologists.

The natural cause of that instability is the 'likely actor' concept itself. Methodologically, these models study not the *driving forces* of behavior, but more or less reliable *indicators* proving the validity of declarative intentions. Therefore, they focused not on the evaluation of behavior's inner drivers' strength and valence, but on the similarity; does this particular respondent looks "like" a typical historical actor, or not? Generally speaking, they use associative ties instead of cause-and-effect relations. For true understanding and reliable prediction of behavior, it is obviously not enough.

Unsurprisingly, there are some theories pointing to the fact that RAA models do not predict unplanned behaviors very well. Some of them explain unplanned behavior as guided by automatism, which does not take part in the development of intentions (Gibbons et al., 1998). In others, affect overrides RAA reflective mechanisms. (Friese, Hofmann, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009). There is quite a popular theory that unplanned actions can be attributed to habits (Soror et al., 2015), stereotypes (Devine, 1989), and ritual (Collins, 1981). The heuristic behavior theory occupies a somewhat special place, assuming some behavior could be intentionally random (Chaiken, 1980).

There are some studies that focus specifically on the phenomenon of unplanned behavior. From the latest studies, we may outline a study of unplanned use of social net-

2. Please see: Likely voters IV — The Gallup model. Mystery Pollster URL: http://www.mysterypollster.com/main/2004/10/likely_voters_i_1.html for the current state of the model.

3. American National Electoral Survey. Please see: https://electionstudies.org/ for details.

working sites (Turel, Qahri-Saremi, 2018), and several studies of unpredictable buyer behaviors (Bell, et al., 2011; Hui, et. al., 2013; Chomvilailuka, Butcher, 2014).

These examples represent two opposing approaches to the explanation of the phenomenon of unplanned behavior. According to Turel and Qahri-Saremi, unplanned behaviors are a function of an actor's cognitive system. Bell, Hui, and their coauthors explain unplanned behavior as being caused by stimuli that fill the gap between the formed intention and the actual behavior. This is a principal divergence. In the first approach, unplanned behavior is a characteristic of the actor. In contrast, in the second approach, it is a characteristic of the environment in which the action is performed.

Sociologically, these interpretations can be viewed as problems of the respondents' inconsistency (deliberate misreporting or lack of introspection issues) or intentions' "late swing". Both interpretations present a way to improve our explanatory models. If a tendency to unplanned behavior is a trait of the actor, then it should exist before forming of intention and may be accounted for by a model. If unplanned behaviors are a result of impact of intervening factors, the model should include some explanations why some intentions survive but others do not.

We contend that the explanation of the phenomenon of unplanned behaviors could be improved by expanding the RAA model into a domain of implicit behavioral factors. This expansion could redefine the set of these factors, if it helps to understand why some behaviors obey the intention-based model's prescripts.

3. Theoretical design and framework

3.1 A comparative approach

Our general assumption is that *not every "unplanned" behavior is truly unplanned*. It may look unplanned due to the fact that RAA models are not accurate enough at defining and identifying intentions. Some of the true intentions are presumably guided by implicit factors and therefore are ignored or invisible for the RAA models.

Thus, in this paper we discuss the results of an experiment where the RAA model was enriched with an implicit predictor, which proved its effectiveness in numerous electoral studies. As a perfect example of a RAA-based model, we take the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). As a mechanism of integrating explicit and implicit determinants, we take our two-component model (TCM) of behavioral factors (Chernozub, 2018a, 2018b, 2020a, 2020b).

In this way, we create two models. The "control" model contains no implicit component and represents the "pure" TPB model. The "experimental" model is actually the same TPB model except for an implicit component of "general attitude", whose explicit component is an "official" part of the original TPB model.

In comparing behavior driving forces and locations where these forces are generated for both models, we plan to identify the implicit component impact and mechanisms for its transmission.

3.2 The theoretical framework for the control model

The Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein, Ajzen, 2011) is one of the most influential theoretical models in the social sciences. Within the TPB framework, it is assumed that human behavior involves some grade of reasoning and actions are intentional and aim at the subjective goals of actors. "Reasoned" means "correct" or "right" not in objective reality, but in the mind of the actors. Being directed by "reasoned" factors is enough for an actor if he *believes* these factors guide him to the most viable option.

The TPB model's specific value for our experiment is rooted in its representation of human behavior as a well-structured process which starts with encountering the initial stimuli and ends with the accomplishment of actions. The TPB argues that any action is preceded by an intention, when looking at the action-escalation process backwards. The intention in turn is an outcome of interaction between three factors presented as actors' "estimations". These estimations take the form of reasoned calculations but are driven by subjective "beliefs". As mentioned above, the latter may be far away from reality. Last but not least, the beliefs are influenced by "background factors" such as societal pressure, personal characteristics, cognitive abilities, cultural environment, etc.

The three basic factors of (subjective) beliefs and corresponding (rationalized) estimations are:

- Behavioral beliefs /attitudes asks whether a particular action appears beneficial enough for the actor. That is a core concept of the RAA which is based on the expectancy-value model, where the evaluation of possible outcomes of planning behavior against personal goals is weighed by the probability of these outcomes.
- Normative beliefs / subjective norms. Actors take not only their own instrumental benefits of planned actions into account, but also the anticipated effects of these actions on their social environment. That is an incredibly critical component that dramatically distinguishes the RAA from economic models focused on hunting for a better balance of gains versus losses. As a result, this factor may support, alter, or block an actor's action according to expected reaction of the actor's social environment.
- Control beliefs / perceived behavioral control. This factor reflects the actors' assessment of their control over the situation of action, in particular, whether the planned action is feasible for them or not.

Historically, behavioral attitudes were introduced as the first factor of the model (Fishbein, 1967) reproducing the 1948 Friedman-Savage pattern of "economic behavior". At the very beginning, behavioral attitudes were viewed as the only factor of reasoned behavior and social action. The theory assumes that the conscious summation of all possible effects of planning behavior necessarily takes into consideration all other determinants, e.g., anticipated reactions of a social environment. Later, M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen (1975) split this integral factor into two, adding normative beliefs / subjective norms as a representation of "social pressure" effects. These two factors constitute the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA). The TPB differs from it by the third factor, which explains why

some actions may be omitted even if they are beneficial for actors and are socially acceptable. Control beliefs were introduced as a third factor. Now, the TRA is viewed as a particular case of the TPB where actors believe there are no external barriers to accomplishing the action (Fishbein, Ajzen, 2011).[4]

For further discussion, following A. Ajzen, we will use the term "beliefs" to name these three TBP factors, keeping their dual nature in mind, as subjective beliefs that have been transformed into rationalized estimations.

Finally, the TBP does not overestimate explicit (conscious or reflective) and disregard implicit (unconscious or impulsive) factors of behavior, but presumes they both are counted by the model within its "beliefs" predictors. Aizen would write that "In the TPB, the fundamental determinants of intentions and behavior are the behavioral, normative, and control beliefs people hold in relation to the behavior in question. However, no assumption is made about the objectivity or veridicality of these beliefs. They may be based on invalid or selective information; *they may be irrational, reflecting unconscious biases, paranoid tendencies, wishful thinking, or other self-serving motives*; and they may fail to correspond to reality in many other ways" (2019 — *italics added*).

3.3 The theoretical framework for the experimental model

It has been pointed out that for a long period of time, the RAA models in taking into account only sensible, rational factors of behavior are not able to convincingly explain the entire diversity of human behavior (Baumeister, 2002; Goldstein, Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahneman, Frederick, 2002; Shah, Oppenheimer, 2008; Hofmann et al., 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Wood, Bechara, 2014; and Thaler, 2015). Against this background, a whole spectrum of various theories has emerged, combining both "reflective" and "impulsive" factors as determinants of behavior. (Fazio, 1990, 2007; Kahneman, Frederick, 2002; Gilovich, Griffin, 2002; Strack, Deutsch, 2004).

Due to the fact that the former are quite conscious phenomena relatively easily accessible for introspection from the point of view of social measurements, they are usually associated with "explicit" (overt) factors of behavior. The second group is relatively less accessible for direct fixation and may remain unrecognized not only by the researcher, but also by the respondent himself. This group of influences is associated with "implicit" (hidden or ulterior) behavioral factors.

The presence of implicit determinants of behavior is quite reliably established (Rosenberg, 1956; Rosenberg, et al., 1960). In the same way, their influence on behavior is proven, if not directly, then at least through the mechanism of consistency/inconsistency of the components of attitude (Metcalfe, Mischel, 1999; Strack, Neumann, 2000; Greenwald et al, 2009a, 2009b; Perugini, 2005; Perugini et al., 2010; Roccato, Zogmaister, 2010; Chernozub, 2018b, 2020a, 2020b). This approach, usually known as the Dual System The-

4. Please see: https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.background.html for a summary of the last findings.

ory (DST), serves as a ground for dual-process theories of information processing and decision-making.

An action escalation process starts with activation of an "implicit" system. This system stores mental associations between stimuli, behaviors, and rewards, retrieving them when a stimulus is presented. Creating expectations for dopamine release, the reactive system motivates immediate action (Meshi et al., 2015). The very process of forming chains of associative links is hidden from a person whose consciousness only sees its final result (Sloman, 1996; Smith, DeCoster, 2000). This "reactive" or "impulsive" system produces an automatic response pushing an actor towards (presumably) rewarding behavior. These associations, stimulus — prescribed behavior — reward, are activated quickly and independently of conscious control.

The other, the "reflective" system, mobilizes the resources of self-awareness and tries to control, block, or alter the guiding pressure of the first one (Turel, Bechara, 2016).

In its most general form, it is believed that one of them is governed by the rules of conceptual thinking and that a person is fully aware of both, that is, the process itself and the rules in accordance with which he performs logical operations. In this way, the second system is "explicit" in the introspection of actors, and has relatively low barriers for effective external observation.

A response to stimuli always begins with the activation of the impulse system. Normally, a conscious mechanism is prepared to intervene in an action escalation process and to keep an actor from potentially harmful consequences of an impulsive system impetus, if any. Sometimes however, the impulsive component is strong while the reflective aspect is relatively weak. This is the balance that results in "unplanned" behavior (Turel, Qahri-Saremi, 2016). However, there are strong barriers to the activation of this reflective system, as its functioning is extremely resource-consuming. For example, according to the Motivation and Opportunity DEterminants model (MODE), the impulsive system is automatically activated after exposure to a stimulus. As individuals tend to evade spending additional resources, impulsive factors directly determine the bulk of actual behavior. It is only in some cases, if an actor recognizes the significance of the anticipated action and simultaneously has opportunities for thinking (has a clear mind, has knowledge and time to think, etc.), that the rational apparatus of a person is involved in the refining of the initially prescribed option (Ranganath et al., 2008; Koole et al., 2001; Gawronski, LeBel, 2008; Jordan et al., 2007; Kendrick, Olson, 2012).

Theoretically, the most significant consequence of these assumptions is the denial of the joint impact of explicit and implicit components on behavior. Behaviors are influenced either by the implicit or (if they have been activated) by the explicit determinants. According to the MODE approach, empirical confirmation of this assumption is provided by a strong correlation between the implicit and explicit components identified in the course of numerous studies (Fazio et al., 1995; Dasgupta, Rivera, 2006; Conner et al., 2007; Florack et al., 2001; Koole et al., 2001; Ranganath et al., 2008). An alternative approach might be described by the Reflective — Impulsive Model (RIM). This model is based on the assumption of a high degree of independence for each of the components.

Both systems have their own nature, obey their own laws, and compete for the "right" to have a decisive influence on the course of actions that will be chosen. According to this approach, the inconsistency between implicit and explicit factors of behavior is the norm of an action escalation process (Strack, Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Neumann, 2000).

While the natures of the two DST systems are relatively clear, their naming terms are still far from being standardized. The formulations for the components of numerous DST models vary from theory to theory and seem inconsistent (Evans, 2009). There are, for example: "heuristic" vs. "systematic" processing (Chaiken, 1980), "automatic stereotyping" vs. "suppression" (Devine, 1989), "automatic affective reactions" vs. "self-control" (Friese, Hofmann, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009), "habit" vs. "self-regulation" (Soror et al., 2015), "impulsive" vs "reflective" processing (Strack, Deutsch, 2004), controlled or deliberative vs. automatic or spontaneous (Fascio, 1995, Fazio, Olson, 2014), etc.

We avoid discussing the specifics of understanding and naming DST components in this study. We use conventional names for the "implicit" and "explicit" components of an action escalation model to represent the effects imposed on it by impulsive and reflective systems respectively.

Sociology presents this approach as "dispositional vs. deliberative" types of action (Bourdieu, 1980/1990; Joas, 1996; Swidler, 2003). In the past few years, sociological interpretations of dual-process theories were developed in cultural and cognitive models. In general, sociologists do not study the cognitive process itself, but examine the idea of autonomy and the interaction of consciously-controllable and uncontrollable factors of social interactions[5] (Auyero, Swistun, 2008; Vaisey, 2009; Martin, 2010; Lizardo, Strand, 2010; Srivastava, Banaji, 2011; Pugh, 2013; Patterson, 2014; Leschziner, 2015; Leschziner, Green, 2013; Vila-Henninger, 2015; Lizardo et al., 2016; Rivers et al., 2017).

3.4 The experimental model's conceptual design

The integration of the DST concept into the conventional TBP model can be achieved by applying our two-component model of behavior factors (TCM). This is a sociological model rooted in the structured theory of attitudes. The TCM regards the implicit and explicit components of attitudes as independent factors of behavior. Whether or not formal intentions are formed, their behavioral impact results from the conflict between influences generated by every component.

The TCM generalized all possible combinations of attitudes' explicit and implicit components by into four "consistency statuses". Two statuses of consistent attitudes, where both components demonstrate the same valence, are "consistent positive" and "consistent negative" attitudes. Two inconsistent statuses are "explicit positive, implicit negative" and "explicit negative, implicit positive" combinations of the components.

It is assumed that the consistent positive status should generate a higher probability of action, while consistent negative status should generate a higher probability of inaction.

5. In the sociological interpretation of these terms.

Inconsistent statuses should be placed in the middle of the row. In the fields of behaviors which tend to the superiority of reflective drivers, it is anticipated that "explicit positive, implicit negative" status will motivate more actions than the "explicit negative, implicit positive" status, while in the fields where impulse drivers are relatively strong, it will be the other way around.

These assumptions are well proven. Table 3.1 represents an example of the aforementioned regularity. Empirical data was obtained through an Internet survey. The quota-controlled sample represents the population of the Russian Federation aged 18 to 45 years. The respondents completed a "psychological test" in which an implicit measurement concerning the attractiveness of obtaining test results was included. Then, respondents were explicitly asked about their attitudes towards a chance to look at their personal test results. Finally, at the very end of the questionnaire, there was a link to these results. The respondents had the option either to follow the link, or to close the inquiry's session. The first option was treated as an action, and the second option as inaction. By doing so, we were able to collect both explicit and implicit attitudes as well as reliable data on actual behavior. The scales for both components of attitudes were recoded into "relatively positive" — "relatively negative" values, and were merged to create the four above-mentioned groups of attitude statuses.

For all the data presented hereafter, tests of statistical significance were carried out and showed statistically significant associations at the level of no less than p=0.05.

Table 3.1. Motivational power based on consistency of an attitude

Consistency statuses	Group's share	Action	Inaction
Consistent positive	45%	38%	62%
Explicit positive, Implisit negative	33%	29%	71%
Explicit negative, Implisit positive	12%	8%	92%
Consistent negative	10%	7%	94%
Total	100%	NA	NA

As the data of Table 3.1 demonstrates, the consistency status of an attitude is directly associated with the probability of actual behaviors. Following our data, one could see that the probability of action decreases, while the probability of inaction increases with every step of the scale. More data concerning TCM effectiveness was published earlier (Chernozub, 2018b, 2020b).

Since the TCM has shown some potential to explain behaviors independently of intentions, its integration into the TPB model makes *practical sense*. It is *theoretically possible* to do this within TPB's interpretation of so-called "general attitudes".

General attitudes are regarded by the TPB as one of the "background factors" of actors' "beliefs". Attitude is "general" since the TBP regards it as an overall view of the

potential actor toward a complex entity, like "the politician X", rather than toward specific actions, or like "voting for the politician X for the office Y next Sunday". The TPB suggests that general attitudes can affect not a specific action, but the style of behavior in this field. For example, it is not this person's turnout in this particular election, but their overall electoral activity for a long period of time. Concerning specific behaviors, the TPB argues that general attitudes can influence them, but through the mediation of "beliefs". Technically, that should be represented by relatively strong correlations between attitudes and "beliefs" variables in contrast to relatively weak correlations between attitudes and intentions and / or behavioral variables (Fishbein, Ajzen, 2011: 273-279).

Therefore, there are no obvious theoretical barriers to integrating the TCM into the TPB model on the grounds of its legal component of "general attitude".

According to the TPB, we should anticipate that general attitude:

- will affect the TPB "beliefs" and will not affect intentions and behaviors;
- will be a predictor of "beliefs" either with an explicit or an implicit component, but not with any combination of them.

In contrary, the TCM assumes that general attitude:

- will affect behaviors directly;
- will affect behavior depending on its consistency status.

Thus, the experimental model represents the conventional TBP structure where "background factors" of "general attitudes" is split into two components, those of explicit and implicit.

4. Hypothesis and anticipated theoretical contribution of the study

Within this framework, the anticipated theoretical contribution of this paper includes several dimensions.

First of all, we hope to shed some light on the phenomenon of "unplanned" actions. If even a fraction of these actions can be explained by the impact of an implicit factor, then an extension of the TPB to implicit factors makes sense. Next, we see it as a chance to test the effectiveness of two competing models of behavior-factors interaction. The MODE proposes that only one component determines any given behavior. On the contrary, RIM argues that both components affect behaviors simultaneously.

The formal hypotheses are stipulated as follows;

Ho1: "The strength of associations between variables reflecting general attitudes and those reflecting the actual behaviors will be weaker than the strength of associations between variables reflecting general attitudes and those reflecting TPB "beliefs", while the latter are statistically significant".

Ho2: "The strength of associations between variables reflecting consistent status of an attitude components and variable reflecting the actual behaviors will be weaker than the strength of associations between variables reflecting each of these components and the same dependent variable, while the latter are statistically significant".

In the sociological context, the rejection of these hypotheses will lead to a better understanding of the structuration process in both directions. First of all, we will gain a better understanding of how a general attitude influences social behavior by the use of implicit / unconscious forces. That will support the model of interaction ritual chains proposed by R. Collins and probably actualize his model of microfoundations of macrosociology (1981). Next, we plan to describe the mechanics by which dispositions affect deliberate social actions, supporting the structural theory of attitude.

It will be a significant contribution to social psychology and cognitive sciences if our results support either the MODE or RIM model of implicit and explicit factors' interaction in the specific domain of "unplanned" actions.

5. The model and its operationalization, research plan

Despite the fact that TPB is wide-spread and recognized by scientists all around the world, there are several research domains where it is used especially intensively. Electoral behavior is one of them. Taking into consideration a parallel experience of applying TCM to this field, we chose electoral studies as the appropriate and accessible empirical ground for our investigation.

As the general framework for our model, we take a well-known scheme of the TBP.[6] Putting all unnecessary elements aside, we configure the model as it is shown in figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1. The model of the theory of planned behavior enriched by the element of two-component general attitude.

In Figure 5.1, the blue elements compose the original TPB model. One addition to it is a white rectangle, representing the implicit component of general attitudes. The black

6. https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.background.html

bold arrows reflect the classical TPB interpretation of an action escalation process. The blue arrows point to the anticipated impact of general attitudes as per the TPB, while the blue broken ones are as per the TCM. The red broken lines represent the combined influences of two components, as assumed by the TCM.

Thus, the colored lines represent the expected effect of TPB enrichment, while the broken lines mark effects that may emerge contrary to the TPB's prediction.

* * *

We designed an online mass poll devoted to measuring the activities of political volunteers in order to test our model empirically. The role of the respondents was defined as partisans of potential candidates for the Russian presidential elections of 2024. To eliminate the possibility of any "actual control" factor intervention, we used a simple and immediately executed form of behavior of filling out a short form, containing the respondent's contact information.[7] The disclosure of the e-mail address or telephone number in this form was considered an act of behavior. The TPB views this as incomplete behavior. However, such actions are regarded as a "commitment" to behave and a reliable predictor of behavior (Fishbein, Ajzen, 2011).

To make sure that there are no external barriers for the planned behaviors, only respondents who answered "definitely yes" to the screening question "I always disclose my contacts in the Internet if I really want to get feedback" were selected for the survey. Our belief is that this will eliminate the risks associated with disclosing contacts specific to behavioral fields.

The model was operationalized according to the recommendations of A. Ajzen[8] as well as the practical limitations of the fieldwork design. Seven variables were configured;

General attitude, explicit component (AE): "It will be helpful for people like me, if my favorite candidate takes/keeps this office".

General attitude, implicit component (AI): as per the Graphic Associative Test of Attitudes (please, see next section of the paper).

Behavioral beliefs / expectations (BB): "My help to my candidate will bring me more gains than losses".

Normative beliefs / expectations (NB): "My help to my candidate will be approved by those whose opinion I respect".

Control beliefs / expectations (CB): "Contribution such as commenting and re-posting messages on the Internet or distributing leaflets will not require any effort from me".

Intentions (Int): "If you have a chance, would you fill a contact form to get feedback from the headquarters of your candidate or not?"

Behaviors (Bh): — the act of filling out a contact form.

7. In Russia, an e-mail address or phone number tied to a person's name does not qualify as personal data that should be protected by law or ethics.

8. Please see https://people.umass.edu/aizen/pdf/tpb.measurement.pdf.

Self-evaluation questions (AE, BB, NB, and CB) started with "To what extent do you agree, or disagree with the following: …". For these variables, we used a four-point scale of "totally agree — rather agree — rather disagree — totally disagree". The options for answering the question about intention were "yes" or "no". To identify the actual behavior, we asked respondents to fill out a contact form as a potential volunteer for the candidate they preferred. To measure the implicit component of attitudes, we used our method of the Graphic Associative Test of Attitudes (GATA).

6. The GATA

Considering the practical limitations of the poll methodology, we developed the Graphic Associative Test of Attitude (GATA) (Chernozub, 2018a, 2018b). Methodologically, it is a modified Etkind's Color Test, ECT (Etkind, 1980, 1985, 1087), which, in turn, is a development of the 1990 Lüscher test. Initially, ECT was developed for questioning people with cognitive dysfunctions who could not understand the verbal constructs of a questionnaire well. Thus, it deliberately focused on addressing the unconscious structures of the mind.

The participants in ETC associate simple concepts like relatives, mates, friends, etc., with colors from Lüscher's "small" set. Then, respondents rate the colors as "pleasing" or "unpleasing". Thus, an individual preference-rejection scale is developed to measure the participants' implicit attitude towards the tested objects.

In politics, colors and color schemes are often significant symbols and used for political identification. For this reason, the stimulus set of the original ECT was substituted with 8 graphic shapes from the 1980 Markert Test. The shapes of the test have no political connotations and thus can be used to differentiate between electoral alternatives. Figure 6.1 depicts examples of the stimulus set found in GATA.

Figure 6.1. Examples of K. Markert Test stimuli used in the current study to measure voters' implicit attitudes.

Thus, the method's procedure was structured as follows;

a. The set of graphic shapes is presented to a respondent on the screen of a CAPI device.
b. The respondent associates graphic shapes with test objects represented by verbal concepts as they are described by an interviewer / presented on a screen.
c. The respondent's mind is turned to other issues of the survey.
d. The respondent rates graphic shapes from most attractive ("shapes that are pleasant to look at, shapes one wants to gaze at") to less attractive ("shapes that are unpleasant to look at, shapes one would not want to gaze at").

e. An "individual scale" of shape preferences is created, based on the ranking from phase "d".
f. An implicit preferences score is attributed to every concept, based on association from phase "b" and according to the "individual scale".

Here is an example; a respondent chose Shape "C" as the most preferable, and Shape "D" as the least preferred among all the shapes. Thus, Shape "C" receives the highest score of "1" and Shape "D" receives the lowest score of "8" on this respondent's "individual scale". Then, a researcher selects all the tested objects associated by this particular respondent with these shapes, and gets the valence of implicit attitude towards objects, which counts as "extremely positive" for all objects associated with the Shape "C", and as "extremely negative" for ones associated with the Shape "D". The same algorithm is repeated for all shapes and all objects.

As a result, every tested object gains a score on an ordinal scale, regardless of which particular shape may be preferred or rejected by each single respondent due to his or her psychological, cultural, national traits, or any other factors of the same kind.

7. The interim summary

The RAA, and especially the TPB, are widely recognized models for explaining and predicting behaviors based on the *explicit* factors of behavior. However, there is quite an extensive field of "unplanned" behaviors not covered by these models. Behavioral patterns of this kind are attributed to the "intention inflation" phenomenon. In turn, this inflation is explained by poor "actual behavior control".

Previous studies have shown that there are situations in which reasonable chances for "inflation" are absent and where the "actual control" is full, yet unplanned behavior still occurs.

At the same time, there is a lot of evidence that behaviors depend not only on explicit, but also on *implicit* factors. The general approach of DST has been combined with numerous theories, such as the TCM as an example. As the TCM has a successful record of studying combined explicit /implicit effects on behaviors, it may be a convenient instrument to test the idea of enlarging TPB with implicit factors attempting to explain the phenomenon of unintended behavior.

Technically, this could be realized by splitting the TPB "background factor" of "general attitude" into explicit and implicit components, leaving all other structures of the model untouched.

Will this homeopathic invasion bring some meaningful results?

We will see in the next article.

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Теория (не)запланированного поведения? Как наши прогнозы поведения страдают от «незапланированных» действий

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Будучи весьма влиятельной в микросоциологии, Теория запланированного поведения (ТЗП) предлагает одну из самых популярных технических моделей прогнозирования социального действия. Её центральным пунктом выступает допущение, что намерения являются *обязательными* посредниками между исходными факторами поведения и соответствующими действиями. Если некоторые люди отказываются от своих намерений, ТЗП интерпретирует это как то, что они были «обесценены» под давлением внешних факторов. ТЗП не претендует на объяснение этих факторов, просто подчеркивая, что существует разрыв между «воспринимаемым» и «фактическим» контролем поведения. Таким образом, возникает концепция «незапланированного поведения», вызванного действиями неконтролируемых внешних факторов.

Настоящая статья предлагает альтернативный подход к проблеме. В ней мы проверяем предположение о существовании неких факторов, которые могут объяснять «незапланированное» поведение исходя из *внутренних* закономерностей процесса эскалации действия, но пока не учитываются существующей моделью ТЗП. Оставаясь в рамках социологической интерпретации, предлагаемой теорией двойственных систем, примером этих пока еще неучтенных факторов мы выбрали имплицитный компонент общей установки. Доказательство воздействия этого фактора на поведение *в обход намерений* дает

нам возможность распространить модель ТЗП по крайней мере на некоторые разновидности поведения, считающегося на данный момент «девиантным» по отношению к теоретически предсказанному.

В теоретическом плане это может привести к реструктуризации базовой модели ТЗП путем ее обогащения этим не учитываемым на данный момент фактором. Практическое значение нашей работы будет состоять в том, что некоторые области «незапланированных» действий станут доступными для прогностического анализа.

Ключевые слова: факторы поведения; двухкомпонентная модель факторов поведения; эксплицитные факторы; имплицитные факторы; установка, структурная теория установки; двойственный процесс; теория двойственной системы; подход рационального действия; теория запланированного поведения; ГАТО; ТЗП; DST; RAA; MODE; RIM.

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Violence against Female Domestic Workers in Kuwait

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This study aims to examine the types and severity of violence and abuse encountered by female domestic workers in Kuwait. Methodologically, the study employed a quantitative approach. This study found that in terms of ethnicity and origin, Philippine and Sri-Lankan females dominated the social care and domestic workers sector in Kuwait. The statistical analysis showed that 82 % encountered physical abuse; 45%, sexual abuse; 88 %, psychological abuse; and 70 %, battering abuse. The paper recommends changes to Kuwaiti criminal laws to include proper prosecution of those who abuse domestic workers. It also recommends the implementation of proper protective mechanisms for these female workers.

Keywords: domestic violence, physical abuse, battered women, Kuwait

Introduction

The topic of violence is not new to social science. There are different options and versions of its description, as in political philosophy (Arendt, 1969) or, say, in social and cultural anthropology (Feldman, 1991). In any case, approaches like these are primarily concerned with the properly political dimension of violence.

Our interest in this study concerns a different type of violence, that of domestic violence. Although the private or household sphere is traditionally assumed to be irrelevant to the political one, this is not entirely true in our case. Our study concerns violence against domestic workers in the Gulf countries. Since these workers are all immigrants, the themes of gender, ethnicity and race, protection of rights, and political interrelationships with their countries of origin are all addressed in our study. In recent times, a large percentage of Gulf families have become dependent on domestic workers of various nationalities. Workers from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Nepal, and other countries live with families in order to work inside their homes for a long period of time. According to a report in 2003, the number of domestic workers classified as immigrants reached approximately 812,000 in Saudi Arabia, 400,000 in Kuwait, 66,000 in Oman, 30,000 in

Bahrain, and 450,000 in the Emirates. These numbers are constantly increasing in Kuwait, the Emirates, and the rest of the Gulf countries so that the ratio of domestic workers to citizens is approximately 1:2 (Executive Office of the Council of Ministers of Social Affairs and Labor in the Gulf States, 2003).

Dessiye (2011) explored how these domestic workers get to the Middle East countries, their mental health status, and their experiences of sexual abuse, their work conditions, and their low position within Arab society. She also detailed the types of legitimate and illicit work that Ethiopian women take part in in the Middle East. Brahic, Olaiya & Jacobs (2011) clarified the disadvantages of the complex intersection of gender and labor oppression compounded by casual employment using the example of export-oriented horticulture estates in Africa, particularly in cut-flower farms in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. In their opinion, domestic workers are not given access to work. Furthermore, certain benefits such as housing allowances, medical benefits, maternity leave, collective bargaining rights, social protection, sick leave, etc., are not provided. They are also excluded from opportunities for promotion.

Furthermore, Vlieger (2011) asserts that the UAE and Saudi Arabia use exploitation and forced confinement as a standard part of their labor conditions, and those domestic workers are often victims of human trafficking. Additionally, she opined that such trafficking is most commonly driven by deception, misinformation, exploitation, and confinement. She, however, argued that it is societal norms that provide the reason why traffickers are not being prosecuted, not legal obscurities.

Domestic-worker abuse which usually occurs in private homes and is kept secret from the public has received more attention lately. The vast list of abuses performed by labor representatives and employers includes forced detention at work, nonpayment of salaries, physical, psychological, and sexual assault, as well as excessively long working hours without breaks. In the most severe cases, women and girls are trafficked into forced domestic work under conditions that are close to slavery. In addition, they are held captive in situations of forced labor.

Laborers who migrate from Asia, Africa, and the poorer Arab countries are used by the oil-rich monarchs of the Arabian Gulf as construction workers, guards, delivery workers, hairdressers, garbage collectors, and housekeepers, as a cheap workforce that keeps the machinery of daily life running.

The Abu Dhabi Dialogue forum on immigrants stated that, in 2016, the Gulf recorded nearly four million foreign domestic workers, and there has been a tremendous increase since (ILO, 2016). It also indicated a threat to the number of annual opt-ins for the region before the coronavirus pandemic, which was estimated to be 36,000 domestic workers (Kuwait Times News 2015). The Gulf countries use a sponsorship system for employing foreign domestic workers, which practically gives their employers total control over them. With this sponsorship system, they are required to obtain permission from their employer before leaving the country, it is almost impossible to change jobs, and their bosses often confiscate their mobile phones and passports.

Over 53 million people worldwide work as household helpers with women making up the majority of this workforce, although a more accurate number would be greater than

100 million. A little over 40% of them are employed in the Asia Pacific region (ILO, 2013). The duties performed by domestic workers in their private homes include taking care of children and the elderly, cleaning, cooking, and laundry. Some are subjected to servile conditions and circumstances. Adel Alkassadi (2000) opined that most domestic workers are not paid their wages by their employers, their identity documents are being withheld, they are kept indoors and instructed not to communicate with their family members, and very often, they are intimidated and abused. Domestic workers, particularly females, suffer many psychological, emotional, physical, and sexual abuses. To avoid the stigma attached to such exploitation and abuse and for fear of what could become of them, most female domestic workers that experience abuse rarely speak out. The threat of losing their job with the economic impact it may have on their families also makes them silent. The majority of live-in domestic workers receives poor treatment, lives in substandard quarters, receives very scarce food, is deprived of their basic needs, and is under an unreasonable amount of pressure with no fixed working hours (Adel Alkassadi, 2000).

This study aims to examine the types and severity of violence and abuse encountered by female domestic workers in Kuwait. It is a quantitative research paper whose purpose is to identify the overall situation of violence against domestic workers. Additionally, it relates this to the issues of gender, race, and ethnicity, and offers concrete recommendations for improving the situation.

The Overview of Violence against Female Domestic Workers in the Gulf and Kuwait

The most prevalent and common form of domestic violence is physical abuse or assault. It always starts with a quarrel, resulting in forceful wrist grabbing or escalating shoving. Physical abuse or battering becomes frequent over time and is usually more severe, eventually leading to the victim's death (Hattery, 2009). Domestic violence takes different forms; it can include attacking, hitting, kicking, obnoxious attacks, conservative maltreatment, and psychological maltreatment with the intent to humiliate the victim (Karmen, 2007).

Verbal abuse is also a common form of violence against domestic workers, having very different connotations in various socio-ethnic backgrounds. For example, raising the voice, yelling, and scolding are perceived as much more severe measures in the Philippines than in Kuwait. This leaves migrant workers from this or similar ethnicity offended or shocked (SAIS, 2013).

Some workers face physical abuse. Several female workers report having suffered sexual assaults, including rape, by their male sponsors. Spurred by a recent increase in reported maltreatment and sexual abuse cases, *Mga Oragon sa Kuwait* (a Kuwaiti-based Filipino rights group) presented a petition on 2nd September, 2013, to the Philippine consul, General Raul Dado. Signed by more than 10,000 Filipino workers in Kuwait, it called for an immediate moratorium on the further deployment of Filipino domestic workers to Kuwait and the Middle East (Arab Times, 2013). There are records of worker exploitation on both the Philippines and Kuwaitis sides.

Wage-nonpayment is one of the major domestic workers' complaints, as reported by the Kuwaiti Association for the Basic Evaluators of Human Rights. A complaint can be filed for nonpayment, late payment, or withholding of certain amounts. In addition, workers often face excessively long working hours without time off for rest; "In Kuwait, the average time for domestic work ranges from 78–100 hours per week." (ILO Convention, 2007). They are given no days off; they are forced to work around the clock, especially during religious holidays; they live in poor conditions, and suffer from unfair wage deductions (SAIS, 2013).

This study focuses on the violence against female domestic workers in Kuwaiti society, specifically, actions such as physical abuse, battering, sexual and psychological abuses that are understood to be only a few forms of abuse that female domestic workers encounter in their employer-employee relationships. There are several issues faced by domestic workers due to the power and place differences between employer and employee. In the vast majority of cases, these issues result in an abusive relationship. These domestic workers endure violence because there are no reporting mechanisms or alternative opportunities. Therefore, they have no other option than to remain in their job and tolerate the abuse, which creates a permissive environment for it to continue, and even escalate.

In recent years, Kuwait has been experiencing an increase in violence against domestic workers, a situation that has brought disagreement between Kuwaitis and Filipinos. In 2018, a Kuwaiti court sentenced a Syrian woman and her Lebanese husband to death for killing their Filipino housemaid, as reported in *Al Qabas* newspaper. According to the report, the maid, Joanna Daniela Demafelis, was murdered a year earlier. Her corpse was discovered in a freezer in the couple's flat in a populated residential area of Kuwait called Hawally. According to the state-run National News Agency, Nader Essam Assaf, 40, confessed to murder and was charged by a prosecutor in South Lebanon. His Syrian wife, Mona, is in custody in Damascus, where the couple was arrested a month after the discovery of the corpse.

A forty-seven-year-old Filipino domestic worker, Constancia Lago Dayag, a native of Angadanan in the province of Isabela and working in Kuwait, was allegedly sexually abused and beaten to death by her employer. It was reported that Dayag was taken to the Al Sabah hospital with a hematoma and a cucumber lodged in her vagina.

Another case of an Ethiopian domestic worker who was beaten to death by her female sponsor was also reported by the *A-Rai* newspaper (2018). Kuwaiti detectives found blood spots and bruises on her body when she was found dead at her sponsor's home. The female sponsor confessed that she had beaten the victim because she (victim) did not do her job, and that after the beating, she locked the room door out of fear that someone might notice the bruises on her body. On reopening the door, she discovered the maid dead. She then narrated the incident to her husband, and the maid's death was reported.

In 2020, according to *Gulf News*, a 46-year-old Sri Lankan maid was tortured to death by a Kuwaiti couple. The case was investigated and reported by the local media. The maid was brought by her Kuwaiti sponsor to Amiri hospital in Kuwait, where she died, with traces of wounds, cuts, and burns on her body.

Lastly, the Kuwaiti Times (2015) reported a murder case in the Umm Al-Hayman area, where a 27-year-old Kuwaiti man stabbed a Sri Lankan housemaid to death, and was later arrested by the police. After Kuwaiti detectives in Ahmadi discovered the body, the suspect was sent to the relevant authorities while the case was registered for investigation.

The study found that this type of harassment is widespread, and many victims lack the right words to describe or discuss this issue. In addition, the majority of targets are casual and temporary female workers.

Gender Role Theory

Culture plays a major role in perpetuating interpersonal violence (IPV) against women. Moreover, patriarchal ideology and gendered resources work hand-in-hand to enable men to gain control over women, thus increasing the rate of IPV (Mann, Takyi, 2009; Cassiman, 2000; Nukunya, 2003; Derry, 1987). Studies like Levinson (1989) and Sugarman & Frankel (1996) show higher levels of patriarchal ideology in societies that tend to have higher rates of IPV.

In a patriarchal society, gender role differentiation is a characteristic feature. Roles are acted according to expectations as defined for men and women (Coontz, Henderson, 1987; Parsons, Bales, 1955; Rosaldo, 1974). Men produce and create artifacts and cultural values in the 'public sphere', while women have to care, maintain, and procreate as assigned in the 'domestic sphere' (Coontz, Henderson, 1987; Parsons, Bales, 1955; Rosaldo, 1974).

According to Connell, five principles constitute "the logical core of role theory": 1.Differentiation between individuals and positions occupied; 2. A set of activities or job practices following the position; 3. Role assumptions or standards specifying activities vested in a position; 4. Role senders and reference groups — those who ensure that role expectations are met;, and 5. Role application through sanctions — positive and negative reinforcements. In the application of role theory to sexual roles, "The main idea is that being a male or a female is generally attributed to one's sex — the 'sex role'. In a given context of the sex role, there are always two sex roles, the 'male role' and the 'female role'; less commonly but equivalently called 'male's role' or 'female's role', the 'masculine or 'feminine role', etc." (1987).

It is critical to understand that men are policing specialists when it comes to power. The reason for this is that not only do they have the 'manly' role, but they also provide consistency through different sanctions. Researchers have contended that male brutality against females, as a rule, is articulated through men's position to authorize women's compliance with sex roles in both the private and public spaces. (Ampofo, 2008; Hattery, 2009; Hunnicutt, 2009; Stith, Farley, 1993).

The Feminist Perspective

Workers organization coupled with action research has given 'voice' to those women/females suffering brutality and abuse; this is the first step in feminist labor mobilization and policy formulation.

Feminist theorists see the brutality of men toward women as an occurrence that has been masked and influenced by what they refer to as domestic violence. The feminist view stresses the patriarchal nature of society. It sees it as a system of male supremacy that emphasizes man's power. The feminist view stresses the patriarchal nature of society. It sees it as a system of male supremacy that emphasizes the man's power. Social and economic processes operate directly and indirectly to support a patriarchal social order and family structure. Patriarchy is the causal factor behind the historical pattern of systematic violence directed against females, and it has led to the devaluation of women.

In line with Bloomquist, the social constructs of patriarchy resulting in violence against women define the relationship between men and women as that of dominance and subordination. The feeling of powerlessness coupled with society's emphasis on violent imagery increases the temptation to resort to the violent control of women. This is in order to assert manhood and a sense of personal power that is not being expressed outside of the home.

1. The research question that guided the study is: What are the forms and severity of violence encountered by female domestic workers in Kuwait City?

2. The hypothesis was formulated to explore the question of the levels of violence against female domestic workers in Kuwait City most frequently perpetrated in the form of sexual, psychological and physical abuse such as beating or severe physical violence.

Sampling and Method Design

The study was conducted in 2018, and 1,655 women were recruited from the total number of 1,700 cases reported in the various residential governorates of Kuwait City. Kuwait is administratively-divided into six governorates: al-Ahmadi, al-Jahra, Mubarak al-Kabir, al-Asima (in Arabic "the capital," including the area around Kuwait City where approximately 94% of the total population resides), al-Farwaniyya, and Hawalli. They have slightly different rules and regulations, but are governed by Kuwaiti policies under one ruler. The six governorates have a Parliament (majlis al-umma) of 50 directly-elected members, and up to 16 ministers who are directly appointed by the emir.

The sample comprised of 1,145 Philippine and 510 Sri Lankan female domestic workers. In addition, a purpose sample was selected from private and governmental residents, and apartments or floor residents in Kuwait City; this technique was used to focus systematically on the target population. A random sample of 40 blocks was selected from six governorates. Microsoft Excel® was used to create a list of 10 random houses in each block. A sheet with complete census and geographical information was given to the researchers. To ensure clarity of questions and understanding of meanings, the instrument was checked on a pretest sample of 20 cases before data collection.

The sample was chosen to represent the total population of each of the six governorates in Kuwait City. Face-to-face interviews and questionnaires were used in late 2018 by a team consisting of two field supervisors and 15 researchers who were specially trained in the process of collecting data. The field supervisor was given a pre-approved schedule by the principal researcher. The objective of the study was communicated to all respondents, and informed consent was verbally obtained prior to the interview. Respondents were individually interviewed for confidentiality, and they participated of their own free will. The sample response rate was 98%.

Data Collection and Procedures

The study employed a questionnaire with several questions that covered the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics while dealing with the major subject of violence against female domestic workers.

1. Socio-demographic data. The questionnaire consists of questions about the respondent's nationality, the governorate of residence, age, etc., as shown in Table 1.

2. Violence against women. Linda Marshall (1992) developed a 46-item questionnaire known as the Severity of Violence against Women Scale (SVAWS). It is used to assess the frequency and severity of physical aggression by male partners against women. Female domestic workers were asked questions about the violent behaviors (contained in a list) they had been exposed to during the past 12 months (e.g., threw an object at you; threatened to kill you; hit or kicked a wall or door; threatened to hurt you, etc.). Three sub-scales further captured the seriousness of violence, which consisted of psychological, physical, and sexual violence. The acts of violence sub-scale comprised 21 items measuring mild, moderate, minor, and serious acts of physical violence (e.g., slapped you with the back of his hand, choked you, pulled your hair, and pushed or shoved you). Lastly, the level of sexual aggression inflicted by employees was measured using six items (e.g., physically forced you to have sex). Items were listed based on the perceived severity of the acts. Female workers, filling the questionnaire on a scale ranging from never (1) to a great many times (4), indicated the acts of the past year on how often their employers inflicted pain on them. The validity and reliability results indicated that these scales have adequate internal validity (Cronbach's alpha = 0.89) for the following subscales: 1.psychological violence; 2. physical violence; 3. severe physical violence; and 4. sexual violence.

3. Women's Experiences with Battering Scale (WEB). The WEB scale was also used to measure trauma, susceptibility to psychological and physical danger, and control in a relationship with most employers that female domestic workers experience (Smith, Earp, DeVellis, 2002). The WEB scale can be made gender-neutral by changing "he" to "my boss", but it has not been validated on male victims of female violence or casualties of same-sex battering. Participants responded on a 6-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1; strongly agree = 6), and a summed total score can be created as a result of the responses to 10 statements. As for IPV, a score of 20 points or higher on the WEB is con-

sidered positive. Research has shown that the WEB is a more comprehensive and sensitive screening tool when compared to other validating tools. However, its primary focus is on physical assault. IPV has been identified among Caucasian and African American women through the WEB evaluation in various studies (Anyikwa, 2015; Satyen et al., 2019).

Reliability and Validity

The reliability of various instruments used in the analysis was determined using Cronbach's alphas computation. For SVAWS, the results were 0.85 for the total sample, 0.89 for Filipino domestics, and 0.79 for Sri Lankans. High values indicate that SVAWS has a high degree of internal consistency. The coefficients for the four subscales were as follows: Cronbach's alpha scores for battering (0.75), psychological violence (0.79), physical violence (0.82), and sexual abuse (0.73).

Sample and Socio-demographic Characteristics

The sample for this study consisted of 1145 Philippine (69.2%) and 512 Sri Lankan female domestic workers (30.8%) from different residential governorates in Kuwait City. Female domestic workers from the Jahra governorate accounted for 49.5 % of the sample, 31.4% from the Hawalli governorate, and 17.9% were from the Farwaniya governorate. In terms of living conditions, 42.8% resided in private residences for domestic workers, 41.4% reside in governmental residences, and 15.8% lived in an apartment or floor. Domestic respondents between 21 and 25 years of age accounted for 39.6 % of the sample. 22.3% of the domestic respondents were 36 and above, domestic workers between 26 and 30 years of age composed 21.4%.

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics

Governorate		
Hawalli	520	31.4%
Jahra	819	.49%
Mubarak Alkabeer	7	.4%
Alassima	8	.5%
Alahmadi	3	.2%
Farwaniya	297	17.9%
Education		
Diploma	195	11.8%
elementary	203	12..3%
Higher Edu and High sch	71	4.3%

illiterate	171	10.3%
primary	25	1.5%
university	394	23.8%
Type of Resident		
Private Residences	708	42.8%
Government Residences	685	41.4%
Apartment	262	15.8%
Age		
16-20	50	3%
21-25	655	39.6%
26-30	354	21.4%
31-35	227	13.7%
36 and Above	369	22.3%

Data analysis

The statistical analysis showed that 82% of respondents encountered physical abuse; 45% — sexual abuse; 88% — psychological abuse; and 70% met with battering abuse as shown in Table 2. In this research, 1357 (82%) female domestic workers attested to being physically abused by their employers by being hit with instruments, slapping, severe beating, etc., while 745 (45%) reported that they were sexually harassed. The survey revealed that 1456 (88%) domestic workers were psychologically abused by using hurtful words, emotional blackmail, etc., and 1159 women (70%) were battered.

Table 2. Violence against female domestic workers in Kuwait City

Types of Violence	No of Respondent	%
Physical Abuse	1522	82 %
Sexual Abuse	1523	45 %
Psychological Abuse	1456	88 %
Battering Abuse	1572	70 %

As shown in Table 3, overall, there are substantial positive associations and significant correlations at the *level.01* between all forms of violence (physical, sexual, and emotional) in this study. For example, the correlation coefficient relationship between psychological abuse and serious physical violence against women is *.503.* This correlation coefficient is very high, implying that there is a strong positive significant relationship between psychological abuse and severe physical violence against female domestic workers. Also, sexual abuse and battering have a strong association with serious physical violence.

Table 3. Correlation coefficients

Correlations					
		Batter Women	Sex Abuse	Psychological Abuse	Serious Physical Violence
Women Battering	Pearson Correlation	1	-.028	.069**	.207**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.263	.008	.000
	N	1650	1548	1453	1519
Sexual Abuse	Pearson Correlation	-.028	1	.490**	.384**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.263		.000	.000
	N	1548	1551	1380	1440
Psychological Abuse	Pearson Correlation	.069**	.490**	1	.503**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	.000		.000
	N	1453	1380	1455	1361
Serious Physical Violence	Pearson Correlation	.207**	.384**	.503**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	1519	1440	1361	1521
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					

Table 4 presents the association between Women Battering, Sexual Abuse, Psychological Abuse, and Serious Physical Violence by using multiple regression analysis. Women Battering, Sexual Abuse, and Psychological Abuse are independent variables, and Serious Physical Violence is a dependent variable. The significance value (t=7.088, p=0.000<0.01) reveals that Serious Physical Violence is related to Women Battering. Also, the beta coefficient of Women Battering (ß = 0.438) is positive. It reveals that if the value of Women Battering increases, then it will lead to a more Serious Physical Violence.

The significance value of Sexual Abuse (t=6.555, p=0.000<0.01) which is less than 0.01 indicates that Serious Physical Violence is dependent on the Sexual Abuse. Also, the beta coefficient of Sexual Abuse (ß = 0.326) is positive. It reveals that if Sexual Abuse increases in value, then it will lead to an increase in Serious Physical Violence. Hence, there is an association between Sexual Abuse and Serious Physical Violence.

Similarly, when Psychological Abuse is considered as the third independent variable, the significance value (t=14.834, p=0.000<0.01) is less than 0.01, and this suggests that Serious Physical Violence is dependent on Psychological Abuse. Also, the beta coefficient of Psychological Abuse (ß = 0.120) is positive. It reveals that if Psychological Abuse increases in value, it will increase Serious Physical Violence. Accordingly, there is a corre-

lation between Psychological Abuse and Serious Physical Violence. In addition, Women Battering, Sexual Abuse and Psychological Abuse might be able to explain 54% of the variance in Serious Physical Violence (R2 value =0.540). Hence, there is an overlap between Women Battering, Sexual Abuse, Psychological Abuse, and Serious Physical Violence.

Table 4. Multiple regressions predicting physical violence against female domestic workers

Coefficientsa						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6.471	1.064		6.085	.000
	Women Battering	.438	.062	.166	7.088	.000
	Sexual Abuse	.326	.050	.177	6.555	.000
	Psychological Abuse	.120	.008	.401	14.834	.000
a. Dependent Variable: Serious Physical Violence						

Discussion

Quantitative results showed that physical abuse, battering, psychological, and sexual abuse were the highest forms of violence against Philippine and Sri-Lankan female domestic workers. In Kuwait, toxic masculinity is regarded as part of the cultural context. This concept sees men as morally, intellectually, and physiologically superior to women, thus providing the rationale for the patriarchal basis of the society. According to feminist theories, the gendered patterns of violence against female domestic workers are, to a great extent, accelerated by prevailing male gender roles that characterize manliness. If men feel their masculinity threatened, they may seek to reinforce it through violent behavior toward women. This study's results are consistent with those of Anderson (1997), Dobash & Dobash (1979), and Johnson (2006). A crucial examination of participants' responses points to the theory of gender role norms, which suggests that men in the "public sphere" specialize in the creation and production of cultural values and artifacts, whereas women are assigned to roles of care, maintenance, and procreation in the "domestic sphere" that is conventionally considered as utterly private and depoliticized. This is consistent with the findings of Coontz and Henderson (1986), Parsons and Bales (1955), and Rosaldo (1974).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study found that violence against domestic workers is a widespread and pressing issue. Its victims often lack the right words to describe or discuss it, since most are women of foreign origin hired on a casual or temporary basis. For this reason, it is also accompanied by all of the other identity problems associated with gender, toxic masculinity, ethnicity, and race. However, given the size of the problem, action must be taken as quickly as possible. Kuwait does not have any specialized female facilities to deal with the issues of physical protection, psychological aid, or human rights, but some measures should also be taken in this direction. To combat this injustice, we require a more specialized and regional approach. Even though Kuwait is a stunning country with innumerable amazing people, injustices like these prevent it from realizing its full potential.

This study recommends that domestic worker abuse should result in due punishment, that Kuwait should embrace positive changes in its laws and policies, that protective mechanisms also should be implemented there, that civil society initiatives should be encouraged and strengthened in Kuwait and the Philippines, and that there should be increased bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

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Насилие по отношению к женщинам-домашним работницам в Кувейте

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Цель данного исследования — изучить виды и степень тяжести насилия и жестокого обращения, которым подвергаются женщины, работающие в Кувейте домашней прислугой. В качестве метода использовался количественный подход. Исследование показало, что с точки зрения этнической принадлежности и стран происхождения в секторах социальной и домашней работы доминируют женщины, прибывшие с Филиппин и Шри-Ланки. Статистический анализ показал, что 82% сталкивались с физическим насилием; 45% — с сексуальным насилием; 88 % — с психологическим насилием; и 70 % — с побоями. В статье содержатся предложения по изменению кувейтского законодательства, предусматривающие ужесточение наказания за жестокое обращение с домашней прислугой. Также в статье предлагается внедрение надлежащих механизмов социальной защиты для женщин-работниц, столкнувшихся с насилием и жестоким обращением.

Ключевые слова: домашнее насилие, физическое насилие, женщины, подвергшиеся побоям, Кувейт.

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The Sociocultural Trauma of Forced Migration and Displacement

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Trauma occurs when individuals or groups encounter a horrific experience that leads to enduring imprints on their consciousness and memory, and results in a crucial alteration in how they perceive their identity, social surrounding, and even their future. The concept of trauma is firmly connected to war, conflict, and forced migration. Refugees face catastrophic life events when everything breaks apart. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in exploring trauma from different approaches, including sociological ones. Therefore, this article aims to review, explore, and analyze the concepts of cultural trauma, collective identity, and social trauma regarding the issue of refugees' forced migration. The first part of the study focuses on reviewing related literature on cultural trauma and collective identity. Then, I investigate the concept of social trauma by considering forced migration, the host communities, the identity of forced migrants, and the role of the carrier groups. In this way, I attempt to present a comprehensive analysis of forced displacement from a sociocultural perspective.

Keywords: cultural trauma, social trauma, identity, forced migration, displacement, refugee, host community, final destination

Introduction

As conflicts, wars, and depletion of economic conditions have contributed to vast and recurring forced migration, it would be helpful to examine this case from a sociocultural perspective. In this paper, I try to relate cultural trauma, social trauma, and the issue of forced migration. Trauma takes place when individuals or groups go through a dreadful experience that leaves profound traces in their awareness and memories. This leads to change in their perception of the future. Even though trauma is studied at a socio-cultural level, it is collective trauma that is studied rather than individual suffering.

From a cultural perspective, Alexander (2004) has stated that cultural trauma occurs when " members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways" (1).

In its broadest meaning, social trauma is characterized by humiliation and rejection in societal contexts (Bjornsson *et al.*, 2020). Social trauma primarily refers to the concepts of 'struggle', 'suffering', incidents associated with the cause of the pain, 'sacrifice', and a sense of accountability (Pedović, Hedrih, 2019). On a collective level, Hamburger has described social trauma as "the psychological and relational consequences of a traumatic experience in the frame of societal occurrences, where a social group is the target of a planned persecution" (Hamburger, Hancheva, Volkan, 2021).

Before discussing the concept of trauma on the collective level, I find it helpful to differentiate it from individual trauma. Erikson (1976) argues that individual trauma is characterized as being a "blow to the psyche that breaks through one's defenses so suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively". Still, he distinguishes it from collective trauma which is a "blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality" (153-154). Collective trauma is also characterized by how it functions: "collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of those who suffer from it, so it does not have the quality of suddenness normally associated with trauma" (Ibid.). Both individual and collective traumas result from 'shock'. In addition to being 'personal', the wounds are also 'collective' and 'social'. Traumatic events on an individual and a social level may reinforce one another, heightening the shock and sense of loss. Therefore, one's personal loss is closely related to that experienced by others (Eyerman, 2013: 43). According to Smelser, there is a tendency to describe collective trauma as 'indelible', such as national shame. If this representation is effective in establishing itself, memory does indeed take on the qualities of 'indelibility' and 'unshakeability' (2004: 42).

Smelser has described how collective trauma is inextricably tied to the identity of the traumatized group by stating that "collective trauma, affecting a group with definable membership, will, of necessity, also be associated with that group's collective identity" (43). In one way or another, the collective identity of the group is affected by the acute event experienced by each individual. Collective identity emerges from the definition of the shared experiences and interests of the members of a social group. Since "identity involves a cultural reference" (Alexander, 2004:10), horrific events largely affect collective identities and participate in the emergence of cultural trauma.

From this perspective, migration, in its broadest context, could be voluntary or forced, for positive or negative reasons, or for economic and political reasons. Trauma needs to be examined in terms of social trauma and its relation to the identity of forced migratory groups and the host communities. When social groups suffer from wars and conflicts as forced migrants, then aspects, processes, and consequences of social and cultural trauma and their relation to identity are crucial concepts to be explored. Studying trauma from a cultural perspective along with the collective nature of identity is reviewed and analyzed following the principles presented by Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues. The study emphasizes social trauma as a result of conflicts and wars, as well as social trauma as both a clinical and psychological phenomenon. It is the intentional persecution of a social group as a result of organized social violence or genocide. It affects not only the victims but also the environment they live in. Therefore, I review the related literature on cultural trauma including the causes and stages of cultural trauma formation, the role of the different sects in enhancing it, its basic relationship with traumatic persons who suffer from a state of conflict or war, and other root causes which have paved the way for the emergence of cultural trauma. Then, I move on to the concepts of forced migration and social trauma, I seek to analyze the relationship between forced migration and the emergence of social trauma. In this regard, the aim is to reach a uniform concept of sociocultural trauma

arising from forced migration. This is especially true in cases of displacement and asylum for vulnerable groups.

Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity

The sociological approach to cultural trauma has acquired a new domination in addition to its psychological and medical interpretations. Here, I review Jeffrey C. Alexander's works which take a constructivist approach and Piotr Sztompka with his realistic view, in addition to the works of Ron Eyerman, Neil Smelser, and Bernhard Giesen. The authors examine 'culture classification', 'symbolic contamination', and 'collective memory.' They also recognize the role of 'institutional environments', 'carrier groups', and 'stratification hierarchies' as critical components in understanding the emergence and centralization of trauma narratives.

Alexander views cultural trauma as a national and collective phenomenon, not as an individual event. In *Cultural trauma and collective identity* (Alexander et al., 2004), Alexander's definition of cultural trauma implies that trauma does not have to be sensed or directly experienced by everyone in a community. Even though identification of a significant causal event or occurrence may be necessary, its traumatizing connotation should be defined and widely acknowledged by the group, as this process takes time, intervention, and exemplification. Through public contemplation and conversation, cultural trauma is comprehended and explained. Alexander adds a new dimension to the physiological definition of trauma by referring to its collectiveness. The effects of trauma extend beyond the individuals involved to the entire community as well. Trauma damages the bonds of society. However, Alexander has presented the psychological roots of the definition of trauma. Nevertheless, he insists that the cultural approach is heading in a new direction by undervaluing psychological definitions or what he refers to as the 'lay trauma theory'. This is a questionable issue since psychological trauma cannot be completely isolated from the current definition, and cultural trauma cannot be isolated from its psychological and classical aspects. In other words, individuals and their collectivities interact with different elements such as psychological, political, cultural, etc. Alexander claims that traumatic exposure should be limited to cultural trauma and that a traumatic event without a culturally applicable foundation is nothing more than naive objectivity. He states that "it is critical to the process by which a collectivity becomes traumatized" (2004:15). It is an interesting question that Alexander raises by asking how some events have left a minor impression on cultural memory compared to others, such as the Japanese atrocities at Nanking, for example. This concept extends to many crimes and enormities that have been committed all around the world. The concept of cultural trauma has been defined by Alexander from the beginning as encompassing society as a whole. Additionally, Alexander (2004) assumes that "trauma is not something naturally existing; it is something constructed by society" (2). In this context, traumatic roots in the consciousness of individuals can be viewed as psychologically, socially, and even culturally constructed. Alexander discusses how 'trauma processes' can strengthen the transition

to 'peace' (2020a). This is achieved by broadening the cultural meaning and 'emotional' affiliation among groups whose previous mutual animosity generated conflict both within and between nations. It is only through 'cultural performances' that collective trauma events become opportunities for rebuilding collective identities, in which hostility gives access to 'mutual identification'. Alexander has shown that in regards to the establishment of cultural trauma (2016), social groups, nationwide societies, and sometimes whole civilizations must not only acknowledge the existence of human misery, but also must assume a kind of ethical responsibility for that misery. Alexander argues that the misery of others reflects our own, and discusses the ways in which communities extend the scope of the 'we', thus providing the potential for rebuilding society to prevent a recurrence of this trauma. Furthermore, social clusters often refuse to understand the existence of others' suffering, or consider it the responsibility of others rather than of themselves. Failure to recognize and sympathize is the result of such denials. He has stated that "…it is the threat to collective rather than individual identity that defines the suffering at stake" (2016:14). In other words, he does not neglect 'individual suffering', but he considers it the duty of 'ethics' and 'psychology'. His concern is the possibility of traumas being gathered and formulated into a shared social identity. Alexander describes the psychological aspect of trauma by explaining how individual victims respond to traumatic harm with 'repression' and 'denial'. They gain relief when these psychological barriers are dissolved, and pain is brought to their awareness so they can 'mourn' (2016). He depicts the role of groups, not individuals, such as 'intellectuals', 'political leaders, and 'symbol creators' in deciding who are the heroes and villains, weaving these characters into stories aimed at 'third-party audiences'. Consequently, he has declared that the 'we' is constructed via narration and coding, and it is this collective identity that experiences and confronts danger. Even though he admits that trauma on an individual level is coupled with loss and pain, it is still regarded as an 'individual fact'. Moreover, in *Trauma: a social theory* (2013), Alexander expands the innovative social theory of trauma and employs it in a series of empirical enquiries into social suffering around the world. Alexander argues that traumas are not merely psychological, but are also collective experiences; trauma workings play a pivotal role in defining the foundations and results of crucial social confrontations. He describes how collective agency emerges or fails to emerge in response to the experience of social suffering. Religion, nation, race, ethnicity, gender, and class are some of the factors creating social misery. He observes that events are not naturally traumatic. Trauma is a socially constructed acknowledgement. Consequently, to rise to the level of trauma, social crises need to evolve into cultural dilemmas. This is because group suffering is viewed as a basic threat to collective identity. According to Gao and Alexander in *Remembrance of Things Past: Cultural Trauma, the Nanking Massacre and Chinese Identity*, such an incident was not perceived as collective trauma. So, the prospects for long-term psychological recognition and moral equality were not exploited, due to dilemmas of cohesion, binding, and collective identity (2012).

Piotr Sztompka's approach to cultural trauma and collective identity is more meaningful in the context of a realistic perspective. As described by Sztompka in his "*Collective trau-*

ma"[1] (Ritzer, 2007), traumatogenic changes have four characteristics: they are unexpected, extensive, distinguished by their peculiar nature, and they are viewed with suspicion[2]. Sztompka has also defined the sources of cultural trauma as the following: increased 'intercultural' interaction and confrontation among several cultures; the 'spatial' mobility of individuals who find themselves in an unfamiliar community as immigrants and refugees but also as travelers with business goals and tourists; the change of 'fundamental institutions' or authorities; and the traumatogenic transformation occurs at the level of attitudes, faiths, beliefs, and ideologies (595). According to Sztompka, collective identity is distinct from both personal and mass identities. Personal identity is the 'self-defined perception' a person has of belonging to a certain social group or structure. Still, mass identity is the aggregate of distinct individual identities found in each 'collectivity'. Thus, it is a work of art or a 'statistical average' lacking 'ontological hard reality' (2004). In other words, it reveals that a specific group of individuals possess a certain kind of personal identity. Nevertheless, collective identity can only be created by the interchange of meanings in the 'meaning industry', including public discussion, creative activities, discussions, disputes, and the media. It arises as a record of shared social experiences through interpersonal encounters. Additionally, it is the result of social contacts as a chronicle of shared experiences and interactions. It exists less as a result of individual history and more as a result of society's biography. From this perspective, he has stated that "collective identity can be seen as sedimentary rock built up of layers of social practices and traditions" (482). Cultural trauma starts with the disintegration of cultural standards, followed by individual confusion, and can lead to the loss of identity. Still, the proliferation of traumatic events in culture is addressed by a variety of coping techniques. If they are effective, trauma may become a mobilizing drive for human agency and a catalyst for creative social beings. Those changes need to be 'sudden, comprehensive, fundamental, and unexpected' (Sztompka, 2000). Mass traumatic events are first experienced individually, but "truly collective traumas, as distinct from mass traumas, appear only when people start to be aware of the common plight, perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, define it as shared" (279). Furthermore, culture's wounds are seen as the hardest to cure. There is also a possibility that cultural trauma could be used as a tool of 'social becoming'. Nevertheless, this optimistic scenario[3] implies that despite its immediate negative, painful repercussions, cultural trauma demonstrates its beneficial potential as a force of social being.

Regarding Eyerman's works, in *Memory, Trauma, and Identity* (2019a), he distinguishes between two types of cultural trauma. First, by referring to Alexander's interpretive research perspective on cultural trauma, Eyerman claims that the latter can be considered a "tear in the social fabric, which requires interpretation and repair" (2008, 22). He also provides his own perception that is a bit contradictory to Alexander's by implying

1. The concepts presented in this article have been previously explained in Sztompka, 2000.
2. Sztomka declares here that Durkheim was the forerunner of this approach.
3. For more details please see:
- *Society in Action: The Theory of Social Becoming* (Sztompka, 1991).
- *The Sociology of Social Change* (Sztompka, 1993).

that the definition of cultural trauma is also a concept that "permits us to set borders around an occurrence that reaches back into the past and forward into the future" (164). Eyerman and Bartmanski (2019) have demonstrated how a specific war crime may develop as a cultural trauma capable of profoundly affecting entire populations. Consequently, the 'denial of representation' and a 'lack of symbolic closure' only serve to exacerbate cultural trauma (Eyerman, 2019f: 137). For example, there are cases of forced migration caused by war and crimes of aggression. In these situations, trauma manifests not only through the victimized people, but is also tied to the concept of 'perpetrator trauma,' which is also correlated with collective guilt. Eyerman illustrates this notion with what he defines as an 'imparted military culture'. his conclusion is that "Perpetrator trauma results from moral injury, an injury that entails humanizing one's victim and recognizing that one has acted immorally toward another human being" (2019b:184). Eyerman also focuses on the role of collective memory. He explores how it is manifested in its ability to relate to a specific community in both space and time. He provides a narrative framework that functions as a collective story in which the individual is included and involved in addition to his biography. (2019e). His analysis has shown that collective memory is a 'living force' in the life of individuals and communities where it is rooted. Collective memory influences the way people and communities perceive themselves, influencing their perception of who they are and why they behave in a certain way (Eyerman, Madigan and Ring, 2017). Moreover, the stories and myths that crystallize as collective memory function as a basis for constructing identity through the media and related ritual behaviors. In the case of nations "there is no single collective memory; rather, there are many voices that over time achieve some cohesive clarity" (12). Eyerman observes that all allusions to trauma imply a strong sense of emotional engagement. The concept of cultural trauma needs to include rather than reject this emotional aspect, even though the original reason for the emotion can be genuine or imagined (2019d). He argues that: "Cultural traumas are not things, but processes of meaning-making and attribution" (93). Breese (2013) asserts that "collective trauma is primarily an emotional state, whereas cultural trauma is an emotional and cognitive process having to do with construction and contestation of meaning" (Eyerman, Alexander, Breese, 2013: 220). Cultural traumas represent deeply felt emotions and identities that are publicly declared and portrayed in 'discursive processes', indicating an affective 'communicative' dimension that asserts sincerity. Furthermore, cultural trauma, as a discursive process resulting from massive conflict and revealing the strong emotional foundation that defines individual and collective identity, is both an articulation of this emotional grounding and a "working-through, a searching attempt at collective repair" (Eyerman, 2012: 579).

Neil Smelser (2004) addresses cultural trauma from a psychosocial and emotional perspective by describing the psychological conception of trauma before, during, and after Sigmund Freud. He explains the role of emotions in providing a link to the cultural and psychological aspects of trauma. He primarily describes the situation four months after the attacks of September 11, 2001. He illustrates how it is not easy to deliver a clear and comprehensive analysis of the attacks when they are still fresh in the mind. Yet, Smelser

argues that these attacks have the elements of the 'quintessential cultural trauma'. Smelser finds one essential difference in the fact that cultural traumas are 'made', not 'born'. He defines cultural trauma as the following: "an invasive and overwhelming event that is believed to undermine or overwhelm one or several essential ingredients of a culture or the culture as a whole" (2004: 38).

In Bernhard Giesen's study (2004), the psychological aspect dominates throughout his work on the concept of trauma, with an emphasis in his *The Trauma of Perpetrators: The Holocaust as the Traumatic Reference of German National Identity* (112–154). Giesen focuses on identity formation and its subsequent change, and reveals that trauma affects not only victims but also the perpetrators who are considered traumatized individuals as well. This concept refers to the traumatized 'perpetrators' and their relationship to the next generation[4], as well as how this new generation will have a different point of view or even an opposing one toward war and Nazism. Together with Seyfeert (2016), Giesen focuses on empty signifiers of collective identity that are produced precisely and principally as solved mysteries in public discourse, open discussion, and steady criticism. Imaginaries formed by such non-representational characters are responsible for maintaining collective identity as dormant. Squabbles and conflicts of opinion may lead to the rejection of a certain collective identity. The authors ask why we are willing to help other people in our country with public money and individual funds when disaster strikes but we are hesitant to help strangers in other countries. Why do we have faith in our neighbors but distrust strangers? Answers to these questions cannot be found in the force or threat of punishment if help is rendered. The collective identity is built and depicted through pictures and emblems (flags, coats of arms), ceremonies and monuments, legends, narrations, and songs. Accordingly, "in collective traumas, public communication assumes the function or role that consciousness plays in the individual" (Giesen and Seyfert, 2016: 118). Giesen and Seyfert write that it is only after, through a younger generation's perspective, that trauma can be defined and organizationally addressed (2016).

The Social Trauma of Forced Migration

Migration is strongly related to the concept of trauma and cannot be addressed until this context is understood. Refugees undergo a traumatic life experience in which their social and cultural environment, their family, and their identity fall apart. Forced displacement trauma has a psychosocial impact not only on the individual, but also on families, communities, and society as a whole. Consequently, social groups that have been through a traumatic experience are more dependent, passive, without guidance, distrustful, and skeptical (Hamburger, Hancheva and Ozcurumez, 2019). Somasundaram (2014) observed that social trauma is characterized by the disintegration of established systems, organizations, and traditional lifestyles, as well as the degradation of cultural and social rules, ethics, and social capital. Trauma based on racial and other forms of oppression undermines the individual's

4. Who could be their children in such a case?

and communities' feelings of safety and belonging in conventional society, as well as their sense of collective identity. According to Hillebrandt (2004), all man-made traumatizations are characterized by an unbalanced distribution of the participants in the traumatic situation's ability to have authority upon, or act over, another human being. I suppose, through the process of traumatization, at each stage, some traumatic aspects will appear. These aspects may differ from one stage to another before arriving at the final destination. Since this claim does not flow straight, trauma occur rapidly for some people even when there is no external displacement. This is due to the change in the social and other essential aspects of the community. For others, it may be fully manifested in transit countries. For some others, it was not even possible thanks to coping mechanisms. In this respect, Hamburger, Hancheva and Ozcurumez assume that traumatic experiences in refuge can be classified into three stages: pre-flight exposure to violence and/or loss of family members; a risky journey typically related to violence with separation from family members; and the resettlement phase, associated with uncertainty involving asylum claims and acculturation in the target country (2019). Foster also highlighted the role of social, historical, and political contexts in migration and acculturation (2005). This is done by observing that traumatic experiences can occur at various points in immigration, in the country of origin, during the flight to the new country, and while adjusting to it. Moreover, conditions such as lack of adequate financial resources, lack of support, and the stress of protecting their children can contribute to traumatic feelings that are more chronic in nature.

Ron Eyerman has stated that "in economic crisis as in war, one's personal loss is intimately tied to those suffered by others. The cumulative impact would only intensify the trauma, where a sense of belonging, a collective identity, is shattered along with individual identity" (2013: 43). Accordingly, to gain a better understanding of trauma, I will try to study it by analyzing forced migration trauma. My attention will be focused on different sections of the study. In other words, trauma can be experienced by refugees, their communities of origin, the host community, as well as the carrier groups involving both pro- and anti-migration movements. My intention is to provide a better understanding of social and cultural trauma and the identity of forced migrants by presenting different perspectives.

Forced Migrants and Identity Threatening

Migration is fundamentally associated with communities experiencing an identity-threatening transition. When a host society receives migrants or external groups, it defines the identity of the latter in terms of language, race, ethnicity, or economic status. Through this process, historically arbitrary characteristics are transformed into primordial ones, becoming a kind of essence (Alexander, 2006). The conflict between refugees' cultural identity and their host culture is one facet of social trauma during the journey. Volkan (2004) argues that relocating from one country to another involves the loss of an individual's former identity, and that the displacement experience can be evaluated when the immigrants pass through or resist the mourning process. Chrysanthi Papadopoulou demonstrated through her work in refugee camps how 'ethnic', 'class', and 'group identities' disintegrate in refugee

cases (2019). All of these distinctions that could be enormously significant in the homeland lose relevance in refugee camps, and are overwhelmed by the dominant refugee identity (Hamburger, Hancheva, Ozcurumez, 2019). The agony of war and displacement is part of the brutal reality of a traumatized community. This reality is something they value as part of their identity and are unable to get over (Kanagaratnam, Rummens, Toner VA, 2020). Large-group identity challenges are exacerbated by mass forced migrations, both among refugees and in host communities. During the migration process, almost everything is shattered: social and cultural surroundings, family, and personal identity. In the absence of a clear identity for the forced migrants, refugees serve as a blank slate for the formation of the host country's culture (Hamburger, Hancheva and Ozcurumez, 2019). Refugees face challenges in preserving their cultural identities and networks (Watters, 2001). According to Maier and Straub (2011), the asylum seekers appeared to be hurled back to a biographical 'zero' point from which they had to essentially redefine their whole identity, as a result of tremendous stress and forced relocation. The degree of their trauma and loss was most likely beyond the ability of any individual, social, cultural, or religious idea to comprehend and integrate. There is sometimes a displaced perspective where they forget who they used to be. This is a kind of shedding of their pre-flight identity, and following a brand-new life path in the host community (Pearlman, 2018). Here we may ask about the role of the host community in reconstructing the collective identity of forced migrants. Then, how does this lead to the establishment of what could be identified as us and them? Anastasia Zissi (2019) highlighted the significance of identity as a process, and Porobić (2019) pointed out that, in migration, the process of transforming identity frequently begins long before departure (Hamburger, Hancheva, Ozcurumez, 2019). Persecution on ethnic or group grounds, for example, is a threat to identity. Migrants in general and forced migrants in particular, are forced to reconsider their identity; this can impact their collective perspective and their existence in the host community. Shame may arise as a result of the many types of torture suffered in the home country. However, it is often exacerbated by the painful asylum process and having to adopt a new frequently-devalued social identity as an asylum seeker (Theisen-Womersley, 2021). The process of migrating may be a humiliating experience in itself. Individual and social identities are at risk of being denied due to systemic trauma related to legal and cultural practices of exclusion (Goldsmith, Martin, Smith, 2014). Accordingly, the physical, social, and political isolation that is prevalent upon arrival contributes to reinforcing terrible feelings of invisibility and disconnectedness (Bhimji, 2015).

Communities of Origins

Most displaced people have witnessed violence in their home country, including the loss of family members, horrific murders, the destruction of their property and employment, and persecution (Kanagaratnam, Rummens, Toner VA, 2020). As noted by Du and Wittmer (2020), loss attributed to the refugee experience encompasses not only the death of loved ones and the loss of residence, but also the instability of life and biography at the individual, collective, and generational levels. In this context, FitzGerald & Arar (2018)

argue how families should recognize the dangers of violence alongside the consequences of economic risks, such as losing financial assets if everyone flees at the same time. Additionally, it is not simply what is lost while leaving one's home that causes disruptions in familial and cultural systems, but also separations from family and ethnic groups in hazardous refugee camps throughout the migratory process (Lambert, Alhassoon, 2015).

Communities of Refugees

The experience of war is often perceived and manifested collectively, involving the sharing of collective memories and identity, collective sorrow, and collective rage. According to Kanagaratnam, Rummens and Toner, forced migrants express their grief collectively, as a result of being part of a cultural community rather than as individuals (2020). When it comes to war, genocidal trauma does not only target a group but is also perpetuated by a social group. These are the victims' group and the attackers' group. Both groups belong to the same society, and are part of the same cultural environment. This leads to the destruction or at least drastically affects 'the nature' and 'character' of the society in which it occurs (Hamburger, Hancheva, Ozcurumez, 2019). In this way, Hamburger and his co-authors have described social trauma in terms that necessitate the participation of the 'social environment', implying that traumatized individuals are members of a social group that is being persecuted and has a defined, established identity. Additionally, both groups[5] usually belong to the same 'overreaching society' (Hamburger, 2017). Moreover, social trauma can exist and continue collectively, creating trans-generational effects such as post-traumatic stress, feelings-of-belonging difficulties, and the absence of social and political trust. Accordingly, it has been observed that trust, shame, and betrayal in interpersonal bonds are increasingly major concerns for refugees following their multiple trauma exposures during warfare, displacement, and resettlement (Murray, Davidson and Schweitzer, 2010). This can be related to the consequence of trauma for the community of refugees itself and the host community as well. From a collective perspective, there is a propensity within the community of displaced persons to equate patriotism with war-related sorrow, which can also be extended to disparaging individuals who are externally viewed as non-sufferers. Trauma can also be manifested through conflicts caused by disagreements between forced migrants. According to Kanagaratnam et al., disagreement is expressed regarding beliefs that certain people had not suffered from the war as much as others, or had not participated in and fought as much for 'the cause' as others (Kanagaratnam, Rummens and Toner VA, 2020).

Host Communities

Trauma is not only the duration preceding and following migration but also the period following arrival in host communities. Hamburger and his co-authors have described this

5. Attackers and victims.

period as being typically marked by social and political alienation, leading to detachment, abandonment, distrust, non-recognition, and denial, as well as being separated from the individual's collective and the whole of society (Hamburger, Hancheva, Ozcurumez, 2019). Many variables contribute to trauma in both the transit and host communities. Hamburger, Hancheva and Ozcurumez discuss the refusal of work permits, restricted access to healthcare, living in camps and halls without privacy, the passiveness imposed by the asylum procedure, and the residential responsibility that is divided among family and friends. There are also the difficulties of adjusting to a foreign culture and lifestyle, as well as racism and general prejudice in the host country. Additionally, 'retraumatisation' can occur in both transit and destination countries (2019). According to Boulanger (2004), immigrants feel a loss of "contextual continuity" (355), which contributes to an unrecognized absence. Immigrants embrace components of the new culture to avoid anxiety and sadness, while portions of their self-experience inside the culture of origin detach and subsequently reappear in their social lives. The host society typically involves not only the larger society, but also the 'small community'. This is a reference to the previously presented concept of 'us' and 'them', or 'insider' and' outsider'. For instance, Heins (2020) shows how both the Jewish and Muslim communities of Germany can be viewed from the perspective of migrants, and the complex stories he presents illustrate the difficulties of smaller communities within the larger ones, including their relation to the civil sphere. As a result, these difficulties highlight the existence of trauma at both the national and community levels.

Carrier Groups

Refugees arrive in the host country, having hopes and fears regarding the new life they are about to begin in addition to their existing trauma caused by war and conflicts. Host communities include both pro-migration groups that assist refugees and support their efforts, and anti-migration groups that have fears and reservations about forced migrants entering their countries. A large part of this fear is caused by forced migrants coming from different ideological, cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Heins argues that what is called the 'refugee crisis' has emerged due to the unprecedented number of migrants attempting to reach European countries. This term, according to Heins has been criticized by many supporters of the liberal immigration system (2020). It could be asserted that when forced migrants reach Europe and its partner nations, they are faced with those who feel an immediate need to assist as well as people and groups who are filled with resentment, anxiety, and mistrust toward them.

It is well known how international organizations such as the UNHCR and others aid refugees in camps with education, shelter, and health care. The political parties of some countries still tend to detach refugees from local communities. This is done by limiting legal work and isolating them in separate camps (Betts, Collier, 2017). For instance, W. Binder and A. Mijić (2020) discuss the 'welcome culture' during the 'Refugee Crisis' of 2015. However, in Austria, which is interested in the intake of refugees, the fear of immigration initially present in a number of Austrian federation states before becom-

ing a 'national issue' in 2017. It was fueled by right-wing politicians as well as by some mass media. In contrast, there are many attempts to integrate the refugees into Western countries' resettlement programs and help them to adapt to the new society. In the fall of 2015, the German government planned to maintain an open borders policy for a considerable number of asylum seekers. This was done with the help of crucial segments of civil society, who argue that there is strong opposition from social movements, political parties, civil associations, churches, and other institutions to attempts to marginalize and demean refugees and forced migrants. Furthermore, individuals who are not integrated into a pro-migration organization have also worked in opposition to the injustice and brutality shown to those who were forced to migrate (Heins, 2020).

Advocates for migrant rights, activists, doctors, social workers, journalists, lawyers, doctors, rabbis, priests, and regular men and women of conscience are all part of the solidarity efforts to support forced migrants and refugees. They provide support to marginalized groups who are viewed as outsiders in the community and to challenge the government policy against asylum seekers (Alexander, 2020b). Therefore, Heins states that "the refugee crisis in Germany in 2015 led to a split in the country between those who saw the admission of the refugees as a catastrophic deviation from the law and the most sacred values of Europe, and those who believed that they were witnessing an unprecedented fulfillment of the ideals of transnational civil solidarity" (2020: 40). This split between the pro- and anti-refugee movements has led to a crisis of multicultural 'welcome culture' (Heins, Unrau, 2018). Heins argues that it is significant to highlight that many of the 'welcome culture' advocacy groups and volunteers were either immigrants themselves who came to Germany or were of immigrant origin (2020: 40). Hence, as Eyerman observes, I can conclude that 'Carrier groups' are crucial to the trauma process in expressing claims and reflecting the needs and goals of the affected to a 'wider public' (2001: 3).

Conclusion

The approaches to cultural trauma used by Alexander and his colleagues emphasize analyzing trauma from a cultural and collective perspective. However they do not completely disregard the value of the individual. Their approach emphasizes the role of emotion and memory. Furthermore, these concepts are deeply related to the situation of forced migrants who suffer from different types of trauma, including cultural and social trauma. The present study focuses on these concepts. Therefore, by employing a cultural sociology perspective, we can better comprehend the trauma and identity of forced migrants.

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Социокультурная травма миграции и вынужденного переселения. Теоретический аспект

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Травма есть результат столкновения отдельного человека или группы людей с ужасающим опытом, оставляющим устойчивые следы в их памяти и сознании и приводящим к кардинальным изменениям в восприятии ими своей идентичности, социального окружения и будущего. Концепт травмы прочно связан с войной, конфликтами и вынужденной миграцией. Беженцы сталкиваются с катастрофическими жизненными событиями, вызывающими обрушение их привычного образа жизни. В последние годы

наблюдается резкий рост интереса к изучению проблемы травмы с опорой на разные подходы, в том числе и на социологические. Поэтому цель данной статьи — рассмотреть, изучить и проанализировать концепты культурной травмы, коллективной идентичности, а также социальной травмы в связи с проблемами беженцев и вынужденной миграции. Первая часть нашего исследования посвящена обзору базовой литературы по культурной травме и коллективной идентичности. Затем мы исследуем концепцию социальной травмы, рассматривая вынужденную миграцию, принимающие сообщества, идентичность вынужденных мигрантов и роль групп-носителей. Таким образом, в статье делается попытка предложить всесторонний анализ проблемы вынужденного перемещения с точки зрения культурсоциологии.

Ключевые слова: культурная травма, социальная травма, идентичность, вынужденная миграция, перемещение, беженец, принимающее сообщество, конечный пункт назначения

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Humanitarian Populism[1]

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Populism is both a well-known and an extremely vague term[2] defined as an ideology, a strategy, a discourse, or a political logic[3] appealing to real or imagined majority (the 'people') in the fight for political, institutional power with authoritarian methods to wield it. It has been said that "Populism has been stretched so far in some scholarly usage — and in much journalistic discussion and public commentary — that it risks dissolving as a distinct object of analysis".[4] However, there is scholarly agreement on the analytical core of populism — an idealized conception of the people's community — and on two general approaches to the study of populism , those of the theoretical (historical and contemporary), and the analysis of specific manifestations of populism. Perhaps, most works on populism focus on its specific cases rather than on theoretical discussions about its essence, and the reviewed book definitely contributes to the first –the historical — approach.

Christopher Ely defines his book as having a pedagogical purpose: "Having taught the history of Imperial Russia now for more than a quarter century, I have come to recognize just how alien that history can be to my contemporaries… A great wealth of material on Russian populism exists on library bookshelves, and indeed on the shelves of my own office, but for undergraduates, some of it is lengthy, some out of print, and some overly technical or specialized. Not having found a relatively brief but comprehensive introduction to the topic, that is what I have tried to provide here. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of

1. The article was prepared in the framework of a research grant funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (grant ID: 075-15-2022-326).

2. Panizza F. (Ed.) (2005) *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, London: Verso, p. 1.

3. Moffitt B. (2016) *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 5.

4. Brubaker R. (2020) Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 2, no 1, p. 53.

the book, my sole aim in writing it has been to produce an accessible overview for the use of students and those unfamiliar with the history of Imperial Russia" (p. viii). Therefore, as primarily a textbook on the history of Russian populism for students of American universities, this book presents an easy-to-read (in terms of the academic requirements) and a fascinating story, which makes it a kind of 'fundamentals of populism' for all intellectuals interested in the history of Russia's populist searches in the last two centuries.

In the Preface, the author warns the reader that he uses the term 'populism' in its broadest sense, rather than as a name of any particular doctrine: "This book defines Russian populism in very broad terms. It goes back as far as the late eighteenth century and extends into the first half of the twentieth century, and it runs roughshod over any narrow definition of *narodnichestvo*, accepting populism as a broad enough phenomenon to include room for all those members of the intelligentsia fascinated by the *narod*, from conservative Slavophiles to radical socialists" (p. ix). Such an approach is justified for summarizing the typical hopes and ideas that determined both the interests and anxieties of the majority of the Russian population in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Ely prevents any possible criticism by emphasizing his modest ambition and inevitable limitations of simplification (implicit for all broad terms and definitions): "This book does not seek to break any new ground in our understanding of Russian populism. If anything it is an attempt to convey to undergraduate readers the fascination I myself developed about the populist movement as a student... Unfortunately, writing a textbook is… "an exercise in gross over-simplification". The abundance and complexity of the materials I have tried to distill into accessible form here necessitates a great loss of subtlety, not to mention a great opportunity for mistakes and inaccuracies" (ibid.).

The author admits that populism can be both right-wing, conservative, and left-wing. Different, sometimes quite opposite political directions of Russian populism are described in the book: "What was Russian populism? Unfortunately, no simple definition — no matter how nuanced and multifaceted — could capture the rich, variegated, long-lasting, self-contradictory, and endlessly disputed nature of this phenomenon, a phenomenon that manifested itself at times as a political movement, at times as an articulated ideology, at times as a form of artistic expression, and at times as little more than a cast of thought" (p. 2). Throughout the book, the author emphasizes the specifics of Russian populism as an attempt to overcome the deep social-class split of tsarist Russia — into a privileged, educated, polite society (social elites) and a poor, illiterate people: "'the common people' or 'ordinary folk'… the majority of the *narod* consisted of (mostly) poor, (mostly) illiterate rural farmers, most of whom were legally designated as members of the peasant estate" (ibid.).

The author makes instructive remarks about the fundamental differences between American and Russian populism in the late 19th century, summarized in the Conclusion. American populism, which was on the rise in the 1890s, had its deepest roots in farming communities. It was primarily populism growing 'from below', that is, from the pragmatic democratic foundations of rural America: "American populism, like Russian, was agrarian. Like Russian populism it too sought to lift up common rural folk to a higher

status by addressing problems of social inequality. Populism in the United States was therefore considered to be on the left of the political spectrum just as Russian populism was. But the similarities end there. Most importantly, the American version of populism was a movement that emerged from within the rural community itself, among people who had electoral power and used that power to create a new political party to advance their interests in opposition to the existing parties" (p. 215–216).

Russian populism was developed primarily by the highly educated in cities and suburban estates. In its essence, it was populism 'from above' — rather speculative and often detached from the real people's lives: "The Russian populists… hailed from educated society; they were members of an intelligentsia that stood apart from the people, the *narod*, whom they considered to be the proper inheritors of Russia's destiny" (p. 216). At the same time, Russian populism often showed amazing sacrifice and self-denial.

Ely considers the differences between Russian and American populism by comparing the two countries' great 19th century populist poets believed to have captured the spirit of their societies: "Both Nekrasov and Whitman at first were accused of introducing vulgarity into the high art of poetry, both understood their work as an evocation of the entire national experience, both hoped their poetry would speak to the masses, and both were in fact read almost exclusively by intellectual elites…Whitman… seeks both to interest readers in his uniqueness and to convince them that he and they are one and the same. Nekrasov… lamented the fact that he was unable to do more for the *narod*, but he congratulated himself in his outsider capacity for having been able to serve them by finding a voice to 'sing your suffering'" (p. 218).

On the one hand, the author repeatedly emphasizes that the radical populists were inclined to see the source of a bright future for Russia and a possible path for the rest of the world in the special nature of peasant culture. The radical populists were convinced that the peasantry possessed a special communal and revolutionary instinct which would eventually manifest in the overthrow of tsarist power and in the victory of socialism in Russia. On the other hand, the author admits that there were both a radical populist path and an opposite populist belief in the peasantry as the guardians of Russia's Orthodox, conservative social order. The author refers to the authoritative opinion of the Russian social philosopher Georgy Fedotov, who quite reasonably included some liberals, conservatives, and even the last tsar of the Romanov dynasty Nicholas II in the list of Russian populists: "*Narodnichestvo* colored many sections of Russian political life. The Marxists and Westernizers remained outside this trend, but there were *Narodniks* among the liberals of the *Kadet* party as well as among the ultra-reactionary Union of the Russian People… Least of all is one prepared to meet *Narodniks* among the Russian bureaucracy, and yet there was a whole department of the government, the Ministry of Agriculture, which was infected with populist tendencies" (p. 224)[5].

A special cross-cutting theme of the book is the relationship between populism and Marxism in Russia. The author argues that, in general, in the perspective of Russian

5. The author refers to: Fedotov G. P. (1942) The religious sources of Russian populism. *Russian Review,* vol. 1, no 2, p. 27.

Marxism in the late 19th century, populism was a version of Russian agrarian socialism which strived to acquire its basis in the peasants' rural worlds, while Marxist socialism proceeded from the development of industrial capitalism and the growth of the urban working class. He writes that "The Marxist version, first expressed in the 1890s, equated populism (of the revolutionary type) with any kind of Russian agrarian socialism — i.e., socialism based on rural, peasant institutions — that pre-dated the late-nineteenth-century advent of Marxism in Russia… The Marxist equation of populism with agrarian socialism was later accepted implicitly by many non-Marxist scholars and became the most common way of thinking about populism. The idea of populism as agrarian socialism has the advantage of providing historians with a clear target of analysis, but unfortunately it excludes all non-socialist expressions of populism (of the more general kind), and thereby distorts and minimizes populism's historical relevance" (p. 6).

Thus, a century and a half ago, the 'Russian peasant' was at the center of the disputes about the past and present of Russia, its fate, mission, and national character. Like the mythical Proteus, the 'Russian peasant' was constantly transforming, like into the 'bearded Orthodox man' for Konstantin Leontiev, who defended and expanded the borders of the Russian tsardom; into an embodiment of the communal spirit for the Slavophiles; into the driving force of the Russian history, which could revive even an exhausted Europe, for Alexander Herzen; into a representative of the God-bearing people for Fyodor Dostoevsky, and so on. The author refers to Hans Rogger's description of the Russian educated society's obsession with the *narod*: "Russians, insofar as they tried to arrive at a definition of the national character and its unique elements, had in one way or another to come to terms with the peasants as a phenomenon of Russian reality"[6]. However, the author argues that "while Rogger's list is long, he actually neglects to mention several other important peasant-centered movements and philosophies like those of Russian anarchists, the peasant Tolstoyans, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party" (p. 6). Thus, until now, the broad interpretations of Russian populism paradoxically bring together violent political antagonists, and add some mystic features to the Russian peasant's image in order to place it in the center of the opposing ideological directions.

The author explains his approach to populism metaphorically with a ring of concentric circles, i.e., he "considers Russian populism not as a temporal phenomenon, unfolding over time, but spatially" (p. 10). Since "the metaphor of concentric circles reminds us that populism was also the expression of a long-standing condition that faced Russian elites when they considered how to unite their divided society but kept running up against the intractability of the preexisting divisions. Aspects of populism in Russia could be found in everything from well-articulated economic arguments about the inevitable communalism of the Russian people, to the act of taking up residence in a peasant hut, to the simple decision to grow a long beard to signal one's preferences and affiliation. In the broadest sense, populism was the intelligentsia's attempt to envision a Russia that could transcend the divisions that defined it" (p. 11–12).

6. The author refers to: Rogger H. (1960) *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 172–173.

The first small circle in the very center is a dense and concentrated concept of populism as a whole, which had evolved by the middle of the 19th century and for which "the word *narodnichestvo* was first invented… the Russian people themselves could determine the path to the future, a path that would inevitably be collectivist and anarchist, and those on the right side of history, as good populists, must submit to the will of the people and accept the result, come what may" (p.10).

The second circle represents populism as a rapidly spreading populist agrarian socialism from the late 1860s to the early 1880s: "The populists at this level hoped to use the benefits of peasant culture and institutions to bring socialism to Russia, believing that the communalism Russian peasants practiced… could serve as a basis on which to transform Russia into a socialist/ anarchist federation through a popular uprising and sweeping social revolution… These first two rings of populism comprised that which the Marxists later labeled agrarian socialism" (ibid.).

The third analytical circle is comprised by those intellectuals who hoped for a peasant-centered revolutionary transformation of Russia, but did not advocate the fatal inevitability of the peasant socialist victory and institutionalization of the peasant-based communal socialism. The author includes in this circle "the founder of revolutionary populism, Alexander Herzen, who advocated what he called 'Russian socialism' but was intent on maintaining the blessings of Western civilization and full personal liberty, while hoping that a bloody confrontation could be avoided, ... members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party like Viktor Chernov, who continued into the twentieth century to regard the *narod* as the essential *raison d'être* of their revolutionary activism but still supported such 'liberal' institutions as electoral politics and representative government… These individuals and groups did not necessarily refer to themselves as populists [*narodniki*] (for some of them the word had yet to be invented), but it would be very difficult to see them as anything other than populist in orientation" (p. 10–11).

The fourth circle represents the widespread tendency among the Russian intelligentsia to use the peasantry as a way of understanding and interpreting Russia's history and destiny. The author mentions many Russian writers as members of this circle, including such great ones as Fyodor Dostoevsky and Leo Tolstoy: although they were skeptical about the revolutionary hopes of populist socialists for the peasantry, they still believed that the Russian peasantry was the key to the national destiny as a whole.

The last and largest circle of populist sentiments, the outermost circle, is defined as a widespread general opinion about the goodness of peasant life, the righteousness of the hinterland, the world of village values, the wisdom of ordinary rural people, that is, "the poor and downtrodden. It is highly visible because of its prominence on the world stage in the form of Russian novels, opera, painting, and poetry, and it can even, in a more remote sense, be found in rough-hewn wooden toys, or the present-day vogue among Russian city dwellers for living rustically in their country *dachas*. The cultural and artistic markers and memories that helped give Russia its sense of a national character based on the rural values of the *narod* also helped to fix and perpetuate the idea that the rescue and revitalization of Russia had to come from among the rural majority itself. This outermost

form of populism was not articulated as an ideology; it was experienced by educated Russians as a feeling of sympathy for, and admiration of, the *narod*, its environment, its history, and its 'unspoiled' Russian identity" (p. 11).

Thus, the author sought to present a panoramic overview of various directions of the Russian populist thought which aimed at overcoming the fatal backwardness of the country, and at finding a worthy place for Russia in the contemporary world. To provide such an overview, the author reconstructs the main stages in the historical development of Russian populism. The origins of proto-populism are defined as early as the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries in the people-loving sentimentalism of some enlightened representatives of the ruling Russian elite, as well as in the famous journey of Alexander Radishchev from Saint Petersburg to Moscow, who was compassionate to the peasantry and critical of the landlords. Ely considers some populist sentiments among the Decembrists, noting the radical populist spirit of the *Russian Truth* by Pavel Pestel:[7] "He was among the most far-sighted of the Decembrists and was more concerned about the welfare of the peasantry… attacked the social problem directly… called for the abolition of the entire estate system… condemned serfdom as 'a shameful thing, against humanity, against the laws of nature, against the Christian faith', and demanded 'freedom of the peasant from slavery'. In many ways, Pestel's view of the *narod* resembled that of Radishchev. He interpreted the peasantry's central problem as lack of political equality and called for an end to the injustices perpetrated against them (p. 25–26).

The author describes the formation of a truly systematic populist doctrine among the Slavophiles, who affirmed the priority of communalism and conciliarism for the Russian people, and criticized the bureaucracy of the Petrine reforms as having determined the split in the life and culture of Russia's various social strata. The author pays special attention to the ideas of the remarkable thinker and writer Konstantin Aksakov as "the most devoted admirer of the *narod* among the Slavophiles. So devoted was he to his vision of the Russian peasantry, and so innovative in his interpretation of the peasantry's significance in Russian history and society, that in spite of the multitude of differences between him and the later populists, one can make the argument that Aksakov represents Russia's first populist thinker" (p. 33).

The author also mentions such an opponent of the Slavophiles as Pyotr Chaadaev, who became famous primarily for his pessimistic assessments of Russia's past and future in his first philosophical letters: "Chaadaev's denunciation of Russian society was brutal and unrelieved by even a drop of countervailing hopefulness" (p. 13) and; "Chaadaev's condemnation of Russian aimlessness and lack of potential was symptomatic of an urgently felt need to take stock of Russia's place in a rapidly evolving modern world" (p. 14). Nevertheless, as the author rightly points out, in his subsequent letters, Chaadaev identified some positive opportunities for Russia in rethinking and reworking its historical heritage into new and better forms of national life. The author would write that "Chaadaev had argued that since Russia was a 'blank page' it could adopt or reject the lessons

7. The author refers to: Pestel P. I. (1906) *Russkaia Provda*, Saint Petersburg: Kultura.

of European history and thereby improve upon them. Herzen went further, contending that socialism in Europe was impossible because Europeans were fettered by what they had to lose" (p. 27).

The author considers the evolution of the views of Alexander Herzen, one of the brightest representatives of Russian populism, in detail. As an immigrant, Herzen was an included observer of the tragedies of the 1848 European revolutions, which made him radically rethink the populist concepts of the Slavophiles, Chaadaev's Westernism and the study of the German scholar August von Haxthausen, who published a book about the life and significance of peasant communities in Russia[8]. Ely writes that "Partly inspired by the Slavophiles, Haxthausen sang the praises of the commune as a bulwark against what he considered the pernicious influence of capitalism then sweeping across Europe. He argued that the commune had enabled Russia to retain the peaceful agricultural life of Europe's past that capitalism was rapidly destroying everywhere else… He praised the Russian village commune as the institution which ensured… the survival of the very sort of traditional small farming of which Haxthausen heartily approved. Like the Slavophiles, Haxthausen admired the agricultural life as a moral realm in which salubrious, age-old traditions would be upheld" (p. 43). Herzen formulated the hypothesis that the backwardness of communal Russia was an advantage over the bourgeois West in creating new forms of social life: in Ely's words, "Herzen assumed that Russia was destined for socialism because the vast majority of Russians were equal in their shared poverty" (p. 49).

The birth of the rebellious ideology of populism is described through the views of the great Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. However, Ely mentions that the first more-or-less systematic attempt to present a populist history was made by Afanasy Shchapov, while Pavel Iakushkin contributed to the populist hypothesis of classless identity with his methods of long-term ethnographic included observation. He would write that "Herzen's 'Russian Socialism' designated the village commune as Russia's vehicle toward a socialist future. The firebrand revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin declared the peasantry a revolutionary force capable of bringing about a cataclysmic change. The historian Afanasy Shchapov discovered a socially integrated society in Russia's past and imagined it as the key to forging an egalitarian future. The wandering ethnographer Pavel Iakushkin attempted to erase the boundary between *narod* and *obshchestvo* in his own person, both by spending time among the peasants and by dressing and living in a way that erased the traces of his noble upbringing. The radical publicist Nikolai Chernyshevsky advocated for a socialist, egalitarian future in ways that inspired generations of revolutionaries… The word 'populist' [*narodnik*] would not come into use until the 1870s, but this cohort in the 1850s and 1860s set the tone for their populist followers in the 1870s and beyond" (p. 42).

8. Haxthausen A. von (1870) *Issledovaniya vnutrennih otnosheniy narodnoy zhizni i v osobennosti selskih uchrezhdeniy Rossii*, Moscow: Tip. A.N. Mamontova i K°. The author refers to Haxthausen A. von (1972) *Studies on the Interior of Russia.* Transl. by E.L.M. Schmidt, ed. by S.F. Starr, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The author calls Nikolai Chernyshevsky a paradoxical populist, on the one hand due to his unconditional faith in the creative and revolutionary forces of the Russian people and intelligentsia, while on the other hand, due to his rejection of the specific nationalism of the Slavophiles and Herzen with their belief in the exceptional and globally significant positive qualities of the Russian community. Chernyshevsky was generally positive about Western progress but had strong socialist beliefs: Ely writes that "He understood the commune's coelacanth-like persistence into modern Russia to be a potential 'advantage of backwardness' Russian socialists could make use of, referring to it as an 'anti-toxin' against the debilitating side of capitalism and wage labor in rural Russia… Chernyshevsky, more than anyone else, set a new tone among the left-leaning and radical intelligentsia. He pointed the way toward a life of self-sacrifice and single-minded devotion to the cause that virtually all young Russian radicals found compelling… Chernyshevsky can be considered the individual most responsible for the rise of populist activism" (p. 65). As the author rightly notes, the peak of Chernyshevsky's popularity in Russia's populism coincided with the manifestation of the controversial generational problem of 'fathers and children', expressed in the populist calls for the intelligent youth's active action among the people.

Ely then shows how, in populist theory and practice of the 1860s-1880s, various heroic, selfless, and inventive attempts were made to go to the people in order to awaken their creative and revolutionary will, and how, among radical populists, the idea of terror's influence on the state apparatus of the Russian Empire and, ultimately, on the tsar, was becoming increasingly popular. However, the end of this populist orgy of humanistic terrorism — the assassination of Tsar Alexander II — turned out to be morally destructive and devastating for the populist movement. Moreover, in response to the assassination of the tsar, the police defeated the organizational structures of the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will), and almost all its prominent representatives were executed, imprisoned, or condemned to penal servitude. Ely writes that "How did they convince themselves that assassination of the tsar would lead to revolution in the Russian countryside when they were already well aware of the peasant distrust toward educated elites and parallel faith in the good wishes of the tsar? …One simple, though insufficient, explanation is that they had exhausted all other options — from propagandizing among the workers, to living in the village and attempting to ignite revolution there, to the deception of Chigirin, to urban public protest... Perhaps a spectacular act would finally shock the *narod* and/or *obshchestvo* out of its complacency… Other motives… were revenge against a state that had persecuted the populists for pursuing their revolutionary goals, ...outreach not to peasants but to the various sectors of urban society, including the liberal intelligentsia, the growing class of industrial workers, and members of the military" (p. 119–120).

The author concludes Chapter 5 with the statement that "The People's Will would disintegrate, but in a sense the populists' revolutionary ideology had already burned to ashes amid the flames of terrorism… Populism had reached a crisis point, but it would live on in the realms of art and ideas, and it would gain new life as a political movement in the early twentieth century" (p. 125). From the description of the end of the irrecon-

cilable bloody struggle between the People's Will and the tsar, the author proceeds to the analysis of the features of populism in Russian art and literature. He shows that Ivan Turgenev, Nikolay Nekrasov, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Leo Tolstoy made great contributions to the artistic description of the features and significance of the Russian national character (with the extended supporting quotes), but at the same time admits the deep internal ideological and artistic contradictions in the populism of famous Russian writers. These sections constitute the first part of Chapter 6, while its second part presents the reflections of populism in Russian art and music.

Ely argues that the Russian Itinerants created a complex picturesque panorama of the Russian national characters in their everyday life, in both sorrow and joy. Most of the works of this direction in painting are characterized by deep social and psychological realism protecting the human dignity of Russia's peasant and working people. The author pays special attention to Ilya Repin's works and his well-known painting *Barge Haulers on the Volga* (*Burlaki*), writing that "What is arguably the single best-known Russian painting of the nineteenth century was admired from its first appearance for dignifying the narod and locating within the people fresh strength. Ilya Repin's *Boat Haulers on the Volga*[9] managed to unite into a single image a condemnation of popular travail and an appeal for a better future… Boat haulers had long fascinated the intelligentsia as a species of human oxen, a forceful reminder of the dehumanization of the working class, and it was already a popular subject in literature" (p. 150–151). He continues by saying "More than just its initial impression of humans in harness, the wealth of contrasts and the food for thought Repin's painting offers help explain why it became an iconic image of the populist era" (p. 152).

The reflections of populism in music are considered in the examples of the works of the *Moguchaya Kuchka* (*Mighty Handful/Bunch/Five*), and especially in Modest Mussorgsky's operas *Boris Godunov* and *Khovanshchina*, writing that "Among the five, the composer who had been most closely associated with populism was Mussorgsky" (p. 154), who succeeded in depicting the dark depths of the Russian national history and in showing that the Russian people possessed powerful forces that often manifested in an extremely destructive and ultimately hopeless form. According to Ely, "Mussorgsky's fascination with the Russian people fits more comfortably with conservative strains of populism. In his work the *narod* does not come across as ideal, and certainly not communal, but especially in his operas the popular masses play a central role. In both *Boris Godunov* and *Khovanshchina* the key to an understanding of Russia can be found less in the main characters and more in the people as a whole; in both operas the fate of the country is the fate of the whole people" (p. 155).

The author reflects on the incompleteness of his chapter on Russian populist art, admitting that "So much more could be (and has been) written about the art and literature of the populist age. This chapter has examined only a minuscule sampling of the lives, ideas, and work of some of the best known and most talented artists of the period"

9. There two translations, either 'barge' or 'boat' haulers.

(p. 157). He concludes Chapter 6 with a promise that Chapter 7 "will shine a light on some more of them. It does so, however, not to understand their work or admire their creations but to show how their creativity reflected the agony of the populists as they began to recognize the limitations of the high hopes they had placed upon the *narod*" (p. 158).

In Chapter 7, the author returns to the social-political and publicist issues of populism at the end of the 19th century. For instance, he considers the economic-social experiments and observations of the scientist and landowner Alexander Engelhardt on the life of the peasants around him in detail. The author pays particular attention to the reflections and initiatives of Engelhardt[10] in the development of communal and *artel* labor, writing that "In the early 1860s, Engelgardt had written about his admiration for the village commune as a genuinely cooperative institution. He even made an appeal to young urbanites to go to the countryside to offer their services and to profit from living a simple country life… Engelgardt's letters consist mainly of commentary on everyday life in the countryside, weaving his own experience as a gentry farmer together with that of the local community… Like other writers in the populist era, Engelgardt had to meet the twin demands for unadorned realism and portrayal of the *narod* in a positive light. He accomplished the balancing act by blending a tone reminiscent of a field biologist describing an ecosystem — that is refusing to intrude his own judgment on what he observed — together with the repeated theme that he was studying and learning from the remarkable know-how of the peasantry, a know-how hard won in the daily struggle to manage a grueling life devoted to subsistence agriculture" (p. 163).

A special section of Chapter 7 provides a systematic comparison of the works of two once-famous populist writers-publicists, the 'pessimist' Gleb Uspensky and the 'optimist', Nikolai Zlatovratsky, explaining that "Although their outlooks were quite different, their mission to understand the peasantry was virtually the same… They both sought to understand who the 'real' peasants were and to convey that understanding to their audience of urban readers" (p.167). If Uspensky mainly emphasized the hard lot of the peasantry crushed by hard work, poverty, and the rudeness of everyday existence, Zlatovratsky sought to prove the importance of the simple folks' wisdom, and of moral relations in the communal life; here, "If Zlatovratsky was the optimistic idealist, always on the lookout for the praiseworthy sides of peasant life, Uspensky more easily gave way to despair and had to dig deeper and deeper to discover any positive message in the rapidly modernizing countryside" (p. 168). Thus, "it cannot be said that the work of Uspensky, Zlatovratsky, or Engelgardt was the sole cause of populist disillusionment, but collectively their work offered a powerful reflection of the growing sense of despair that populism's optimistic hopes for Russia's future may have been illusory" (p. 172).

In the last sections of this chapter, the author considers the evolution of populist political-economic ideology, and explains the growth of populist moderate reformist sentiments associated with the development of 'legal, liberal populism' and with the expansion of the theory and practice of 'small deeds'. In general, on the eve of the 20th century,

10. There two acceptable spellings, either Engelhardt or Engelgardt.

there was a deepening ideological crisis and disappointment in populist doctrines. On the one hand, the development of capitalism in Russia was becoming increasingly obvious; on the other hand, there was growing stagnation and destruction of the age-old peasant-communal foundations; here, "The 'crisis' in Russian populism was brought on in large measure by a series of gradually accruing discoveries. The village commune did not, it turned out, offer an easy path to a socialist future; the peasantry was not after all a tinder keg of rebelliousness; and peasant culture was not in reality the preserve of long-suffering virtue" (p. 184). Therefore, Marxism was rapidly becoming a new attractive political doctrine which convincingly criticized populist ideologists for their sentimental utopianism of agrarian socialism since "Marx and Engels regarded the populist trust in the power of the human will as naive and utopian… The first important Russian Marxist, Georgy Plekhanov (a former populist), labeled the populists unscientific and Romantic, afraid to face the raw facts of global historical development that Marx had understood" (p. 81).

The author rightly argues that there were no impenetrable borders between Marxism and populism in Russia. Many *Narodniks* knew the works of Marx and, like neo-populist Viktor Chernov, tried to "redirect Marxist theory so that it could apply to Russian circumstances" (p. 188), i.e., sought to organically incorporate the fundamental ideas of Marxism into the populist ideology. Ely is correct in his comment about the interpenetration of populist and Marxist ideas in the theoretical works and practical activities of Vladimir Lenin, writing that "Marxism faced some major difficulties when applied to Russia… Even after the emancipation in most ways the Russian Empire still somewhat resembled a feudal system, with a landed gentry, an autocratic ruler, and a mass of subsistence farmers supporting them… The Bolsheviks under Lenin saw Russian circumstances as unique and stole a page from the populist underground, favoring close party unity, conspiratorial techniques, and enlisting the support of the peasantry. The Bolsheviks also expressed ambivalence about revolutionary stages and welcomed the early advent of a workers' revolution" (p. 197–198). However, the author's assessments of the connections between Russian Marxism and populism seem too brief and missing details and explanations.

In the book, the beginning of the 20th century is correctly called a period of the growing contemptuous-skeptical attitude of Russian intellectuals to the issues of 'the people'. By referring to the bleak images of the peasantry in the works of Anton Chekhov and to the derogatory descriptions of the peasants by Ivan Bunin and Maxim Gorky, not to mention the cynical attitude towards the people among the Russian Decadents, Ely emphasizes the ideological breakdown and crisis of the traditional paradigm of the 19th-century Russian populism. He says that "So bleak is Chekhov's story that it comes across as a sort of counter-exaggeration in opposition to the long-standing tendency to idealize the peasantry… Chekhov's younger contemporaries, Maxim Gorky and Ivan Bunin, often showed a similar contempt for the peasantry... Part of this literary disdain for the rural poor was in keeping with the strictures of critical realism… But for some among the intelligentsia it would seem that disappointment in the peasantry had led not

just to renouncing the *narod*… but to laying some of the blame for Russia's troubles on their 'bad habits'" (p. 186).

In the last chapter, the author argues that "around the turn of the twentieth century a novel form of populism, often referred to as 'neo-populism', arose to play a central role in revolutionary Russia" (p. 188). The populist ideology got a second wind due to the neo-populism of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (SR). Its ideology supported the idea of uniting the revolutionary efforts of all Russia's working strata and estates instead of relying only on the peasantry. Here, Ely writes that "Chernov discarded the utopian vagaries about the promise of the commune and peasant-centered revolution that had bedeviled populism in its heyday. He put in their place an honest recognition of the rise of capitalism in Russia, the revolutionary importance of the urban proletariat, and a more fully worked out set of guidelines for how to foment revolution throughout Russian society... Unlike the Marxists, who separated the proletariat from the peasantry, and focused their attention almost exclusively on the urban working class, the SRs envisioned both classes together engaged in a single struggle to overthrow the autocracy and establish a more egalitarian society" (p. 190–191).

It was the Socialist-Revolutionaries who played the most important role in the organization and development of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, due to being the most massive and heroic revolutionary party at that time. However, as Ely convincingly explains, despite all signs of revolutionary leadership, the deep internal, often subjective contradictions, and the incoherent ideology and organization of the SR fatally predetermined their defeat in the struggle for power against the authoritatively united Bolsheviks. The author wrote that "As a result of their trust in democratic principles and belief that the people as a collective whole should determine the direction and pace of the revolution the SRs were defeated by a Bolshevik Party willing to take control in the name of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' and to govern without consideration for any opinion outside their own party line... The reasons for the Socialist Revolutionary embrace of democratic politics and their inability to stand up to the Bolsheviks… had deep roots in their ideology, their sense of purpose as a party, and the special conditions in which the Russian Revolution took place" (p. 207).

Certainly, a history of Russian populism by Christopher Ely is a bright and original book which provides a compelling perspective of the topic in a clear and accessible style, offering a comprehensive account of the rise, proliferation, differentiation, and influence of the populist ideology in Russia. However, there are some shortcomings, the presence of which the author admitted in the Preface as the inevitable results of the ambition to present such a diverse phenomenon in the widest perspective. The more-or-less competent reader would question the author's choice of certain representatives of Russian populism. For instance, why are so many pages devoted to the populist- anarchist Bakunin, while another populist-anarchist Kropotkin is just briefly mentioned? Or why neo-populism is considered mainly on the example of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and its leader Viktor Chernov, while at the beginning of the 20th century, there were many other no less remarkable neo-populist movements and personalities?

Perhaps, a more serious reproach of the book is that it provides the reader with too brief and fragmentary information on the historiography of Russian populism. Certainly, there are many historiographic references in the book, but they are rather unsystematic and mainly in English, while references to the works of Russian Soviet and post-Soviet authors are missing. There is a strong Russian historiography of populism presented by M.Ya. Gefter[11], V.G. Khoros[12], K.N. Morozov[13], A.A. Teslya[14], V.V. Zverev[15], and many others[16]. Moreover, the Russian reader may be surprised by the book's bias in the philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics of populism at the expense of the more traditional Russian focus on the political economy and the sociology of populism. In this perspective, the book lacks the so familiar reviews of the *zemstvo* and university economic-statistical, empirical and theoretical works within the *narodnichestvo* framework for the Russian reader[17]. In addition, although the author mentions the main contradictions between populism and Marxism, they are described too briefly and fragmentarily. Therefore, if the author purposefully ignored the works of the Russian-speaking authors, he could have at least referred to the works of Teodor Shanin, which explain the mutual influence of the ideas of Marx and *Narodnaya Volya*[18], and the essence of Leninist populist Marxism[19].

Finally, the book ends too abruptly with the fact that the Bolsheviks and Lenin came to power: "While some populists — the *zemstvo* 'third element' or the legal populists — managed to rest satisfied with a gradual approach to bringing about the greater good, they were not typical. More typical among the populists was the struggle to bring to fruition a utopian future and to do so as quickly as possible. That fixity on the perfect over the merely good led… to a revolutionary mindset… And when the Russian Revolution finally did take place… the Bolsheviks' own urgency, utopianism, and ruthlessness lay more in Lenin's populist inheritance than in his knowledge of Marxist theory" (p. 218–219). However, this does not mean that Russian populism turned into a memory after the October Revolution. The populist ideology has reproduced in both radical and conservative forms in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and has contributed to its analogues in

11.Gefter M.Ya. (2020) *Anthology of Populism*. Ed. by V.G. Vinogradsky, M.G. Pugacheva, M.Ya. Rozhansky, Saint Petersburg: Nestor-History.

12. Khoros V.G. (1980) *Ideological Movements of the Populist Type in Developing Countries*, Moscow: Nauka.

13. Morozov K.N. (2017) Socialist-revolutionary democratic alternative to the October 1917. *Petersburg Historical Journal*, no 4, pp. 144–157.

14. Teslya A.A. (2020) 'Slavophiles' in the populist perspective: Interpretation of Slavophilism of the 1840–1880s by M.K. Mikhailovsky. *Notebooks on Conservatism*, no 3,pp. 149–159.

15. Zverev V.V. (2021) To the anniversary of the half-forgotten book (V.P. Vorontsov's *Peasant Community*). *Russian Peasant Studies*, vol. 6, no 2, pp. 6–44.

16. *Paths of Russia. Narodnichestvo and Populism* (2020): Collection of articles by the participants of the XXVI International Symposium, vol. XXVI, Moscow: Publishing House 'Delo'.

17. Kuznetsov I.A. (2018) *Essays on the History of Agricultural Economy in Russia: 19th — Early 20th Century*, Moscow: Publishing House 'Delo'.

18. Shanin T. (Ed.) (1983) *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the "Peripheries of Capitalism"*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

19. Shanin T. (1990) *Defining Peasants: Essays Concerning Rural Societies, Explolary Economies, and Learning from Them in the Contemporary World*, Oxford: Blackwell.

other regions of the world[20]. Such a sustainable revival and actualization of the Russian populist ideas could have been mentioned and described in the book in more detail[21].

Certainly, it is impossible to systematically explain all the features of such a multifaceted and contradictory worldview and world-action as Russian populism in a single small book, but Christopher Ely succeeded in presenting in his fascinating narrative its deepest ethical and aesthetic roots. He created a sympathetic version of Russian populism, which can be called a humanitarian populism, as opposed to the historical courses on the political-economic populism familiar to the Russian reader.

Гуманитарный популизм

Рецензия на книгу: Ely C. (2022). Russian Populism: A History. Bloomsbury Publishing. 254 p.

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Schemmel C. (2021): *Justice and Egalitarian Relations.* New York: Oxford University Press. 336 pages

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The publication of a major work on liberal justice and equality in 2021 might lead one to believe that it is *just another* theory of justice alongside many others. Since John Rawls published his *Theory of Justice* more than fifty years ago, the number of academic works on this topic has become voluminous. As a result, they may naturally merge into a big blob of arguments, concepts, and proposals, the value of which is difficult to estimate.

Christian Schemmel's book *Justice and Egalitarian Relations* risks becoming *just another* theory of justice in a time when the questions and problems that Rawls raised in his famous work are gradually fading into the background, giving room for more relevant discussions such as global justice, the political philosophy of healthcare and education, social epistemology, etc. In order to avoid such an attitude towards Schemmel's book, I shall explore a context that we need to take into consideration when estimating the importance and impact of the book on political philosophy.

This context emerges from a discussion that has been called the 'luck vs. relations egalitarians debate'. It started in 1999 when the American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson published the essay *What is the Point of Equality*?, in which she expressed doubts that contemporary egalitarianism was taking the right direction. Post-Rawlsian theories of liberal equality as proposed by Ronald Dworkin, Gerald Cohen, Eric Rakowski, and many others, were largely focused on egalitarian distribution, setting aside questions concerning social status hierarchies and the value of equal relations between members of a political community. In a discussion around this essay, two camps formed, one being the proponents of the novel idea of relational equality, and the other being the defenders of mainstream distributive theories such as what is now called luck egalitarianism[1].

1. Prominent works on relational egalitarianism include: Anderson E. (1999) What is the point of equality. *Ethics, vol.* 109, no 2, pp. 287–337; Anderson E. (2008) How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks? *Theoretical Inquiries in Law,* vol. 1, no 9, pp. 239–270; Scheffler S. (2003) What is Egalitarianism? *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 31, no 1, pp. 5–39; Scheffler S. (2005) Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality. *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, vol. 4, no 1, pp. 5–28; Wolff J. (1998) Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos. *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* vol. 27, no 2, pp. 97–122.

For primers and elaborations of luck egalitarians, see: Arneson R. J. (1989) Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 1, no 56, pp. 77–93; Arneson R. J. (2004) Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 32, no ½, pp. 1–20; Cohen G. A. (1989) On the currency of egalitarian justice. *Ethics*, vol. 99, no 4, pp. 906–944; Lippert-Rasmussen K. (2015) *Luck Egalitarianism*, London: Bloomsbury Academic; Tan K.-C. (2008) A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism. *Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 105, no 11, pp. 665–690.

There is neither place nor time to judge this debate, or determine who might win or lose. As a relatively new theory of liberal equality, social egalitarianism[2] has been forged in the heated and tense atmosphere of an academic debate. However, its polemic nature results in the fact that its status as a theory was seriously unclear. In the strictest sense, relational egalitarianism was not *a theory*. Instead, it was rather a pool of arguments, critical considerations, and drafts of future theories, the majority of which have been left as such.

Christian Schemmel participated in the debate between luck and relational egalitarians on the side of the latter. His papers written in early 2010s have been included in the book as two introductory chapters[3]. Significantly, Schemmel does not give up on the critical focal points of the debate that is slowly calming down. His aim is to provide a systematic account of relational egalitarianism as a normative theory that has something to say about existing social inequalities. He is seeking to lay theoretical grounds that allow us to overcome these inequalities, and to offer practical recipes of how to do just that.

In other words, *Justice and Egalitarian Relations* is not *just another* theory of liberal equality. It is a first attempt at a systematic study of social equality, a theory created from scattered arguments and practical implications. Thus, we must evaluate this book from the perspective of how it addresses the context in which it has emerged, and which problems it solves within that particular context.

In general, in *Justice and Egalitarian Relations*, Schemmel intends to solve two problems. As said above, the first is to formulate a theory of relational egalitarianism. The second is to show its closest implications concerning distributive justice, healthcare, and political equality (p. 10–11). Accordingly, the book is divided into two parts: in the first part, Schemmel explores the conceptual grounds and limits of his theory of relational equality. The first part in turn consists of two introductory chapters and four chapters in which Schemmel presents his main argument in the book. In the second part, which consists of three chapters, he turns to the application of his theory to political equality, distributive justice, and healthcare.

In my review, I shall investigate two main points that will allow us to properly assess the place of this book in the egalitarian tradition. First, I shall explore the main argument of the book concerning the autonomy of relational equality and an interpretation of it in terms of non-domination, and then I shall assess Schemmel's view of distributive justice.

Let us turn to the first part of the book. In the introductory chapters, Schemmel demonstrates that relational equality is an autonomous ideal that is based on the expressive attitudes of agents, not on principles of egalitarian justice. We may deal with different situations of inequality that are distributively identical but expressively different[4], and they should be treated separately. Distributive equality does not guarantee that the

2. From here, I will use the terms 'social egalitarianism' and 'relational egalitarianism' as interchangeable, as well as 'social equality' and 'relational equality'.

3. Schemmel C. (2012) Distributive and relational equality. *Politics, Philosophy and Economicsm*, vol. 11, no 2, pp. 123–148; Schemmel C. (2011) Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions. *Social Theory and Practice,* vol. 37, no 3, pp. 365–390

4. In his 'V-scenario', Schemmel proposes to consider five different situations of inequality. In each situation a certain group of individuals does not have access to a certain good — in Schemmel's example, it is a medicine called 'V'. However, each situation differs from the others by the expressive attitudes of the state:

expressive attitudes of certain agents will be respectful of other agents. Similarly, a slight inequality of distribution does not mean that social relations in a given society are corrupted by inequality, status hierarchies, etc.

Thus, the problem of expressive attitudes requires an independent solution based on a concept of relational equality. Schemmel tries to formulate this basis, using the powerful idea of non-domination that was originally has introduced in political philosophy by Philip Pettit. Non-domination seems indeed an appropriate starting point: alongside social egalitarians, contemporary republicans prefer to think about justice, liberty, and equality in terms of social relations and their institutional framework. They see the root of all oppression and inequalities in domination, defined as an agent's capacity to interfere in certain choices of another agent on an arbitrary basis (p. 52). Moreover, the value of non-domination was recognized[5] before the publication of *Justice and Egalitarian Relations*. This strategy was not originally devised by Schemmel, but he brings it to a new level of conceptualization.

Schemmel turns to non-domination as an ideal that may be successfully incorporated into a liberal theory of equality. For him, non-domination is not an independent ideal, but an appropriate and plausible interpretation of what we may mean by relational equality. Individuals enjoy social equality if and only if none of them have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with the others' choices. An analysis of non-domination as provided by Schemmel is simultaneously a detailed account of existing neo-republican conceptions of non-domination and a proposal for a liberal alternative to them.

The main idea of what Schemmel calls liberal non-domination is that non-domination, if it is to be incorporated into a liberal account of equality, should be based on an idea of the moral powers of persons, namely their capacity to develop a conception of the good and their sense of justice. It distinguishes Schemmel's approach (p. 78–93) from those of Pettit, Forst, or Lovett: unlike republican accounts of non-domination, liberal non-domination presupposes a thick background in the form of the already mentioned concept of moral powers. This ensures that the understanding of non-domination in a given society will not depend on contingent factors such as culturally specific interpretations of fear, power, and honor. Additionally, it relies on the liberal notion of social cooperation, which guarantees the subordination between non-domination and other values.

The second difference between liberal and republican non-domination consists in what Schemmel calls the 'ethos of non-domination' (p. 116). The idea behind it is simple, but powerful: the law is an important institutional tool for promoting non-domination. However, we cannot achieve it fully by law only; there are spheres of human life, such as intimate relations, family, etc., which cannot be regulated by law, or which may suffer from strict legal regulation. In this case, we need to be sure that not only laws and other formal societal rules promote non-domination, but also individual attitudes that ground

in the first scenario, individuals of the given social group cannot afford V and the state ignores this problem, whereas in the last scenario, the state legally prohibits them from acquiring V by any means (p. 27–29).

5. See Garrau M., Laborde C. (2015) Relational Equality, Non-Domination, and Vulnerability. *Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals* (eds. C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, I. Walliman-Helmer, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 45–64; Sanyal S. (2012) A Defence of Democratic Egalitarianism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 109, no 7, pp. 413–434.

them. We need to leave some room for discretion, or else we may achieve an appropriate level of non-domination at the expense of sincere intimacy and voluntary social bonds.

The concept of liberal non-domination is a highly attractive alternative to its republican counterpart. Liberal non-domination allows us to interpret social equality in terms of protection of individuals from arbitrary power and, at the same time, to avoid the republican mistakes of cultural determinism and an obsession with legal institutional frameworks. However, there is an additional problem worth mentioning. Aside from other weaknesses of republican non-domination, Schemmel is particularly interested in rebutting Pettit's republican consequentialism, that is, the thesis that non-domination is a goal, not a deontological constraint[6]. Schemmel points out that this approach is not well-suited for liberal purposes as it cannot ensure that non-domination will be maximized with respect to equality. However, he does not provide an alternative. If republican consequentialism is wrong, what should we believe instead? Perhaps we should view non-domination as a set of absolute constraints, rather than turning to virtues that can be described as liberal in nature. Schemmel emphasizes the importance of ethos for liberal non-domination, but he does not give a sound answer.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that Schemmel's relational egalitarianism runs into a brick wall. Despite Schemmel's clear preference for the interpretation of social equality as non-domination, he does not limit himself to this. An extremely significant part of Schemmel's conception is egalitarian pluralism, an idea shared by many other relational egalitarians. Thus, non-domination is an influential part of the general egalitarian toolkit; however, it is just a part, and its claims may be supplemented by other independent claims of equality.

Let us turn now to the second part of the book in which Schemmel explores the most relevant applications of his theory. One of these pertains to a serious problem social egalitarianism encountered soon after its emergence, namely, distributive justice.

Considerations concerning distributive justice and equality existed in relational theory before Shemmel's work was published. Elizabeth Anderson argued that distributive justice must be subordinated to the pursuit of social equality and a sufficient level of welfare. This is in order for individuals to succeed as members of the democratic community[7]. This account has been justly criticized, as it leads to unattractive implications such as possible economic inequality *above* the 'sufficient level' of economic metrics[8].

Schemmel asserts that, in fact, relational egalitarianism actually implies a much stricter distributive position than was first acknowledged by both its proponents and detractors. A distributive theory based on relational equality is close to strict egalitarianism. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, severe constraints of economic inequality protect individuals from those who may have the opportunity to simply buy power and

6. Pettit P. (2002) *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Governmen*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–108.

7. Anderson E. (1999) What is the point of equality. *Ethics, vol.* 109, no 2, pp. 314–316.

8. Arneson R. J. (2010) Democratic Equality and Relating as Equals. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 40, no S1, pp. 32–33.

thus become dominant agents. Second, these constraints ensure that there will not be a social status hierarchy supported by economic power (p. 242–252).

Schemmel's conception of distributive justice is clearly distinguished from those of Anderson or other relational egalitarians. His arguments show that relational equality must be supported by distributive equality. Perhaps, after some development, they may form the foundation of one of the most promising theories of distributive equality. However, at this moment these arguments are rather instrumental considerations since Schemmel does not propose a theory of distributive justice in the form of a coherent body of high-order principles and their implications, primarily because he does not seek such a goal. Nevertheless, it leaves significant questions unanswered and leaves Schemmel's interpretation of distributive egalitarianism open to criticism, much like Anderson's sufficientarianism.

In general, *Justice and Egalitarian Relations* successfully accomplishes its goals. It proposes a theory of equality that in using both the liberal and republican experiences that combines their conceptual tools. This is in order to show that social equality is an autonomous ideal in the structure of egalitarian values. Turning to 'luck vs. relations egalitarians debate', Schemmel does not stop there, but goes on to formulate relational egalitarianism as a theory that is more than just a critical argument against opposing positions.

The work has some flaws, of course; however, they are not fatal mistakes. Rather, they are minor shortcomings, indicating that there is room for the further development of relational egalitarianism. The urgency for a more detailed and structured conception of distributive justice and a more thoroughly thought-out integration of non-domination into liberal egalitarianism may well catalyze further explorations and elaborations on the foundation provided by *Justice and Egalitarian Relations.*

The relational egalitarianism of Schemmel, like any other normative theory, has its limits and constraints, which should be taken into consideration while reading this book. *Justice and Egalitarian Relations* is a work that emerged in a very particular context and addresses very specific tasks. In particular, it means that arguments from this book are unlikely to convince those who do not share egalitarian values, and treat contemporary liberal theories of justice with suspicion.

Those who, in one way or another, are interested in recent discussions and developments in liberal and republican theory may find this book relevant and worth their attention. Schemmel's arguments will enable us to not only understand the main concepts of contemporary theories of equality, but also to go beyond academic prejudices regarding the relations between neo-republicanism and liberalism in recent political philosophy.

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

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I last saw Bruno on July 11. He was leaving Paris the next day for his country house, before the usual French date for the start of a summer vacation period (Bastille Day), since *les canicules,* the French term for heatwave, or the "dog days", if one deciphers the Latin etymology of this word, were about to overwhelm Paris. The weather was defining the schedules for most of us, if not all. We dined with Latour and his co-author, Nikolaj Schultz, at a Lebanese restaurant not far away from Bruno's apartment. I was interested in discussing the arguments of their last book on the ecological class in detail; they were more interested in what was going on in Ukraine. Hostilities in Europe, unimaginable just a couple of years before, seemed to have canceled out all climate change concerns for the time being. A conversation on the possible immediate doomsday for humanity as a

result of nuclear warfare made discussing the prospects of its eventual decline and death thanks to global warming a concern of secondary importance.

Before we parted, I asked Bruno a usual, crass professional question, "What are you working on these days? What are you writing about?". He responded: "I am not writing. I am reading. Do you know *La Grand Mort* by Rilke?". I was startled, since I never heard Bruno mentioning Rilke before. I could not easily continue the conversation since even though Rilke was one of the key figures of the pantheon of modernist authors (Anna Akhmatova would have called him one of those whales on which 20th century literature rested, although she usually singled out Proust, Joyce, and Kafka to be these three whales) whom one was supposed to know, but reading in the original was beyond me after only three years of unwanted university German classes. Having come home and searched the Internet, I easily found the relevant lines from the third part of Rilke's *Book of Hours*;

> O mon Dieu, donne à chacun sa propre mort,
> donne à chacun la mort née de sa propre vie
> où il connut la mort et la misère.
> Car nous ne sommes que l'écorce, que la feuille,
> mais le fruit qui est au centre de tout
> c'est la grande mort que chacun porte en soi.

A new translation of this poem into English renders the original German verses as

> O Lord, give each of us our own death
> a dying that is born of each life,
> our own desire, our purpose, love, dearth.
> For we are only rind of fruit, and leaf
> The great death, which each of us contains,
> Is that fruit round which all world turns.[1]

Rereading this part of the *Book of Hours* now, after Bruno's death, one is pushed to primitively find the key to the last days and hours of Bruno's life. Rilke wrote about the Great Death that develops within each of us during our life, and to which everything important in our life is connected. However, most of us do not see this fruit fully ripen by the time we reach our death; in other words, we do not bring it to fruition when we die. Instead, we die the death that is not our own, we do not meet our own death, i.e., this Great Death. This is why we fear to die, because our own, sweet death is not given to us at the end of our life. We die an alien, unwanted death, and we do not give birth to the Great Death we carry within us. Susan Ranson's translation renders the original German with the help of a metaphor of a caesarean that did not deliver a baby:

> We stand, Lord, year on year in your garden

1. Rainer Maria Rilke (2008) *The Book of Hours*, trans. Susan Ranson, Rochester, NY: Camden House, pp. 163–165.

Your trees for nurturing a sweet death;
But by the harvest we have grown sere,
And like the woman you have struck barren,
Close down, false to our promise, fruitless.
…
Surely we have whored with eternity
And we come to childbed to bring forth
Only the stillborn foetus of our death…
…
So die we all, like so many whores,
In labor pains, and from caesareans[2].

While reading the original German verses along with a faithful English translation by Ranson, we encounter the following vision. God can send an individual into this world who will have a mission of offering an example of the Great Death to the world. He will "await the hour, when he is due to bring forth death… alone and rustling like a green garden, and gathered in from far." In other words, this envoy of God will be "our own's death bearer" (*Tod-Gebärer* in German), a promise that all of us a capable of this as well, even if we do not usually possess this super-quality of dying a Great Death, of bringing it into full fruition. A calling of a true poet is to glorify this mission of the Great Death messenger, and laud this messiah[3].

The statement that Rilke thought about death throughout all of his life would be banal. Citing examples of his verses explicitly concerned with death would be easy. Shortly before his death, Rilke wrote to the Polish writer and translator Witold Hulewicz on November 13, 1925, saying that the "*Affirmation of life-AND-death appears as one in the "Elegies"*. To grant one without the other is… a limitation which in the end shuts out all that is infinite. *Death* is the *side of life* averted from us, unshone upon by us: we must try to achieve the greatest consciousness of our existence which is at home in *both unbounded realms, inexhaustibly nourished from both* … The true figure of life extends through both spheres, the blood of the mightiest circulation flows through *both: there is neither a here nor a beyond, but the great unity* in which the beings that surpass us, the "angels", are at home.

…[W]e must introduce what is *here* seen and touched into the wider, into the widest orbit. Not into a beyond whose shadow darkens the earth, but into a whole, into the *whole*"[4].

Heidegger cites this letter in his 1946 lecture "What Are Poets For?", given on the 20th anniversary of Rilke's death. He does not quote the same excerpt exactly, but rather the one that precedes the one that I have cited. For Heidegger, it is important to state that death stands in the way of a totally human, all-too-human drive for the objectification of the world. Together with Rilke, Heidegger stresses that animals or plants do not encounter the

2. 167.

3. 169–171.

4. *Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke (1948)* vol. 2: 1910-1926, trans. Jane Bannard Green and M. D. Herter Norton, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 373–374.

world as a world of objects. They are let into the Open of this world, they dwell in it. Modern human beings, by contrast, treat the world as standing before or in front of them. Humans consider the world to be a picture, a representation, so that they live "in front" of the world-picture rather than in the world. The Latin roots of the word "object" illuminates this condition: a thing considered as an ob-ject is an entity ejected in front, opposite and against a human being, it is something to be gazed at, analyzed by this gaze and then dealt with in an instrumental way. Moderns come to treat the world as a sum of producible objects in front of them, and life is understood as a generation and distribution of goods: every thing turns into a material for a self-assertive production or its result. Rilke's poetry is important to Heidegger because it reminds him of the non-objectifying, non-instrumental relationship with the world that true poets share. However, in a civilization oriented towards the betterment of human lives through material production and the accumulation of amenities, death is becoming something negative. Together with Rilke, Heidegger proclaims that we again need "to read the word 'death' without negation"[5].

Bruno Latour was a multi-faceted thinker, and while wearing his philosophical attire, he made fun of Heidegger's critique of technology and modern civilization in *We Have Never Been Modern*. However, Heidegger's lines bring our attention to Rilke's verses that Bruno was reading before his death: animals and plants die differently from the way we do it, because they are open to the world differently. Rilke wrote:

> Lord, we are poorer than the poor beasts
> Dying their blind death. For we have all
> Less than entirely died. Send us the One
> Who guides into our hands the precious skill
> To bind life in espaliers, where May
> Comes early, and the year's fruit advances.
> …
> Or is my arrogance too much? Are trees
> In the end better?[6]

In other words, beasts and plants do not fear their deaths; they are not trembling from the fact that the coming end might be not their own proper death. However, if the humans were able to cultivate their proper, Great Deaths within themselves, their impending factual deaths would not send shivers down their spines as not their own, alien, and alienated deaths. So, how can one cultivate such a Great Death within oneself?

Heidegger quoted the 1925 letter from Rilke to Hulewicz on the unity of "life-AND-death" because Rilke's late poems departed from the intensely Christian stance of his early poetry towards an interest in the transfiguration of the things of this world. Thus, his very specific relationship with death went hand-in-hand with a non-objectifying relationship with things. As Rilke wrote (Heidegger cited the last part of this excerpt):

5. Martin Heidegger (1971) *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 105–122.

6. *The Book of Hours:* 167.

"Nature, the things of our intercourse and use, are provisional and perishable; but they are, as long as we are here, our property and our friendship, co-knowers of our distress and gladness, as they have already been the familiars of our forbears. So it is important not only not to run down and degrade all that is here, but just because of its provisionalness, which it shares with us, these phenomena and things should be understood and transformed by us in a most fervent sense. Transformed? Yes, for it is our task to imprint this provisional, perishable earth so deeply, so patiently and passionately in ourselves that its reality shall arise in us again "invisibly". *We are the bees of the invisible. Nous butinons éperdument le miel du visible, pour l'accumuler dans la grande ruche d'or de l›Invisible*"[7].

In this quote, one can easily recognize what Latour was also doing. First, as he said in an interview, his text on "Irreductions" (on the irreducibility of one thing to another) was an early manifesto — perhaps a bit too Nietzschean (or Deleuzian?) — on how to deal with the variegated beings found in the world. This text had paved the way for a mature book on the modes of existence that he wrote about for almost 40 years. Second, the last years of his life were dedicated to caring about this perishable or ending Earth (if one can translate in such a way Rilke's term *hinfällge Erde*), so that it will arise again, transformed, and transfigured as Gaia. Third, his revealing insistence that modern techno-science is all based on apparatuses of visualization offers us a heretofore-invisible truth of what we are all doing when we are doing modern science.

The use of the word "transformed" in Rilke's last excerpt comes from the word *verwandelt* in the German original. *Verwandlung* in German means not only transformation (like in the title of Kafka's famous short story about Gregor Samsa that Bruno repeated in his last book on the consequences of lockdown), but also the Transfiguration of Jesus Christ as it is described in Matthew XVII:2. The term is also used as part of the church doctrine of transubstantiation (*Wesenverwandlung*), asserting that during the Eucharist, bread and wine are transformed into the body and blood of Christ. I should stress that the doctrine of transfiguration and the corresponding *theosis* (deification) as a goal for the life of humans is one of the central tenets of the Orthodox Christian Church[8]. It is well known that Rilke wrote his *Book of Hours* under the strong influence of his two visits to Russia in 1899–1900 in the company of Lou Andreas-Salome. He experienced an ecstatic transformation during a long and ornate Easter service in a Moscow church. After this, he sometimes called Russia his second Motherland and uncritically supported the statements about the simple Russian folk as a unique people carrying God in their hearts, harboring religious feeling in all its purity. During these visits he met Tolstoy, writing in his diary in 1900 that Tolstoy fought with a dragon called life with the vain hope of vanquishing it[9].

7. The phrase in French means "We ceaselessly gather the honey of the visible, to store it up in the great golden beehive of the Invisible." *Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke*, Volume 2: 1910-1926: 374. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* 1975: 128.

8. Timothy Ware (1964) *The Orthodox Church*, L.: Penguin, pp. 230–231, 239–242.

9. Azadovskii Konstantin (2011) *Rilke i Rossiia,* Moscow: NLO, p. 70.

Bruno's popularity in Russia is perhaps explained by this transfigurative, quasi-theological drive. Of course, his PhD on the exegesis of sacred texts and Charles Peguy was always important for Bruno in the way he treated reality, or in the way he constructed his objects of study, and on how he related to things that allowed him to not treat them as objects. However, few Russians, if any, read Bruno's articles on the pragmatics of religious speech acts, or his thesis on Peguy. However, Bruno's transfigurative approach to things was always appealing to the Russian audience. I remember once, when Harry Collins, a longtime friend and Bruno's competitor in science and technology studies, was teaching at the European University at St. Petersburg, he retorted to a group of bewildered local students: "Please, stop quoting Latour! I thought I was coming to St. Petersburg, but I came to Brunograd!".

Bruno loved Russian literature. I remember how he was impressed by Vassily Grossman's *Life and Fate*. This book is also about the life-death whole, of course, but another writer, Tolstoy was his explicitly favorite figure that helped him re-describe (should one say — transfigure?) the epochal breakthrough of the natural sciences in *The Pasteurization of France*. Rilke was part of a similar infatuation with Tolstoy, whose interests, first, in nature and, second, in the life-and-death whole he mentions in a letter to L. H. from November 8, 1915: "…his enormous experience of Nature (I hardly know anyone who so passionately devoted himself to studying Nature) made him astonishingly able to think from a sense of the whole and to write out of a feeling for life which was so permeated with the finest particles of death, that death seemed to be contained everywhere in it as an odd spice in the strong flavor of life…"[10].

Rilke then adds that Tolstoy, who depicted the fear of death lurking or suddenly awakening in the souls of many of his characters with such finesse, was afraid of death himself. Tolstoy's grandiose lasting achievement was that he composed a fugue of fear, or constructed a whole tower of fear. Bruno did not leave us a hint on whether he became a true Rilkean or whether he feared an impending end. However, if he did fear it, I should finish with Rilke's words about Tolstoy that apply to the grandeur of Bruno as well: "the force with which he experienced and admitted the very extravagance of his own fear may — who knows — at the last moment have changed over into unapproachable reality, was suddenly this tower's sure foundation, landscape and sky and the wind and a flight of birds around it"[11].

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10. *Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke*, Volume 2: 1910-1926: 150
11. 151.